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Preface 
The purpose ofthis report is to systematise the existing knowledge basis for 
high-speed rail lines in Norway and to evaluate previous reports and analyses 
at both national and international level. 
The work has been carried out in collaboration by an interdisciplinary, 
international team consisting of COWI AS of Norway, COWI Denmark and 
the TRANSPORT RESEARCH INSTITUTE (TRl) ofFranee as consuItants . 
The project manager at COWI was Selma Knudsen. 
The contact at Jernbaneverket - the Norwegian National Rail Administration -
was Lars Erik Nybø. 
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Summary 
The Norwegian National Rail Administration has commissioned COWI AS to 
review the status ofknowledge on high-speed trains in Norway up to 2009. The 
purpose of this assignment is to systematise the existing basis of knowledge on 
high-speed rail lines in Norway by evaluating previous reports and analyses at 
both national and international leve\. 
In this report, we have attempted to reveal the weaknesses and deficiencies in 
what has been done so far and to provide input on what has been learned and 
what is worth transferring from the measures taken in other countries with 
regard to the planning and introduction of high-speed rail , while at the same 
time giving recommendations and a basis for further investigation. 
The intention was to investigate and analyse severai important topics: market 
analyses, technical parameters for high-speed trains that are relevant for 
Norway, technical construetion issues (adapting to landscape and 
environmental effects), costs, implementation requirements, finance and 
socioeconomic effects. The most important findings in our report with regard to 
the stated topics are given below. 
Market analyses 
An assessment of the market basis is an essential part of the information on 
which a decision on developing high-speed rail lines in Norway can be taken . 
VWI, Urbanet Analyse and Norsk Bane have all investigated the market for 
high-speed rail lines in Norway. The reports of most relevanee for the section 
on market analyses are: 
VWI: Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway, 
Phase l , Phase 2 and Phase 3 
Urbanet Analyse: Markedetfor høyhastighetstog, (market for high-speed 
trains) report 9/2008 (UA 1) and report 12/2009 (UA2) 
Norsk Bane: Nytt j ernbane og trafikkonsept f or Sør- og Midt Norge (new 
railway and traffic concept for South and Central Norway) 
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The reports contain so few similarities that it would be difficult to speak about 
a consensus regarding the traffic basis for high-speed rail. There are 
consequently great differences in the suggestions regarding the market basis for 
high-speed raillines and the results are difficult to compare. 
The most important differences between the reports is their assumptions about 
what the relevant market for high-speed raillines should be. 
Norsk Bane uses a very broad market defrnition, first and foremost that the 
market for traffic in parts of the corridors is considered to be substantial. 
UAI uses a narrow market definition in comparison, but this is later 
extended somewhat in UA2. 
VWI uses a market defrnition that is not unlike UA2. 
Neither is there any consensus on what the foreseeable market shares are. It is 
difficult to compare the results of the different reports, since some of the 
differences in market share can doubtless be due to the differences in market 
definition. However it appears that 
Norsk Bane is the most optimistic with regard to possible market share, 
although the UA2 report also finds grounds for estimating a high market 
share. 
The market shares arrived at by VWI and UA 1 are seemingly relatively 
low, not least when considered against international experience. 
COWI's review of the status of knowledge on high-speed rail lines in Norway 
stresses the significance of defming the relevant market. When different reports 
are based on different market defmitions, the results will necessarily be difficult 
to compare and it is difficult to consider whether some results may be more 
reasonable than others. None of the reports gives any fundamental grounds for 
its market definition or provides any documentary evidence of the assumptions 
that have actually been made. 
Technical parameters 
The most relevant reports on technical parameters are: 
VWI: Feasibility Study Conceming High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway, 
Phase l , Phase 2 and Phase 3 
Funkwerk and Railconsult: High Speed Operations 
The VWI report is not in accordance with the present technical rules for speeds 
over 250 kph. Most lines must be upgraded in a later feasibility study, so that 
they are in line with the prevailing rules. The stretches of line that lie in very 
meandering valleys will mainly have a higher proportion of tunnel sections than 
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stretches in wider valleys that have the possibility of increasing curve radius, 
while at the same time having sufficient straight lines between the transitional 
curves. 
The vertical aspect also presents a challenge, primarily due to stretches, such as 
Geilo - Bergen, with long ascents and descents, since long descents can put a 
severe load on the brakes. Stretches with long descents should therefore be 
specially considered with regard to the feasibility of such a vertical curvature. 
In the existing material , the tunnel parts have not been studied at any detailed 
level. Proposing a tunnel length on the basis of a 1 :250,000 map is hardly 
sensible. In critical stretches, more detailed map sections should have be en used 
so that the tunnel could be placed in detail. An assessment of the tunnels could 
thus have been made more precisely. Against this background, the tunnel parts 
should be reviewed at a more detailed leve!. 
Funkwelt & Railconsult and VWI both concluded that the proposed operation is 
feasible using single track. This raises problems, since there is not one single 
example of single track high-speed rail line anywhere else in the world. Other 
countries have chosen not to use single track because this would make it 
impossible to adapt services in line with demand (rush hours and low traffic 
periods). This can lead in turn to the loss of passengers and ticket income. The 
proposal for single track rail lines should therefore be reconsidered. The costs 
saved by building single track instead of double track must be balanced against 
the operational flexibility that is lost and the costs and possible loss of income 
that this rigid form of operation involves. 
VWI assesses a form of operation taking into account the departure frequency 
and travel time for each corridor (a scenario for each corridor). VWI concludes 
with a speed of 250 kph and that Oslo-Trondheim should have a departure 
frequency of once an hour in the rush hours and every two hours otherwise. 
VWI gives no grounds for these conclusions, neither are they based on a 
specific traffic study. In order to be able to determine the optimum scenario, the 
effects of different fare leveIs, traveIling times, stopping patterns and departure 
frequencies should be studied in a traffic model. 
Technical challenges in construetion 
The most relevant report on technical challenges in construction is: 
VWI: Feasibility Study Conceming High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway, 
Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3 
Line routing 
The purpose of VWI's study, as regards technical issues involved in 
construction, was among other things to find the most realistic corridor to be 
investigated in more detail in future. A feasibility study was chosen so as to 
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illustrate the potential and the limitations of the various corridors. As we 
understand it, the screening of the various corridors in the VWI report was done 
in such a way as to arrive at a corridor and a route with the best potential for 
making positive use of high-speed trains. It does not appear that the other 
alternatives between towns have been considered and excluded. A later 
planning phase should therefore include a more thorough screening of the 
alternative routes in each corridor be fore the flnal choice of route is made. 
As an overall study of alternative routes in the num ber of corridors that were 
investigated, the line routing shown in the VWI report provides a good enough 
answer to the type of challenges presented by the various routes. The report 
also gives some very rough estimates of quantities. The technical rules have 
also changed in recent years. This means that the routes need to be revised. 
New requirements mean that routes through narrow valleys with many ascents 
and descents may require an even higher proportion of tunnel and have less 
opportunity to follow the terrain. 
There are further challenges relating to certain limited stretches that should be 
investigated further in later stages of planning. The greatest uncertainties relate 
to the routes in western Norway that have long tunnels beneath the fjords , long, 
high bridges with long spans and long tunnels and stretches with extreme 
ascents/descents. Greater consideration should be given to winter operations 
where the railways run high in the mountains, to see whether more 
comprehensive measures are required. This applies especially to the railway to 
Bergen. 
The routes vary greatly in form and are very distinct from each other. Some of 
them go right into and beneath the town centre (Haugesund), others pass just 
outside (Sarpsborg/Kristiansand), while others are a good distance from the 
town centre (Hamar). The routes therefore have very different speed proftles, 
since the curvature is reduced within and nearing certain towns. In terms of 
costs, a route that goes through a town will involve a higher cost per metre. 
Placing a route through the outskirts of a town can reduce the level of conflict 
and the technical issues involved in construction. 
Reducing the proportion of tunnel is and will remain a challenge for severaI of 
the routes. The routes with the lowest proportion of tunnel may prov ide the best 
opportunities for reducing costs, but this can also lead to greater environmental 
disadvantages. 
Environmental effects 
VWI's report provides very little information about consequences of 
environmental impact. The report only describes impact consequences under 
two cost elements: crossings and fences for wildlife. In this phase the cost 
should have been a percentage mark up in accordance with experience. As we 
see it these two items represent costs for mitigating measures for environmental 
impact consequences. 
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SeveraI of the alternative routes that have been investigated go through areas 
where they will affect and change areas of undisturbed nature and open 
landscape and that are currently registered as national parks. It is equally 
important to clarify these conditions as planning criteria for the track itself so as 
to consider whether the route is feasible at all. In some of the routes a choice 
must be made between developing or conserving. VWI's report provides too 
little information about the routes' effect on the environment and landscape to 
be able to consider the extent of mitigating measures, other than costs per linear 
metre based on experience of similar projects. 
Costs 
The most relevant reports on costs are : 
VWI: Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway, 
Phase l , Phase 2 and Phase 3. 
Metier: Concept Evaluation, Cost Estimate and Uncertainty Analysis -
Report I: Basic assumptions and methodology, and calculations for the 
corridor Trondheim - Oslo 
In general the studies prov ide a study of costs that is thorough, well adapted 
and relevant with regard to the different high-speed corridors in Norway. 
We have however identified some issues and uncertainties, including that the 
studies generally underestimate the unit costs of building new high-speed rail 
lines, especially with regard to tunnel costs. Metier's uncertainty analysis of 
2007 estimates an average tunnel cost of NOK 118,000 per linear metre for the 
Oslo-Trondheim stretch. Considered against other, comparable national tunnel 
projects, which have costs of around NOK 140,000 per linear metre of tunnel , 
this seems low. Building a high-speed railline demands a high quality of 
execution and solutions. All tunnels should be built with good security and 
concrete vaulting. Bridges must have proper foundations and open lines will 
require a solid foundation and execution, taking into account the demanding 
winter conditions we have in this country and the speed of the train. Against 
this background, we believe that the costs in the Metier report are too low in 
comparison to what is realistic. We should also point out that the unit prices 
Metier is operating with are based on development being carried out as one 
contract to build the entire stretch , which will therefore have economies of 
scale that are reflected in the unit prices. 
We also believe that VWI overestimates the total development costs somewhat. 
The estimates shown by VWI vary between NOK 200 and 450 million per 
kilometre of railway line. The figures are based on German cost rates from 
previous railway projects. To begin with this is a rather debatable procedure, 
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since the costs must be somewhat different because of the different topography, 
environment, population and land-use planning systems between the two 
countries. Secondly, the figures have be en estimated on the basis of single track 
with a relatively low speed. The low speed pennits curves of greater radius so 
as to be able to avoid running the route through residential areas. This means 
that the need for expropriation is reduced and land costs are lower. It should 
also be possible to propose routes with fewer tunnels , which will in turn reduce 
costs. 
Requirements for implementation and financing 
The questions of finance and how construction is to be implemented are c10sely 
interrelated. The review of requirements for fmancing and implementation 
shows that splitting development and fmancing is inefficient, since this slows 
railway construction and creates unpredictability. The review also shows that a 
public-private partnership can be advantageous if it is appropriately arranged. 
Success depends on how the public-private partnership is organised, and 
especially the specification of the contract. SeveraI of the studies recommend 
project fmancing that involves a total financing decision for the entire 
infrastructure construction. Various solutions for project management have 
been used in Scandinavia, such as tak ing out loans, annual grants with 
guarantees and grants for the entire project and infrastructure funding. 
For implementation of the development, a model should be chosen that ensures 
certainty about fmancing of the entire project and that provides the optimum 
division of risk between the principals. The model must prov ide the best 
possible incentives for cost effectiveness and for keeping to the schedule 
(although not at any price if safety and quality are at risk). The model should 
also safeguard the quality requirements and ensure a total view of all phases, so 
that quality in the operational phase is taken into consideration during the 
construction phase. 
Socioeconomic effects 
80th VWI and ECON have carried out cost-benefit analyses of high-speed 
trains in Norway. VWI's cost-benefit analysis is based on Gennan 
methodology, but inc1udes Norwegian unit prices to some extent. ECON is 
based on Norwegian methodology. A comparison of the socioeconomic 
analyses of high-speed trains made by VWI and ECON has revealed three 
important differences. 
Firstly, there is a difference between VWI and ECON regarding what effects of 
modal shift are inc1uded. In COWI's view, in this area ECON has ignored the 
potentially important elements in the socioeconomic use of high-speed trains. 
COWI believes that the German procedure is in agreement with the Norwegian 
National Rail Administration's guidelines for socioeconomic analyses, even 
though the technical calculation set up may be unusual from a Norwegian point 
of view. We also believe that VWI has not sufficiently investigated how the use 
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of the modal shift is quantified and valued and we can only wonder about the 
level of cost savings from transfer of traffic. 
Secondly, ECON has used a discount rate of 4.5 per cent, which corresponds to 
the recommended rate in Norwegian cost-benefit analyses. VWI has used an 
interest rate of 2 per cent, which corresponds to the German recommendation. 
About half the difference in calculated benefit between VWI and ECON is due 
to different interest rate estimates. COWI recommends that socioeconomic 
analyses of high-speed trains should follow ECON's procedure, that is with a 
discount rate of 4.5 per cent. 
Thirdly, unlike ECON, VWI has not included a tax financing cost. COWI 
recommends using ECON's procedure, which is in line with Norwegian 
practice. 
For future analyses, our recommendation is that new analyses should use a 
gross method that presents the effects for operators, trave liers and the public 
sector in detail. Neither VWI nor ECON have us ed such a procedure. The result 
is that the analyses are not very transparent and are difficult to com pare. It can 
also sometimes be difficult to fully understand the simplifications made in the 
reports as a result of the socioeconomic calculation not being completely 
detailed. 
AIso, the estimates of market share and time values are critical for calculating 
the benefit of building high-speed rail lines. There are no differences in 
principle between ECON and VWI's procedures. As shown in the market 
analysis however, there are other reports and experiences that question whether 
the area of competition between air and high-speed train is well enough 
represented in the VW! report. Questions may also be rai sed whether the time 
values that are used in the VWI and ECON calculations are representative for 
trave liers by high-speed train. New socioeconomic analyses should go into 
these issues in more detail. 
The ongoing development of methodology in socioeconomic analyses of 
transport investments may introduce new aspects that are not part of current 
practice: added benefit, real price development and the reliability of 
traveIling time. It is worth considering whether these should be included in 
further investigation into high-speed rail lines in Norway. Added benefit is 
particularly relevant for large infrastructure investments. 
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1 I ntrod uction 
A process is under way, the purpose of which is to identify the need for and the 
benefits of developing high-speed rail lines in Norway. The process has been 
facilitated by the government, and the Norwegian National Rail Administration 
has full responsibility for leading the work of investigation. 
A good deal of independent input has been obtained from severai seminars and 
public enquiries. A number of studies and analyses have also been carried out 
that prov ide input on the market and the soeial and environmental effects of 
such a development. 
The Norwegian National Rail Administration has commissioned COWI AS to 
review the status ofknowledge on high-speed trains in Norway up to 2009. The 
purpose of this assignment is to systematise the existing basis of knowledge on 
high-speed rail lines in Norway by evaluating previous reports and analyses at 
both national and internationallevel. 
In this report, we have attempted to reveal the weaknesses and deficieneies in 
what has been done so far and to prov ide input on what has been learned and 
what is worth transferring from the measures taken in other countries with 
regard to the planning and introduction of high-speed rail, while at the same 
time giving recommendations and a basis for further investigation. 
1.1 Why high-speed 
High-speed rail lines have been evaluated in many parts of Europe and other 
parts of the world as a means of improving transport facilities. High-speed rail 
could be a competitive alternative to air travel. For example, there is no longer 
a Paris-Brussels air route, since it has been replaced by high-speed train. 
The term high-speed train is us ed to cover all trains that run at over 250 kph on 
new track or 200 kph on upgraded track. This defmition is not precise however 
and it varies from country to country. Regardless of the precise speed, it is 
evident that such trains demand very special infrastrueture, operations and 
maintenance. 
Conventional railways in Norway (normal trains) maintain a speed of under 
100 kph, while trains in the rest of Europe run at 150-200 kph. Norway does 
not currently have a high-speed network, but one line, which is the Gardermoen 
line. This is constructed for speeds of 210 kph. 0stfold-Sandbukta on the 
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Østfold line is designed for speeds of 200 kph, but with the current signal 
system the trains cannot run at more than 160 kph. 
Experience shows that great time savings can often be made by choosing high-
speed train instead of air, especially for destinations that are some distance 
from the airport. It is also often more comfortable to travel by train , since one 
avoids having to change means of transport along the way, as well as the 
waiting time and security checks at the airport . 
The introduction of high-speed trains opens up completely new possibilities for 
the transport of both people and goods. Longer distances become practicable 
and commuting can cover a much wider geographical area than in the current 
situation. From a regional policy perspective, this can lead to significant 
changes in employment and residential patterns . 
A natural consequences in the longer term is expected to be that a great deal of 
car traffic will go over to train, because it represents a more pleasant, 
comfortable and, not least, faster means of travel. In addition to taking the 
pressure off the road network, such measures also lead to considerable 
environmental gains. This is a natural consequence of transferring transport 
from road to rail and, in addition to the socioeconomic benefits, it is one of the 
most important, indeed decisive, factors in the choice of future transport 
solutions. 
Even so, establishing high-speed rail lines is not without its problems, since the 
construetion costs are great and there will necessarily be a not inconsiderable 
impact on the landscape. The question of development has given rise to much 
debate between proponents and opponents. It is therefore important to obtain 
information, which is something to which this summary of knowledge status is 
intended to contribute. 
1.2 The commission 
The purpose of the commission is to 
give a summarised, brief and technically focused presentation of the 
investigations that have been made in Norway 
discuss specifically the report recently presented in Sweden: sau 2009:74 
Hoghaslighelsbanor - elt samhallsbygge for slarkt utveckling och 
konkurrenskraft (High-speed rail lines - a social structure for strong 
development and competitiveness) 
give an overview of relevant international studies 
provide a good basis for seeing weaknesses and deficiencies in what has 
been done to date 
provide input on what has been learned and what is worth transferring 
from what has been done in other countries 
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provide a basis for programming further investigations 
Topics that the Norwegian National Rail Administration wanted covered 
included: 
the market analyses 
technical parameters for high-speed trains that are relevant for Norway 
technical construction issues - adapting to landscape and environmental 
effects 
implementation requirements 
costs 
financing 
social effects, including socioeconomic evaluations 
1.3 The basic material 
The Norwegian National Rail Administration provided COWI with the 
following studies: 
Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway Report 
Phase l, 2006, VWI 
In July 2006, the Norwegian National Rail Administration engaged VWI of 
Germany and its partners to perform consequence analyses for the following 
corridors: 
Oslo - Gøteborg 
Oslo - Stockholm 
Oslo - Trondheim 
Oslo - Bergen 
Oslo - Kristiansand/Stavanger 
Combinations of these corridors 
The report includes market analysis, traffic prognoses and technical aspects. 
Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway WP 
100: High-Speed-Basic-Analysis, 2006, VWI 
The report describes technical aspects of conventional railways and high-speed 
rail in other countries. 
Høyhastighets Jernbane i Norsk Terreng Noen karakteristiske trekk ved 
grunnforhold og topografi og tilpassende løsninger og kostnader (High-
speed rail in Norwegian terrain. Some characteristics of ground conditions 
and topography and suitable solutions and costs), 2007 , SINTEF and NGI 
00W1 
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The report includes unit costs for the construction of high-speed rail in Norway 
and a discussion of line routing. Technical requirements and physical 
conditions are of great significance for solutions and costs. The report explains 
some of the key connections on a general basis. 
Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway Report 
Phase 2, 2007, VWI 
The report analyses the Oslo-Bergen and Oslo-Kristiansand/Stavanger corridors 
with a view to line routing, construction costs, operations, traffic and co st-
benefit. 
Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway Report 
Phase 3, November 2007, VWI 
The report analyses the Oslo-Trondheim and Oslo-Gøteborg corridors with a 
view to line routing, construction costs, operations, traffic and cost-benefit. 
This is less detailed than phase 2. 
High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway Concept Evaluation, Cost Estimate 
and Uncertainty Analysis Report l: Basic assumptions and methodology, 
and calculations for the corridor Trondheim - Oslo, 2007, METIER 
The report presents assumptions, method and calculations for the Trondheim -
Oslo corridor. 
Statement on the VWI report, 2007, Norsk Bane AS 
The document gives a critical assessment of the analyses carried out by VWI. 
Høyhastighet og kapasitet High Speed Operations, 2008, Funkwerk and 
Railconsult 
The purpose of this study is to ensure and improve the robustness of the 
infrastructure by answering the following questions: 
- Is it advisable to integrate high-speed trains with other train traffic in Oslo's 
Intercity area? 
- Is it advisable to run high-speed trains at a frequency of one or two hours on 
single track? 
Nyttekostnadsanalyse av høyhastighetstog i Norge (Cost-benefit analysis of 
high-speed trains in Norway), 2008, EC ON 
The purpose of the report was to give a professional, neutral and independent 
quality assurance of the cost-benefit analyses presented in the VWI group's 
report and compare this with the Norwegian methodological too]s used by the 
Norwegian National Rail Administration. A further purpose was to determine 
the main principles for cost-benefit methodology for any further investigation 
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and planning work regarding the construetion of high-speed raillines in 
Norway. 
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Markedet for høyhastighetstog i Norge Supplerende markedsanalyse basert 
på anvendelse av den nasjonale persontransportmodellen NTM5 (The 
market for high-speed trains in Norway; Supplementary market analysis 
based on the applieation of the national passenger transport model 
NTM5), 2008, U rbanet Analyse 
This report is a supplementary market analysis and gives supplementary traffic 
prognoses to VWI's report. The analysis is based on the NTM5 model, which is 
the national passenger transport model developed for NTP Transportanalyser. 
This model has been used in many previous studies of long-distance travel in 
Norway. 
Samfunnsmessige virkninger av ulik organisering av jernbaneutbygging i 
Norge (Soeial effeets of various ways of organising railway development in 
Norway), 2008, Agenda Utredning & Utvikling AS 
The purpose ofthis report was to study social effects oftypical rail 
development projects in Norway to ca1culate how much of the value 
creation in the project would come to Norwegian business, which industries 
would be most affected and what employment effects the development 
project would have on Norwegian society. Various organisational models 
are diseussed. 
Samferdselskonsept for Sør- og Midt-Norge (Transport eoneept for South 
and Central Norway), Part report 2008, Deutsehe Bahn 
The report summarises the results presented in "Jernbane- og trafikkonsept for 
Sør- og Midt-Norge, Sammendrag, Rapport mai 20091/ (Railway and traffic 
concept for South and Central Norway, Summary, Report May 2009) below. 
Markedet for høyhastighetstog i Norge Analyse av flypassasjerenes 
preferanser (The market for high-speed trains in Norway; Analysis of air 
passengers' preferenees), 2009, Urbanet Analyse 
The analysis diseusses passengers' preferences for high-speed trains, in terms of 
both the value of shorter trave Il ing time and preferences for trains of a higher 
standard. The analysis is bas ed on a questionnaire survey of air passengers. 
This provides a basis for studying preferences and travel behaviour in more 
detail and assessing effects that are not generally covered in NTM5. 
Jernbane- og trajikkonsept for Sør- og Midt-Norge, Kapitel l og 2 (Railway 
and traffie eoneept for South and Central Norway, Chapters l and 2), 
2009, Deutsehe Bahn 
The report analyses resuIts from VWI's report and includes various traffic data. 
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Jernbane- og trajikkonsept for Sør- og Midt-Norge, sammendrag (Railway 
and traffic concept for South and Central Norway, summary), May 2009, 
Deutsche Bahn 
The report presents line routing altematives, construction costs and traffic 
prognoses. 
Hoghastighetsjarnvagar - ett klimatpolitiskt stickspår (High-speed railways -
a c1imate policy siding), July 2009, Jan-Eric Nilsson, Roger Pyddoke 
The report investigates existing j udgements of the socioeconom ic benefits and 
discusses the role ofrail investment in climate policy . The report is intended to 
contribute to a c1arifying debate on the extent to which a major focus on high-
speed rail is a climate policy necessity. 
Hoghastighetsbanor - ett samhallsbygge for starkt utveckling och 
kon ku rrenskraft, (High-speed rail lines - a social structure for strong 
development and competitiveness), 2009, Statens Offentliga Vtredningar 
(SOV 2009:74) 
The purpose of the report is to investigate the preconditions for high-speed rail 
development in Sweden. The report looks at whether the development of high-
speed rail lines could hel p to achieve socioeconomically effective and tenable 
transport solutions for a developed transport system with improved capacity, 
navigability and accessibility. 
Høyhastighetstog i Norge (High-speed trains in Norway), The Norwegian 
National Rail Administration 
This brochure is the Norwegian National Rail Administration's summary of the 
VWI group's assessments and results . The presentation of costs is similarly 
based on the reports of the Metier consultancy company. 
Høyhastighetsringen and Norsk Bane 
Ameeting was also held with Høyhastighetsringen, whose general manager Jon 
Hamre presented their concept. COWI also attempted to hold a similar meeting 
with Norsk Bane, without success. 
1.4 Description of method 
The Norwegian National Rail Administration specified the topics that were to 
be investigated in the basis for tender. It was COWI's hypothesis that the 
various topics would to a certain extent require specially tailored methods of 
investigation. The strategy of methodology is however common and COWI 
therefore believed that it would be appropriate to outline this in a separate 
section on method. 
Our original proposal for method sprang from the fact that the previous reports 
had come to different conclusions regarding whether high-speed trains are 
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socioeconomically beneficial. The hypothesis was that these differences partly 
stemmed from the reports having drawn on different factors in their analyses 
and partly that the critical factors that are common to all the reports were 
differently valued. 
In this project we therefore wished to systematically compare the assumptions 
and what factors the analyses incIude. Such a comparison would prov ide 
insight into why different analyses have arrived at different results and 
concIusions. 
We also wished to compare the sensitivity analyses that had be en made in the 
different reports. This would provide an overview of how uncertainty has thus 
far been revealed in the work of investigation, while also providing a basis for 
assessing which sensitivity analyses future studies should employ. 
We also ai med to compare how risk is assessed and handled in the different 
reports, as regards both systematic and unsystematic risk. This comparison 
would reveal which factors have been assessed as subject to risk and in which 
ways this has be en corrected in the analyses. 
Table 3.1 illustrates how we wished to systemise the knowledge that already 
exists about high-speed trains. Analysis 1, 2 etc. are the publications/reports 
that are listed on page 6 of the specification of requirements from the 
Norwegian National Rail Administration. The factor rows illustrate 
assumptions, variables, parameters etc. that should be compared right across the 
different analyses. We would also organise the comparison and systemisation 
of results and conclusions in the same way. 
Table 2.1: Model for systemising and comparing experiences 
Analysis 1 Analysis 2 Analysis 3 Analysis n 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
Factor 3 
Factor m 
It is been shown in practice that the analyses in the reports we have assessed 
have not been sufficiently systematically documented to allow us to use the 
method we originally intended. Rather, it has been the case that the reports 
differ greatly in their choice of method and approach with reg ard to the 
individual assumptions, variables and parameters used in the analyses. It has 
not therefore been possible to establish a common analysis form to systemise 
the information in all the reports that have been reviewed, as illustrated in the 
figure. 
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Instead of using a common method of comparing the results of the various 
reports, we have therefore used different different approaches in the different 
sections of the report. Where relevant, the method used for the individual topics 
will be explained. 
The somewhat diverse range of methodologies for the individual reports means 
that the existing reports can hardly be said to represent a collected basis of 
information. Only in a few are as is it possible to show where different reports 
arrive at comparable results and there is a consensus on important issues. The 
basis for future work on high-speed rail must therefore be characterised as 
somewhat fragmented. 
1.5 Organisation of the report 
In section 2 we look at international experience. Today many countries have 
high-speed trains and have therefore accumulated a great deal of experience. 
Much ofthis experience can usefully be inc1uded in any investigation into high-
speed rail in Norway. For future work it will be especially useful to look at 
what aspects have been discussed and what conclusions have been reached in 
our neighbouring country Sweden. We discuss this in section 2, along with 
what is considered best practice internationally. 
The subsequent sections will cover the various topics that the Norwegian 
National Rail Adrninistration wished to have investigated. These sections 
prov ide a technically focused and independent presentation of the investigation 
work that has be en done in Norway. Section 3 covers the market analyses. 
Section 4 disc us ses technical parameters, while section 5 looks at technical 
issues involved in construction. Costs will be evaluated in section 6. Sections 7 
and 8 assess the requirements for irnplementation and financing, as well as the 
socioeconomic effects of high-speed rail . 
Finally , section 9 gives recommendations for further work on high-speed rail in 
Norway. 
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2 Experience internationally 
2.1 The Swedish report sau 2009:74 
sau 2009:74 investigates the assumptions and preconditions for building high-
speed rait lines in Sweden. Its main conclusion is positive, as regards 
developing high-speed raillines rather than upgrading the existing rail network. 
As far as Norwegian investigations are concerned, it is useful to look at what 
aspects have been diseussed and what conclusions have been reached in 
Sweden regarding transport policy objectives, environmental consequences, 
socioeconomics, technical aspects and choice of route. We also note the 
proposed model for implementation and financing. It is also interesting to look 
at the possibilities of connecting to the European rail network, and here Norway 
is naturally dependent on Sweden. 
With regard to Swedish transport policy objectives, high-speed rail gets a 
"positive" or "strongly positive" score in all the objectives assessed (briefly , 
these cover improvements for the population, business, regions etc.). As 
regards the environment, an impact on the landscape is unavoidable, but the 
negative effects can be reduced by locating the routes outside the most 
vulnerable areas. Moreover, high-speed rail will help lower emissions from 
transport. 
Relevant routes for development are diseussed, but more analysis is needed. 
The recommendation is to build a separate double track, and for passenger 
traffic only. Socioeconomic analyses have been carried out for the Stockholm -
Malmø and Stockholm - Gøteborg routes that show a positive net benefit. It is 
pointed out that the results are uncertain and that there is a need for more 
thorough analysis of the socioeconomic aspect. 
A model is proposed for implementation and financing. This would involve the 
government establishing a project company to coordinate planning, public 
proeurement and future agreements regarding high-speed rail. The rolling stock 
is the operators' (rail traffic companies') responsibility. The project can be 
partly fmanced from non-government sources by means of charges to the 
operators for the use of the track and contributions from local authorities, 
regions and the EU. Income from traffic would also prov ide part of the 
financing. The ne ed for government finanee is assessed at almost half (47 per 
cent), or SEK 59 billion. It should be one, collective project. 
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2.2 Best Practice 
Every country that has introduced high-speed rail travel has its own best 
practice for construction and operations and underlying reasons for the choice 
of its system. Line routings and the location of stations also provide specific 
grounds for system choice. Tracklaying and the pattem of stations are also 
specific, since they are based on sociodemographic and topographical 
conditions, and so is rail policy in each country . 
A high-speed rail line is not really a specific system, but rather a set of 
construction criteria that perm it high-speed rail travel. 
EC Oirective 96/58 defines high-speed rail as systems of rolling stock and 
infrastructure that regularly operate at or above 250 kph on new tracks or 200 
kph on existing ones. 
Compared with the world's other high-speed rail systems, Norway is a special 
case for the following reasons: 
A high level of domestic air travel and therefore strong market potential 
for high-speed rail 
A high gross domestic product (GOP) per head of population and strong 
growth within the market segment in question 
Low population density in the relevant high-speed corridors 
It is generally considered that the nature of Norway's topography is particularly 
difficuIt for the development of high-speed rail lines, but this is not the case. 
Japan , France, Italy, Taiwan and South Korea have alI either buiIt or are 
building high-speed raillines in similar or more difficult terrain to that found in 
Norway. l 
2.3 Comparison 
We cannot say that there is any clear best practice for high-speed rail lines, but 
rather leading categories of high-speed rail lines in each country. These 
categories correspond to the countries' specific needs and can be defined in the 
following way: 
1. Very high speed with straight line routings and few stops 
2 . Regional high-speed raillines with more stops and lower speed 
3. Low costs and few cuttings with tilting trains and lower speeds 
lThe construction of the high-speed line from Lyon to Turin is an obvious example. More 
examples are described in the section on building costs. 
Status of knowledge on high-speed rail in Norway 23 
4, Maglev systems with very high speed, straight line routings and few stops 
The table below gives a summary of the world's high-speed systems divided 
into the four categories above, We should note that the categorisation below is 
based on average speeds of rail lines for high-speed trains and no allowance is 
made for type of rolling stock (manufacturer), Neither are cases where high-
speed trains operate on conventional lines at lower speed taken into account. 
We can see that the regional type of high-speed rail is the most widespread 
practice, closely fol1owed by type 1 based on very high speeds with straight 
line routings and few stops, 
T bl 21Th a e .. e wor Id' h' h s Igl -spee d 'I rat systems d' 'd d' lVI e mto d'fD I erent categones 
Categor Totallength Record speed on A verage speed Country with high Scheduled trains for scheduled y 
speed (km) test run trains 
2 Austria 250 230 kph 275 kph 153 kph 
I Belgium 326 300, 250 kph 347 kph 237 kph 
431 kph maglev 502 kph maglev 1, 2 and China 350, 330,300, 250, 
4 6003 200 kph 394 kph 313 kph 
conventional conventional 
3 Finland 60 220 kph 255 kph 152 kph 
1 Franee 1700 320, 300, 280, 574 kph 272 kph 210 kph 
Germany 
300, 280, 250, 550 kph maglev 
2 1290 230 kph 406 kph 226 kph 
( conventional) conventional 
3 Italy 815 300, 260, 200 kph 368 kph 178 kph 
Japan 300, 275, 260 kph 
581 kph maglev 
1 and 4 2459 443 kph 256 kph (conventional) 
conventional 
2 Netherlands 100 300,250, 336.2 kph < 140 kph 140/ 160 kph 
2 Norway 60 210 kph 260 kph 15 1 kph 
3 Portugal 314 220 kph 275 kph < 140 kph 
2 Russia 600 250 kph 290 kph 172 kph 
2 South Korea 240.4 300,240 kph 355 kph 200 kph 
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Categor Totallength Record speed on Average speed Country with high Scheduled trains for sched uled y 
speed (km) test run trains 
I Spain 127.3 300, 250 kph 404 kph 236 kph 
3 Sweden O 200 kph 303 kph 173 kph 
2 Switzerland 79 250, 200 kph 280 kph < 140 kph 
I Taiwan 335.5 300,240 kph 315 kph 245 kph 
2 Turkey 245 250 kph 303 kph < 140 kph 
United 
2 Kingdom 109 300 kph , 201 kph 335 kph 219 kph 
3 USA O 241 kph , 20 l kph 296 kph 161 kph 
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3 Market analysis 
An assessment of the market basis is an essential part of the information on 
which a decision on developing high-speed rail lines in Norway can be taken. 
The result of such an analysis will contain severai important components that 
can be us ed in an associated socioeconomic assessment of making such an 
investment, for example 
• traffic basis for high-speed rail 
• time values for passengers on high-speed trains 
• the area of competition with other forms of transport 
3.1 Method 
It is possible to use many different approaches for analysing the market for 
high-speed rail travel in Norway. What they all have in common however is 
that there is considerable uncertainty attached to the conclusions. A particularly 
demanding challenge is that high-speed rail travel will be something 
completely new in the Norwegian market. Important characteristics affecting 
demand, such as price level , time values etc., cannot be estimated by observing 
actual behaviour. Instead we are forced to make assumptions on a more or less 
well-founded basis, on the basis of international experience for example. 
Another problem as regards method is that we cannot really say that any one 
procedure is the correct one to use on a completely general basis. Instead, 
specially adapted methods and tools are often used to analyse competitive 
conditions in a market. In some cases, game theory models for strategic 
behaviour will be relevant. In other cases, optimising models for estimating 
cost-minimising solutions will be preferable. A third alternative is to carry out 
surveys to identify consumer preferences for new options in relation to existing 
solutions. Different models complement each other rather than be ing pure 
alternatives. Since no one model or method is correct, it can often be an 
advantage to consider an issue from different angles. 
Having to summarise the knowledge base for high-speed rail travel is 
methodically demanding in itself, not least be ing able to systemise the are as in 
which different reports have used different assumptions. We have therefore 
chosen to use a relatively general method that is used for cases of competition, 
that is to say in cases where the authorities assess the competitive conditions in 
a market (usually to decide whether a company has a so-called dominant 
OOWI 
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market position or to assess whether a merger between two companies would 
give toa strong a market position). 
The assessment of an issue of competition is usually in two parts. In this 
context the two stages are useful , because in stage one a clear defrnition must 
be made of the alternatives high-speed rail travel is actually competing with. 
Delimitation of the relevant market: The specific basis for the market 
delimitation is an analysis ofwhich products or services can actually be 
substituted with each other. Assessing the conditions for substitution 
should primarily be based on whether two or more products can satisfy the 
same need in the eyes of the consumer. There is normally no clear answer 
to what the correct market delimitation is. There will often be degrees of 
substitutability, and where you put the limit is often a question of 
judgement. Market delimitation is done by both product and geography. 
Competition analysis: Where possible monopolies are beingjudged, this 
part of the market analysis will normally consider whether conditions are 
in place for actual commercial competition. Assessment will often consider 
whether one party actually has a large market share, whether buyer power 
exists, degree of rivalry, start up possibilities, whether there is price or 
quantity competition etc. 
In this report, our ambition is not to give a c1ear defrnition of market 
delimitation or to make an exhaustive competition analysis. In the summary of 
the status of knowledge, it is however important to emphasise that there are 
systematic differences between the various reports that are due to different, 
al beit sometimes implicit, assumptions about the relevant market. Also, all of 
the reports make a more or less explicit assessment of what a possible or 
foreseeable market share for high-speed rail might be. The different analyses 
have not however taken many competitive factors other than ticket price and 
travelling time into consideration and the conclusions largely dep end on the 
results of comprehensive transport models. 
3.2 Hypotheses - analysis - conclusions 
Another methodological concept we will attempt to apply is to review the 
existing reports according to the following more general framework: 
Hypotheses: Ideally all economic analyses should be based on economic 
theory. One way of using theory is to formulate hypotheses for the analysis 
to be carried out. Generally speaking a hypothesis is astatement about an 
economic context, the correctness ofwhich can be tested with the aid of 
empirical investigation . 
Analysis: Generally speaking what we mean by analysis is arriving at 
methods and models that are relevant for verifying a hypothesis. 
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Conclusions: Given reasonable hypotheses and relevant methods/models, 
we are able to conclude an economic analysis, for example with an 
estimate of the traffic basis for high-speed rail travel. 
We will look more c10sely at the extent to which the reports have formulated 
clear hypotheses, especially as regards what areasonable market delimitation is 
or what the competitive situation could be expected to be between high-speed 
trains and other forms of transport. We will also look at whether the analysis 
models are relevant. 
Before we comment on the results of the market analyses in the individual 
reports, it may be useful to put forward some alternative hypotheses regarding 
possible delimitations of the relevant market. 
High-speed rail represents a separate relevant market. This alternative 
would be reasonable iftravellers by high-speed train could not substitute 
other journeys at all. In such a case, the market for high-speed rail would 
be entirely made up of new ly created traffic. 
End to end transport between larger Norwegian towns and cities. This 
alternative would imply a high level of substitution between high-speed 
rail and other forms of transport for journeys that start and end in, or in the 
immediate vicinity of, the larger towns and cities. More specifically, such a 
market defmition would imply a high leve l of competition between 
domestic flights and high-speed rail. High-speed rail could also be 
substituted with traditional Intercity trains. 
All transport in a corridor between larger towns and cities. This 
alternative represents a better delimitation than the one above. For example 
domestic flights for onward domestic or international transit would be 
considered as substitutable with high-speed rai\. Also with this market 
definition, journeys by regional or Intercity train or by road in part of the 
corridor could be substituted with high-speed train. 
All transport is included in the same relevant market. This market 
delim itation would be relevant if all transport needs could be reasonably 
easily covered by all forms of transport. 
3.3 Background and mandate for the market analyses 
The reports that are most relevant for this section on market analyses are: 
VWI: Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway, 
Phase l (VWIl), Phase 2 (VWI2) and Phase 3 (VW13) 
Urbanet Analyse: Markedet/or høyhastighetstog (market for high-speed 
trains), report 9/2008 (UA 1) and report 12/2009 (UA2) 
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Norsk Bane: Nyttjernbane og trafikkonseptfor Sør- og Midt Norge (new 
railway and traffic concept for South and Central Norway) 
During a meeting, the Norwegian National Rail Administration advised COWI 
that the VWI and Urbanet Analyse reports must be seen in relation to each 
other. Neither is in itself a complete market analysis that can be read 
independently of others; rather they represent a gradual development of the 
knowledge basis. As we understand the context, the VWI reports represent the 
first contributions, with the market analysis best developed in reports 2 and 3. 
Urbanet Analyse's study was carried out after the publication of the VWI 
analyses and thus builds on the experience of the VWI reports. Furthermore, 
the approach of the second Urbanet Analyse report is a result of insight 
obtained in the first study and the last report should be given the greatest 
weighting. Norsk Bane's analyses were carried out on an independent basis in 
relation to VWI and Urbanet Analyse. 
The Norwegian National Rail Administration also impressed on COWI that the 
VWI and Urbanet Analyse reports had a Iirnited leveI of ambition and must be 
seen as pre-feasibility studies. 
In order to summarise the status of knowledge that the reports represent, one 
must thus understand both the context and the ambition of the existing analyses. 
The mandate for the reports in question does not explain in any detail the 
background to the assignment, the ex tent to which the reports are based on 
earlier work or in what way differences in concIusions or results may be due to 
revision of the assumptions used. 
3.4 VWI 
The reports from VWI do not make any explicit division of the market analyses 
into hypotheses, analysis and conclusions. The express ion relevant market is 
used in places, but there is no fundamental or qualitative discussion of the 
substitution possibilities between high-speed rail and other forms of transport. 
The analysis itself is based on the use of a weII-established European traffic 
model that has been used for many years, incIuding to develop the master plans 
for extending the German high-speed rail network. 
3.4.1 Relevant market 
Section 3.3.2 of VWI l reads" all trafflc segments could be of interest if 
High-Speed Services" . The model therefore includes basic data that describes 
the current traffic basis, by air, rail and road. VWI therefore apparently takes as 
its basis a very wide market defmition and totally determines substitution 
possibilities from the model's parameters. 
In VWI2 (section 5.2.1) however in the discussion of the traffic basis in the 
individual traffic corridors, there are formulae that indicate that a narrower 
definition of the relevant market has been used. The report argues that domestic 
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tlights for transit to other domestie destinations fall outside the relevant market. 
It is pointed out however that flights for international transit can in future be 
included in the same relevant market as high-speed rail. It is also assumed that 
Intercity traffic north of Oslo falls outside the relevant market. South of Oslo 
however both Intercity traffic and local trains to and from Østfold have been 
included. The present long-distance train traffic in the corridors is considered to 
belong to the same relevant market as high-speed fall. 
The delimitation of the relevant markets in VWI2 has been done verbally. The 
assumptions have not been formulated as clear and distinet hypotheses or 
diseussed on the basis of qualitative or fundamental assessments of the degree 
to which different transport solutions are substitutable. No tab les are presented 
to show how large a proportion of the total traffic in the individual corridors 
falls outside the market delimitation. Neither are any tables presented to show 
traffic figures for air, car or bus in the basic, reference or action alternative. 
VWI3 does not explain whether similar delimitations of the relevant markets 
have be en made. 
3.4.2 Model framework 
VWI bases its market analyses on a very comprehensive transport model. The 
work VWI has done represents the most unified assessment of high-speed raj] 
travel in Norway. By this we mean that technical and market assumptions are 
analysed within the framework of one single module. In general the study is 
based on technical specifications, operational studies, costs and demand models 
that are thorough, recognised and basically relevant for studying the market for 
high-speed rail transport. It would however have been beneficial for the report 
to include a discussion of the model's strengths and weaknesses as regards 
analysing a high-speed rail system in Norway. 
The method used by VWI is iIlustrated in the figure below. 
Figure 3.1: Illustration ofVWI's method 
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Figure 3-1 -Methodology of Iterative planning and design of PUb/IC transportatlon systems 
+ 
2 ) FIXIIlQ of Stops 
5.) Ti c forecast 
Source: VWI (2006a), figure 3-1 
Regarding method, VWI has however noted the following in its report "Due to 
reasons of time and budget the planning, as pictured in figure 3.1, can only be 
run through once in this project, that means linear and without major 
feedbacks. It follows from this that the underlying system definition cannot be 
optimised iteratively". 
An implication of this limitation in method is that VWI is presenting 
conceptual solutions in every single corridor regarding routes, scheduling on 
single track and travelling times that are not based on iterative assessments of 
options or demand for high-speed rail. This creates uncertainty with regard to 
whether the operational scenarios are optimum or whether other altematives 
could have been studied. 
None of VWI's reports inc1udes a c1early set-out presentation of the most 
important assumptions or exogenous input for the model analysis. Neither does 
the report present any documented connections or relationships between 
demand for high-speed rail and the following variables: 
Population growth by region 
Previous developments and future projections for GDP 
Time values for different types of joumey 
Sociodemographic characteristics and travel purposes 
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Distance between towns and cities for different means of transport (air, 
"normal" train, high-speed train, car and bus) for the basic, reference and 
project alternative 
Travel times by means of transport and origin-destination (OD pair) 
Previous developments and future projections for ticket prices and travel 
costs by car 
Significance oftourism 
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All these variables are of course included in VWI's models, but if the reader of 
the analysis is to be able to take an independent decision on the results, it would 
have been beneficial to present the assumptions in a clear and easily 
comprehended manner. It would for example have been very interesting to 
know which assumptions have a particular significance for the model results. 
In VWI3, VWI has however included the following figure that basically shows 
how the model calculates the division oftraffic between high-speed rail and air. 
OOWI 
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Figure 3.2: Market share as a function of traveIling time 
RaI".Y"' Uarll:.1 S~re on lbe A,Jr·RaIl--Markel 
f! :~: ==~: 
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Source: VWI (2007b), figure 5-2 
The figure shows that the market share for high-speed rail will be a decIining 
function with traveIling time. The relationship iIIustrated applies to corridors 
with a distance of 400 - 600 kilometres and a flying time of around 2 hours. 
The report does not explain the difference between the upper and lower limit, 
but we perceive this to be a relatively wide interval. Neither is any explanation 
given of whether the upper or lower limit is used in the calculations. The report 
points out that the relationship will be affected by a num ber of conditions, such 
as scheduling, accessibility of railway stations and airports etc. Furthermore 
this type of relationship only applies to specific OD pair relationships and not 
to composite journeys. How the composite journeys are modelled is not 
explained however. 
It should be noted that the figure as drawn does not really make the leap to the 
calculated market share of high-speed rail lines. By this we mean that if 
traveIling time is doubled from 2 to 4 hours and assuming that a flight will take 
2 hours, high-speed rail will still achieve a market share as high as between 30 
and 60 per cent. 
3.4.3 Schedule and running times 
The schedule proposed by VWI must be viewed as being conceptual and is not 
based on an analysis oftraffic volume or traffic structure. Neither has the traffic 
potential of alternative scenarios been considered, so that it is difficult for the 
reader to decide whether the proposed schedule represents the optimum. 
VWI presents the table below in its first report (phase l), showing traveIling 
times for the various routes. 
Table 3.1: Running times for the different routes 
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Source: VWI (2006a), table 3-7 
The running times for high-speed rail are based on the assumption that the 
trains run at an average speed of between 130 and 180 kph. This range of 
speeds is not explicitly presented in VWI's report, so we have arrived at it 
ourselves on the basis of the runn ing times and distances in the table above. 
VWI's report states that the operational speed of the trains is between 200 and 
250 kph. These speeds are normally considered to be rather low to be able to 
define the train as a high-speed train.2 
In an evaluation of high-speed rail, it is important to test the systems with the 
highest possible speed, so that the costs ofbuilding a high-speed railline can be 
justified. Such an assumption means that the full potential of the new line is 
utilised. If the trains run at higher speed between the most important towns and 
cities, traffic will be higher and sa the project will be more profitable. Higher 
speeds will also lead to lower operational costs. 
With the speeds proposed by VWI, cheaper tilting train systems could be 
considered in some corridors instead of building a completely new line 
designed for 250 kph alone. This type of tilting train is in use in both Sweden 
and Finland. 
The train concept and speeds chosen by VWI correspond to the conventional 
regional express trains in operation. These types of trains and lines are less 
profitable than high-speed rail lines. If VWI has arrived at these speeds because 
of technical track conditions or environmental, cost or political considerations, 
this is not explained in their report. 
We recommend that high-speed scenarios with operational speeds of 300 kph 
or even 350 kph - which are now considered standard in the high-speed rail 
sector - are studied more closely. 
VWI has not explained what assumptions are made for traveIling times by air 
and carlbus. In order to understand VWI's results more clearly, it would have 
been interesting to compare travelling times for high-speed trains with 
competing means of transport. Such a comparison is quite essential to a 
2 EC Directive 96/58 defines hi gh-speed rail as systems of rolling stock and infrastrueture that regularly operate at 
or above 250 kph on new tracks or 200 kph on existing ones. 
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competition analysis, and also an important part of the basis for defining the 
relevant market. 
3.4.4 Ticket prices 
VWI has not discussed the assumptions regarding ticket prices for HSR in its 
reports. Neither have the assumed fares for air travel or travel costs for car for 
each destination be en explained. In the same way as for traveIling times, being 
able to compare ticket costs for different means of transport is vital to a 
competition analysis. Consequently it would have been of great value if the 
assumptions in VWI's analyses had been better explained. 
On a general basis, VWI assumes that ticket prices for air travel would be 
reduced by about 4 per cent a year up to 2020, ref. figure 3-17 in VW! 1. They 
also assume that ticket prices for rail travel will rise by about 7 per cent a year 
up to 2020. The market share for rail falls considerably as a result of these 
assumptions. No grounds have been given for these assumptions and they have 
a negative effect on traffic projections for rail. The assumptions made regarding 
ticket prices would mean that there would be less traffic in the reference 
alternative in 2020 than there is today. 
In order to verifY the assumptions regarding developments in ticket prices, we 
should investigate how ticket prices for air and rail have developed over the last 
10 years. We may use the historical trends to estimate a future trend for ticket 
prices for the two means of transport. Figure 3.5 in section 3.7.4 that shows 
relative prices for rail, road and air based on the consurner price index does not 
support the theory that rail fares will have a negative development as assumed 
in the VWI reports. 
Our recommendation is to avoid assumptions that lead to significant changes to 
the present situation. Best practice in traffic projections is to keep to the 
situation as it is today. This means using the same ticket prices as today for the 
air and rail sectors in the future. In other words the relative prices will remain 
constant. 
3.4.5 Results 
A whole range of results is presented of simulations in the form of market 
shares and num ber of trave lIers by rail. The following summary table is drawn 
from the phase 2 and 3 reports, ref section 5-11 in VWI3 and section 5.2.2 in 
VWI2. 
Table 3.2: Summary of number of high-speed rait passengers and market 
shares for different routes 
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r, .. lill Pass - km/ cia ..,. 
Lines/ combinations of li nes Pass. / dav ·.·/i t h 'NitholIt r' .. l oved f ro m Newly r'.'la rkr:t 
,,.,·it h instance instance Air Car/13l ls created share in 
instan ce 2020 
'Nit h HSR 
Oslo- Bergen (Hallingdal/ I\Jumeclal:, 6 ,30(' 3 0.7 1 0.2 1.1 5 3° 0 
Oslo- Kristiansand .J. .OS(' lA ('AS 0.2 ('.35 OA 27·0 
O sl o-I<ri sti ansancl-Stava nge r 7 .7('(' 2. 6 0. 5 Co. 6 0.6 ('.9 39°. 
Oslo- I<ristiansancl-Stavanger-Bergen 13.800 4. 2 0. 5 1.2 1 1. 5 41°0 
Oslo-Bergen/Stavanger (Hau keli ; i S.h lO 
" 
'), 9 2.3 0. 6 2. 2 50°. 
Oslo Trondheim 5 .350 2.28 0.52 (1.86 0.3 0.6 45·. 
Source: VWI (2007a and 2007b), own comparison 
It is worth noting from the table that the traffic basis for high-speed rail consists 
partly of traffic transferred from car, bus and air and partly of newly created 
traffic. In other words considerable substitution possibilities have been 
assumed, meaning that VWI appears to have used a relatively wide market 
delimitation which includes high-speed rail in the same market as air, car and 
bus. 
Even so the market share is Iimited to about 30-50 per cent. VWI's reports do 
not indicate whether this is due to high-speed rail having its competitive ability 
limited by high generalised transport costs or whether traffic outside the 
relevant market has be en included in the total market. As mentioned above, 
VWI2 for example assurnes that air passengers trans iting to destinations other 
than end points of the corridor are not in the same relevant market as high-
speed rai\. One could however consider that this traffic has been included when 
calculating market share. It might also be thought that VWI has us ed as a basis 
the lower limit for market share as it appears in figure 5-2 in VW13 (repeated in 
table 3.2 above). 
3.5 Urbanet Analyse 
The other important source of market analysis on the potential for high-speed 
trains is the two reports from Urbanet Analyse, report num ber 09/2008 
(hereinafter UAl) and 12/2009 (hereinafter UA2). The mandate for UAl is to 
give a supplementary analysis based on the results of VWI. The analyses were 
to be based on a Norwegian transport model, NTM5 , which has been used in 
many previous reports on long-distance travel in Norway. 
The following tasks are specified for UA l 
Comparison with the results of VWI's analysis 
Investigate the market for intermediate stops 
Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses 
Suitability of the test mode) 
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The man date for U A2 was to carry out a questionnaire-based survey among 
trave lIers by air in order to study preferences and travel behaviour in more 
detail , and to assess effects that are basically not handled in NTM5. 
In its reports, Urbanet Analyse has not made any distinetion between 
hypotheses, analysis model and results . Since part of the mandate was to test 
NTM5's "suitability", it would have been advantageous if more general 
hypotheses had been given for analysing the traffic basis for high-speed rail. 
This would give a c1earer framework for justifying the relevanee of using NTM 
to analyse the market for high-speed rail and the robustness of the results 
arrived at. The report underlines the uncertainty that has been raised about the 
analysis in relation to other studies that have used NTM. 
3.5.1 Relevant market 
What the UA l analysis has in common with VWI is that it does not explicitly 
define what the relevant market for high-speed rail is. We understand that the 
procedure has been to inc1ude high-speed rail as a new transport possibility in 
NTM5 in certain corridors and where there are assumptions about ticket price 
and traveIling time that are decisive in respect of which means of transport the 
traveller will choose. In other words it might appear that the market definition 
is thus determined through the choice of the model's parameters. 
In UA l the following table is presented that implicitly indicates the market 
delimitation. 
Table 3.3: Modelled changes in travel volumes and market shares with the 
introduction of high-speed rail for travel between end points defined as Oslo 
and Bergen with hinterland . Journeys per day one way 
Table 4-2 Modelled changes in travel volum es and market sh:lres with the introtiJction oj High-speed railJor 
journey s between end point markets defi ned in Oslo and Bergen wifl-l hinter land. Jow neys p er day ane way 
Stopping patte rn OBl OB2 OB3 
Air 1,281 1,226 1,228 1.229 
Bu s 180 170 170 170 
Car 956 924 925 926 
Train 767 1,884 1. 808 1, 771 
Tot al 3,184 4,204 4,131 4,096 
Changes in jOlJrneysjday 
Air 
-4°" -4°0 -4°0 
Bu s -6°0 -5°0 -5°0 
( c'l r 
-3°0 _3°" -3°0 
Trc'lin 146°0 136°0 1310 0 
Totc'l l 32°0 30°0 29°0 
Market sharejchange i ll 111 arke t sl,are (~b poin tl 
Air 40°0 -11% -L~S -10% 
BllS 6°0 -1~:' -2% -10:,; 
( ar 30°0 -8~~ -8~;' - 7';\, 
Train 24°0 +21S~ +10S:, +19S;, 
Source: Urbanet Analyse (2008), table 4-2 
The table shows traffic volumes between Oslo and Bergen (with hinterland) as 
end points, with and without high-speed rail. Alternative l (OB l) is a pure 
express connection between Lysaker and Bergen, while alternative 3 (083) 
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includes a total of 6 stops between Oslo Central and Bergen. The figures in the 
first column show traffic without the high-speed alternative. 
What is interesting about the table is that the num ber of journeys by air, bus 
and car are for all practical purposes the same in all four alternatives. In other 
words there appear to be very limited possibilities of substitution between high-
speed rail and other forms of transport. In practice this means that rail 
represents an entirely separate relevant market. It would have strengthened the 
report considerably ifthis result had been explained. 
UA2 studies the effect of changing one key assumption in the calculations, 
namely time values for travellers. UA 1 assumes that time values are the same 
for high-speed rail passengers and traveIlers by ordinary train. In report 2, 
Urbanet Analyse has calculated the distribution between traveIlers by air and 
high-speed rail based on estimated time values for high-speed train from a 
survey of the preferences of air passengers. This new data basis is interesting 
because it gives a direct review of the area of competition between high-speed 
rail and air, bas ed on a specific survey of the trave liers in this market segment. 
Urbanet Analyse finds considerably higher time values for high-speed train 
compared with ordinary train. The re-estimated time values are about 10 - 20 
per cent higher for high-speed rail than for air. 
The updated report presents the following results for the percentages by high-
speed train/air: 
95 0/0/5 0/0 based on the assumptions for own time values for traveIlers by 
high-speed train. 
75 0/0/25 0/0 based on the assumed time values for traveIlers by high-speed 
train, but corrected for a so-called rail factor, i.e. that the survey indicates 
that passengers have an independent preference for train beyond that 
indicated by differences in traveIling time and ticket prices. 
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Figure 3.3: Prognoses for market share for high-speed train at different leve Is 
ofwhat is offered by rail. Share ofrail/air/market 
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Source: Urbanet Analyse (2009), figure S.2 
The resuIts of UA2 indicate that when the newly estimate time values are used 
as a basis, then high-speed rail and air are c1early in the same relevant market. 
As we understand it however, UA2 has on ly looked at the end point market and 
not at all transport in the various corridors. Car and bus transport have also 
been ignored. 
It would obviously have been of interest if Urbanet Analyse had qualitatively 
discussed whether us ing updated time values is more relevant than using time 
values for high-speed rail and traditional rai!, as was done in UA l. Such a 
discussion could have been used based on an explicit delimitation of the 
relevant market, i.e. based on what consumers think about air and high-speed 
rail being substitutable. 
3.5.2 Model framework 
Urbanet Analyse's analyses are based on the NTM5 model, which is 
conceptually different from VWI's mode!. The model describes the demand for 
transport services for a given network of transport options. The dem and 
functions are estimated on the basis of data from the travel behaviour survey 
Reisevaneundersøkelsen 97/98 and describe the relationship between the extent 
of joumeys as a whole - divided into different relationships or different means 
of transport - and drivers such as travel time, ticket cost, frequency, the 
trave liers' income, size of population and business in various zones etc. 
In UAl , Urbanet Analyse states that the normal use of NTM5 involves extra 
uncertainty regarding the results, since they have introduced a type of train that 
did not exist when the model's parameters were estimated. This report takes as 
a basis equal ticket prices and time values for high-speed trains and other trains. 
New model ca1culations are made in UA2, bas ed on estimating separate time 
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values for travelIers by high-speed train, on the basis of a questionnaire-based 
survey of air passengers. 
3.5.3 Model assumptions 
UA2 explains many of the key assumptions, so that it is possible for the reader 
to gain an impression of the area of competition between high-speed rail and 
air. Generally speaking, high-speed rail will cut travelling times by about a 
third compared with air. The exception is Oslo-Stavanger where the travelling 
times for high-speed rail and air would be the same. 
The tables below give a summary of the assumptions made in VA2. 
Table 3.4: Travelling times and prices, price relationship raiVair and travel 
relationship trainJair - today 
Table 4.1: TravelhnJ! times and prices, pric e relationship railIa ir and travellinJ! times relationship rai/fair - today 
Oslo- 0510- 0510- 0510-
Trond he im Be rgen Kristiansand Stavanger 
Trave ll in g t im e by train t oday - door 8. 14 8, 5l 6,11 8.56 
t o door 
Travelling t ime by airtoday - doort o 4,40 4,34 4.18 4.l5 
doo r 
Diff e renæ in tra velli ngtime - door t o 04.18 04.54 03.38 06 .5l 
door rail-air 
Travelling t ime rail/ air - t oday 1. 9 .2. 1 1. 6 l .3 
Price rai l t oda y NOK 837 760 619 871 
Price ai r t oday NOK 1,194 1,008 1,390 1,.260 
Price re lat ions l1ip rail/ <lirtoday 0.7 0,75 0. 45 0.69 
Cost of t ravel t o/ f rom airport N 0 1< 3n 30 2 376 347 
Source: Urbanet Analyse (2009), table 4.1 
Table 3.5: Travelling times and prices, price relationship raiVair and travel 
relationship train/air - new and old 
Table 4.2: Travelling times and p n'ces, price relatian.ship rail/air and h'avellin" h'mes relah'onshi raiVair - new 
Oslo- Os lo- 0510- Os lo-
Trondheim Be rgen Kri sti ansand Stava nge'r 
New t ravelI ing t ime hi gh-speed t rain 150 min 135 min 130 m in 200 min 
Feederti me (f rom surJey ) 44min 39 mi n 45min 70 min 
Tot al travelling t ime doorto door with 194 min 174rnin 175 mi n n o min 
new t rain conæpt / hi l?h-speed train 
Reduction in trave lling tim e train -l 40 min -295 min -150 m in -l95 min 
%, cfl ange in trave ll ing t ime by t rain 59 63 46 5l 
Trave ili ng time' rail'/ air - ne w tratn 0.69 0.64 0,68 1. 02 
se rvice/ t oday 's train se rviæ 
Time between de partures, t rain t oday, l 40 min 300 min l40 min 300 m in 
ave rage 
New t ime between de p<lrture s, trai n SO min SO m in 80 m in 80 min 
Improvement in per ce nt 67 73 67 73 
Time bet ween departures, airtoday 45 min 45 m in 1.2 0 mi n 45 m in 
Differe næ ti me bet ween departures rai! 195 min .255 mi n 1.20 min 255 mi n 
and ai r t oda y 
Dfffere næ time between de partures with 35 35 -40 35 
ne w train conæpt 
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Source: Urbanet Analyse (2009), table 4.2 
The UA2 report makes different assumptions about ticket prices. Basically, the 
same ticket price is assumed for traditional rail and high-speed rail , but 
sensitivity calculations have been made to test the competitiveness of high-
speed rail with ticket prices corresponding to those for air travel. 
In UA 1, travelling times and ticket prices have not been documented in the 
same way. On the other hand, this report shows assumptions regarding 
demographics, income trends, navigability of the road network and size of air 
option, but without explaining how the various assumptions affect demand for 
high-speed rail. 
3.5.4 Results 
An important part of the mandate for UA 1 is to compare the results given by 
VWI with calculations from the NTM5 model. 
Section 7 ofUAI concludes that " .. . without studying VWI's results in detail, we 
choose to conclude that the two analyses are on approximately similar lines ... ". 
The conclusion is based on the figure below. 
Table 3.6: Comparison of the leve! of modelled number of passengers in the 
corridors in the prognosis year 2020 (boardings per day, without major ro ad 
measures in NTM5) 
Table 7-2 Chmpartson of levei ofmodelled number ofrailpassengers in the corridors in p rognosts 
year 2020 (boardings per day, without major road measures in NTM5) 
Rou te 
osi o-Bergen 
Osi o-Kri sti ansand-St avange r 
Oslo-Trondhei m 
i4,lj 
6,150 
7,700 
5,350 
Source: Urbanet Analyse (2008), table 7-2 
mM 
6,200 
6,450 
4,750 
VWI and Urbanet Analyse (NTM5 in the table) have arrived at about the same 
traffic basis for high-speed rail , based on very different assumptions. We have 
seen above that in UAI the traffic basis is overwhelmingly based on newly 
created traffic, while VWI's results show considerable transfer of traveIlers 
from air and car/bus. Jn our assessment the results are consequently much more 
diverse than the traffic figures in themselves indicate. 
UA2 presents completely newestimates for market share for high-speed rail. 
The resu Its are however only shown as the share of the rai I/air market. In U A l , 
this share is at around 50-60 per cent. In UA2, with the exception of the time 
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values for traveIlers by high-speed rail with otherwise similar assumptions, this 
increases to 75-90 per cent. 
UA l also presents the comparison table below. 
Table 3.7: Modelled market share with and without high-speed train (2020 
without major road measures in NTM5). 
road mila,suril,s in NTM5} 
O s lo-Be rgen 16 61 23 54 37 
Os lo-Stavanger 7 68 25 32 57 11 
Os i o-Kri sti ansand 13 24 63 48 17 35 
Os lo-Trondheim 16 45 39 51 18 2l 
Car/Bus 
O s lo-Be rgen 24 48 28 45 31 24 
Oslo-Sta',; anger 14 50 36 31 37 31 
Oslo-Kri stiansand n 28 50 31 2l 47 
Osi o-Trond he i tll 18 40 42 33 29 38 
Source: Urbanet Analyse (2008), table 7-3 
There are other interesting points to note from this table. Firstly the market 
shares in the basis year are very different. For train, the difference is up to 10 
percentage points for all connections except Oslo-Trondheim. This may be due 
to two things. It may be a reflection of different market defmitions. Since the 
shares in VWI are consistently higher for air, one might surmise that the total 
market in the VWI report is more weighted towards long joumeys. Another 
explanation could simply be the differences in the data basis for passenger 
traffic. Whatever the reason, the differences in the basis year mean that it is 
difficult to compare VWI and UA l . 
Another point is that VWI consistently reports a greater increase in market 
share for train if high-speed lines are built. While the market shares in the basis 
year are consistently low for trains in the VWI report, they are, with the 
exception of the Oslo-Stavanger route, 10 to 15 percentage points higher than 
the market shares in the UA l project alternative. In other words VWI decides 
that high-speed rail increases the market share of rail by 20 to 25 percentage 
points more than UA 1. Again, a possible explanation is that VWI has a 
narrower market defrnition than UA 1. 
It would have been very interesting if Urbanet Analyse had given a more 
detailed explanation of the large differences between the results in the UA 1 and 
VWI reports . It would have been especially useful if statistics had been 
presented to show the traffic basis with various market definitions. 
No corresponding comparisons have been made with the results from VWI and 
UA2. 
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3.6 Norsk Bane 
DB International GmbH was commissioned by Norsk Bane AS to carry out a 
market analysis so as to prepare a new railway and traffic concept for South and 
Central Norway. In comparison with the reports from Urbanet Analyse and 
VWI, the analyses from Norsk Bane have been documented in a relatively 
limited way. For this reason our review of the results will be more summary 
than with the other two reports. 
Norsk Bane has not formulated any explicit hypotheses for the area of 
competition between high-speed rail and other forms of transport. 
Furthermore, Norsk Bane has used its own analysis model that is based on 
various sources of data, including Statistics Norway and the National Transport 
Plan, and has come up with conclusions in the form of prognoses of train 
traffic. The report from Norsk Bane also brings in goods transport in addition to 
passenger transport. 
3.6.1 Relevant market 
The expression relevant market is not used in the report from Norsk Bane, but 
since they conclude that new train lines or train offers take market share from 
all the other forms of transport, it indicates that their defmition has high-speed 
rail included in the same relevant market as all other means of transport. 
Norsk Bane also delimits the relevant market in terms of location of the 
stretches of track. They write in their report "A new Norwegian railway and 
transport system must on the one hand orientate itself in accordance with the 
strong trajjic flows between the largest towns and cities. On the other hand, it 
must serve as much of the rest of the country as possible". As they assess 
things, the most plausible corridors (for both passenger and goods transport) 
are: 
Oslo - Trondheim 
Oslo - Bergen/Haugesund/Stavanger 
Oslo - Kristiansand - Stavanger 
Oslo - Halden (- Gøteborg) 
Norsk Bane appears to assume that all traffic in the corridors mentioned is 
included in the relevant market. Thus Norsk Bane has a much wider market 
delimitation than Urbanet Analyse or VWI. Perhaps the most important 
difference is that Norsk Bane includes relatively high traffic on the partial 
sections within each corridor. Since the report does not use the expression 
relevant market, and since it has not formulated hypotheses for competition in 
the transport market, Norsk Bane has not presented any argument why a broad 
market delimitation is plausible. 
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3.6.2 Model framework 
DB International GmbHINorsk Bane has developed its own model for 
estimating the effects of changes in rail options. The prognosis model for 
passenger transport has the following stages of calculation: 
Journey production 
Journey distribution by start and fmish 
Calculation of distribution of means of transport 
Summing up of results for different sections of route 
The model's relationships are estimated or quantified on the basis of 
relationship matrices for all travel purposes. The relationship matrices are 
compared with calculated generalised transport costs and together this gives the 
functions that describe the distribution of means of transport. With the aid of 
the generalised costs and projections of socioeconomic factors , the model 
calculates the effects of different development alternatives for the various forms 
of transport. Newly created traffic (induced traffic) is considered as an 
independent module in the modet. 
As we understand it, Norsk Bane's market model is no different in principle 
from the models used by Urbanet Analyse and VWI. 
Norsk Bane also has projections for goods transport. Goods transport does not 
use the same model as passenger transport. This part of the report begins by 
deducing the existing rail transport and the rail transport that can be transferred 
to new lines. It also ass urnes that only transport that can be carried in 
combination traffic is relevant. The prognosis for goods transport is calculated 
by taking as a basis the amount of combined transport for the railways in 2007. 
This is multiplied by a factor of 1.58 and gives the estimate volurne of goods 
for 2025. The factor comes from the assumed growth in GOP and average 
population growth. 
3.6.3 Data basis 
Norsk Bane makes a great deal of use of publicly available statistics as a data 
basis for its traffic prognoses. Population projections, employment trends and 
commuter flows are obtained from Statistics Norway . They have also used data 
from the national survey of travel behaviour. Some of the data for air traffic has 
been obtained from Avinor and the Norwegian National Rail Administration's 
strategi c document has been used for goods transport. 
3.6.4 Results 
Table 3.8: Estimate for passenger transport in 2025 
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Mil l. Pas s. km/ da',' 
Pass. / da ·,' ·:"j t h "'V ith rVl(· ... ~d fr ..:· In Ne ':·.·1.,. 
Osi o-Bergen-Haugesund-St avangoe r 
Osi 0 -Trondhei lY' 
Osi ,j -Ber ge n-H augesuncl-St a \' an g" r 
(p":' i ntto poi nt ) 
Osi 0 -Tronclhe i m (poi nt t o p('i nt) 
Source: Deutsche Bahn (2009) 
i nst an ce inst an..:e Ai r Car/bu s cr eat "d 
4 6 .300 13.3 3. 2 6. 2 3.0 
21 .500 8.5 1.7 2.5 2.7 
19 .500 
8 .800 
The table above shows Norsk Bane's estimate for passenger transport in 2025. 
Norsk Bane uses annual figures in its report, but to enable easier comparison 
with e.g. VWI's market analysis, we have chosen to present the figures in 
millions of passenger ki lometres per day. For the Oslo-Trondheim route they 
have estimated 21 ,500 passengers, 8,800 of whom are point to point travelIers. 
In comparison, VWI have estimated 5,350 point to point trave lIers on the same 
route, meaning that Norsk Bane's estimates are somewhat higher. As a 
consequence of this, the transport work (measured in passenger kilometres) per 
day used in Norsk Bane's analysis is much higher than VWI's. For Oslo -
BergenlHaugesund/Stavanger, the num ber of passengers a day is estimated as 
46,300, with 19,500 ofthese be ing point to point travellers. 
Norsk Bane's figures for transferred and newly created traffic are very high in 
comparison with those VWI and Urbanet Analyse have arrived at. For the line 
between Oslo and Trondheim, they estimate that 1.7 and 2.5 million passenger 
kilometres per day respectively will be transferred from air and from carlbus to 
rail in 2025. Newly created traffic is 3 million passenger kilometres per day. 
The figures are correspondingly high for the route between Oslo and 
BergenlHaugesund/Stavanger. 
Norsk Bane on ly presents the number of travelIers for selected routes. AIso, 
they give no overview of what the market shares for the different forms of 
transport will be in 2025. 
Table 3.9: Quantity of goods in 2025 
r\~ ill. t onne krnj day 
Li nes/ combinat ions of li nes With r. .. 1oved from 
inst an ce E.xisting rai l Road 
traff i c 
Os i o-Bergen/ Hau ge sund/St ava nger 11.5 5.5 6. 0 
Oslo-Trond he im 10. 1 6.9 3. 3 
Source: Deutsche Bahn (2009) 
For goods transport, Norsk Bane estimates that the transport work (measured in 
million tonne kilometres per day) that will be done on the line between Oslo 
and Trondheim will be 10.1 million tonne kilometres per day. The 
corresponding fig ure for Oslo - Bergen/Haugesund/Stavanger is 11.5 mi ll ion 
tonne ki lometres per day. 
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3.7 Market shares and market delimitation 
In this section we have a brief assessment of some of the key factors in the 
market analysis. 
3.7.1 Delimitation of the market for high-speed rail lines in 
Norway 
In the introduction to this report we outlined four alternatives: 
• High-speed rail represents a separate relevant market. UA 1 appears 
to be based on a narrow market delimitation. 
• End to end transport between larger Norwegian towns and cities. 
UA2 is based on this market definition . 
• All transport in a corridor between larger towns and cities. VWI 
appears to use a defmition that inc\udes parts of the traffic in the who le 
corridor. 
• All transport is included in the same relevant market. None of the 
reports uses such a wide market delimitation. 
In our opinion neither of the two extremes is particularly plausible. An 
important reason for this is that transport is a derivative service and not directly 
useful in itself. As long as one transport alternative can produce the same 
service at a comparable price and quality to other transport alternatives, the 
various forms of transport must be inc\uded in the same relevant market. There 
are thus no a priori grounds for expecting high-speed rai l to represent a 
completely separate relevant market. On the other hand, there is reasonable 
broad acceptance that there is a c\ear distribution of labour between different 
forms of transport. There are clear differences for example in the average 
length of journey by car, train and air. This draws us in the direction that the 
relevant market in which high-speed rail is included must be somewhere 
between the two extremes. 
It may be interesting to make a quick assessment of whether car, rail and air 
currently represent a common relevant market or separate ones. A simple 
method is to look at whether the relative prices are stationary or not. If the 
relative prices of two products are stationary, that is to say that the price 
relationship remains constant over time, this is an indication that they represent 
a common relevant market. Jf prices are stationary in this way, this is often 
taken as an indication that the price trend for a product means a limitation on 
the price trend of the other product. Such a Iimitation may indicate that there 
are good substitution possibilities and competition between the two products. 
In the figure below we have used data from the consumer price index in order 
to plot the price relationship between road, rail and air transport. 
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Figure 3.4: Price relationship between road, rail and air transport; data from 
the consumer price index 1979-2009 
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The figure shows that the relative prices have varied a good deal over the 
course of time. There is however no clear sign that the prices converge or that 
they develop completely independently of each other. Over the course of the 
period, prices for rail have been reduced in comparison with road, while prices 
for road have risen in comparison with air. 80th cases indicate that no 
stationarity exists. The price relationship between rail and air has changed less 
over the course of the period. A simple statistical test for stationarity 
(augmented Dickey-Fuller test) shows that it is rail/air that is the candidate that 
is closest to representing a common relevant market, while raiVroad apparently 
represent separate markets. 
This exercise indicates that areasonable defmition of the relevant market for 
high-speed rail should include limited segments of the transport market and that 
rail transport as such is closer to air than to road. This may indicate that travel 
over a certain distance in one corridor should be included in the same relevant 
market and that merely looking at the end point joumeys between larger towns 
and cities in Norway is too narrow. 
In practice perhaps the most important question is whether today's Intercity 
traffic and regional trains should be considered to be in the same market as 
high-speed trains. Today's Intercity traffic is characterised by having 
considerably more stops than is usual for high-speed rai!. If high-speed rail is to 
be fully or partly substitutable with Intercity traffic, one must therefore imagine 
a feeder system to a limited number of regional hubs. It is also a prerequisite 
that high-speed rail will be competitive in terms of ticket price, combined 
traveIling time and quality generally. In this case, market delimitation would 
become more a question of technical and operational factors than of travelIers' 
preferences. 
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3.7.2 Market shares in VWI and UA 1 do not tally with 
international experience 
80th the VWI and the UA l reports present market shares for air that are 
relatively high, which is not consistent with the observed and comparable 
competition situation between high-speed rail and air in other parts of the 
world. Here the ticket prices for high-speed rail have been set at a leve l that has 
ousted air travel to a great extent. In comparable cases, with regard to travelling 
time and market potential , it has been observed that the railway's market share 
tends to be at the upper level ofVWI's figure 5-2 in VWI3. 
An example ofthis is shown in the figure below. This is taken from GAO (2009) 
and shows market shares for various means of transport in Japan. 
Figure 3.5: Market shares for various means of transport in Japan by transport 
length 
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Source: GAO (2009), fi gure 3 
The figure shows that for distances between 188 and 313 miles (300 to 500 
km), which corresponds to a traveIling time of between l.S and 3 hours at 
speeds around 200 kph, the market share for air will fall to below 5 per cent. As 
a rule of thumb, high-speed train is quicker than air for distances shorter than 
500 km. In spite ofthis, VWI and UAl fmd that the market share for air will be 
between 17 and 57 per cent. 
There are many examples that show that high-speed rail can be implemented in 
such a way as to reduce the use of short flights: 
The high-speed railline between Madrid and Seville radically changed the 
market share for air. The market share for air fell to 13 per cent in just 3 
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years. The distance between Madrid and Seville is 536 km, with a 
travelling time of about 2.5 hours , which makes it comparable with a high-
speed rail line between Oslo and Bergen. Because of the almost identical 
travelling time and comparable market potential, Madrid-Seville is 
probably the most relevant example of market potential for high-speed rail 
in Norway. 
After 3 years, the high-speed railline between Paris and Lyon (425 km and 
a traveIling time of about 1.5 hours) had reduced the market share for air to 
7 per cent. After ten years, the market share for air had been reduced to 3 
per cent. Today, air has only a couple ofper cent of the traffic between 
Lyon and Paris. 
After 6 years, the high-speed railline between Paris and Brussels (264 km 
and a traveIling time of 1 hour 22 minutes) has reduced the market share 
for air to 2 per cent. 
We can also find exceptions to the above rule of thumb. For example the high-
speed railline between Paris and Marseilles (670 km and a travelling time of 3 
hours 15 minutes), where the market share for air has only fallen to 30 per cent. 
This reduction in market share is still relatively large even though the reduction 
is on the wane. A significant proportion of the remaining air traffic comes from 
international transit flights from Paris to Marseilles, which is the port of entry 
to the Cote d'Azur and southern France generally. The relatively long traveIling 
time, combined with a high percentage of international passengers, makes this 
example less comparable with the studies carried out in Norway. 
We think there is reason to believe that high-speed rail travel in Norway could 
achieve a considerable market share in relation to air travel, as the examples 
from Japan, Spain, France and Belgium illustrate. We recommend that the 
cases above should be examined more c10sely in new analyses and that there 
should be benchmarking with regard to the effect of the introduction of high-
speed railon air traffic in comparable cases . 
3.7.3 Good prevailing conditions for high-speed rail in Norway 
There are other grounds to indicate that the market shares that appear in the 
VW) and UA reports may be too low. The prevailing conditions for introducing 
high-speed rail in the most important corridors in Norway could be very good 
for the following four reasons (which we feel have not be adequately 
considered in the existing studies): 
The distances on the lines are in the area - less than 500 kilometres -
where high-speed rail can compete with air. In this way high-speed rail 
can offer shorter door to do or traveIling times than air. It can also create 
a more effective journey from city centre to city centre, which are the 
principle places of origin and destination. 
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200mestic air traffic between the cities in question is exceptionally high 
and therefore gives great market potential if high-speed rail can 
compete on trave Il ing times, price and comfort. This situation has been 
the case for all the examples mentioned above with distances of less 
than 500 km. 
3 Time values in Norway are very high, especially within the market 
segment in question, so that the market will be strongly influenced by 
any reductions in traveIling time offered by high-speed rai\. 
3.8 Summary 
The reports from VWI, Urbanet Analyse and Norsk Bane contain so few 
similarities that it would be difficult to speak about a consensus regarding the 
traffic basis for high-speed rai\. There are consequently great differences in the 
suggestions regarding the market basis for high-speed rail lines and the results 
are difficult to compare. 
The most important differences between the reports is their assumptions about 
what the relevant market for high-speed raillines should be. 
Norsk Bane uses a very broad market defrnition, first and foremost that the 
market for traffic in parts of the corridors is considered to be substantia\. 
U A l uses a narrow market definition in comparison, but this is later 
extended somewhat in UA2. 
VWI uses a market defrnition that is not unlike UA2. 
Neither is there any consensus on what the foreseeable market shares are. It is 
difficult to compare the results of the different reports, since some of the 
differences in market share can doubtless be due to the differences in market 
definition. However it appears that 
Norsk Bane is the most optimistic with regard to possible market share, 
although the U A2 report also fmds grounds for estimating a high market 
share. 
The market shares arrived at by VWI and UA l are seemingly relative ly 
low, not least when considered against international experience. 
COWI's review of the status of knowledge on high-speed rail lines in Norway 
stresses the significanee of defming the relevant market. When different reports 
are based on different market defmitions, the resuIts will necessarily be difficult 
to compare and it is difficuIt to consider whether some results may be more 
reasonable than others. None of the reports gives any fundamental grounds for 
its market defmition or provides any documentary evidence of the assumptions 
that have actually been made. 
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4 Technical parameters 
4.1 Assessment of scenarios and respective fare 
levels 
VWI assesses a form of operation (departure frequency and travel time) for 
each corridor, in other words a scenario for each corridor. Urbanet Analyse 
investigates what effect various pattems of stops have on traffic. Urbanet 
Analyse mentions some fares for travel by high-speed rail, but they are neither 
documented nor compared with competing means of transport. 
The scenario proposed by VWI, and also studied by Urbanet Analyse, is 
described like this: 
• The lines Oslo-Trondheim and Oslo-Gøteborg should be served with a 
connection every hour in peak times and every two hours out of peak 
times 
• Maximum speed is set to 250 kph, parts of the lines will be served with 
200 kph. This maximum speed aUows competitive travel times to the 
plane in these relations and reduces energy consumption as weU as 
investment and operation costs for the trains 
• The lines will be budt as double track lines in the greater Oslo area and 
as single track line outside this area 
(VW I (2006b), page 110) 
VWI gives no grounds for the conc1usions above. The conc1usions are not 
based on a traffic study so it is therefore difficult to say anything about how 
VWI determines departure frequency or the speeds of the trains. To be able to 
decide on the optimum scenario, levels of speed, departure frequency and fares 
should be analysed in a traffic model. 
VWI proposes a pattem of stops that is based on a study of the relevant 
geographical market area. We propose that the traffic generated by the various 
pattems of stops should also be analysed in the traffic model. 
OOWI 
Status of knowledge on high-speed rail in Norway 51 
4.2 Assessment of the required number of train units 
and capacity 
4.2.1 Number of train units 
In planning high-speed trains for Norway, VWl proposes trains that correspond 
to ICE 3 six-carriage trains (ane unit) pro due ed by Deutsche Bahn AG. This 
train unit has a total capacity of 340 passengers. 
Ifwe use the traffic prognosis of 12,777 passengers a day for the Oslo-Bergen 
route (as VWI has estimated), we can determine that the number of trains 
required by the route would be 32 trains a day (ane train an hour in each 
direction with an average operational day of 16 hours) of the ICE 3 type, each 
made up of two units and having a capacity of 680 passengers. This 
presupposes that 60 per cent of capacity would be utilised.3 The number oftrain 
units required would thus be 6, tak ing into account a tumaround time of 6 hours 
for each train unit and a 1 hour departure frequency. 
VWI proposes 10 trains (ane unit) to serve 6,150 passengers a day. Ifwe apply 
the same logic as above, this figure does not tally. 
It is however normal for high-speed rail to offer a departure frequency of 30 
minutes during rush hours so as to cover demand. If this should be the case in 
Norway, more train units would be required. 
We assume that VWI is tied to a departure frequency of once per hour, since 
the schedule has little flexibility owing to the proposed single track high-speed 
railline. 
4.2.2 Schedule and capacity 
The report prepared by Funkwerk and Railconsult provides good data with 
regard to operations, especially for the new infrastrueture in Norway. 
Even so, there should be a better correlation between operations, traffic 
prognoses and ticket income. This topic is not taken up in the report. We 
recommend that a better correlation between operations and optimising of 
income is achieved, so that actual operations correspond with what the market 
expects in terms of the number oftrains and their capacity. 
The customers' expectations should also be taken into account with reg ard to 
mixing passenger and goods transport on single track or with high speed, as 
well as for some corridors with a high proportion of tunnel. 
3The average utilisation of capacity for high-speed trains is 70 per cent in France and 50 per 
cent in Germany (European Environment Agency and SNCF). 
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4.2.3 Single and double track routes 
Funkwelt & Railconsult conclude, as does VWI, that the proposed operation is 
feasible using single track. The location of cross ing points is critical and closely 
linked with the chosen schedule. Funkwerk and Railconsult have the following 
comments: 
One area we have concern about is Ringeriksbanen. We have been unable to 
identify a good service pattern on this route which can operate reliably as 
planned with the proposed cross ing points. 
It would be possible to arrange this if there were complete jlexibility in timing 
Hønefoss trains between Oslo and Sandvika, but in practice there is not. We 
recommend that the whole route is considered for double track, with possible 
single track sectjons only where operationally acceptable and where the terrain 
makes double track prohibitively exp ens ive. 
(Funkwerk og Railconsult (2008), page 55) 
Funkwerk and Railconsult state that for each high-speed corridor they have 
created a new schedule model that is based on the line speed and location of 
tunnels and gradients provided by the Norwegian National Rail Administration. 
It is however unclear whether the schedule and concIusions in the report allow 
for all the tunnels (45-86 per cent of the routes) that VWJ has proposed, or the 
bridges that VWI has not included in its assessments. Jf they do not, it is 
uncertain whether the proposed single track high-speed rail line is feasible 
given the intended departure frequency. 
VWI proposes single track high-speed rail line. This raises problems, since 
there is not one single example of single track high-speed rail line anywhere 
else in the world. The main reason why other countries choose double track 
high-speed rail line is that with single track it is impossible to adapt services in 
line with demand (rush hours and low traffic periods), because operations on 
single track high-speed rail lines are so inflexible. This in turn leads to a loss of 
passengers and ticket income that is considerably higher than the approximately 
15 per cent of construction costs that would be saved by choosing single rather 
than double track. In addition, single track leads to increased traveIling times 
and higher energy consumption because of the uneven speeds along the track. 
We recommend that an assessment be made of double track high-speed rail 
lines in Norway. 
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4.3 Technical regulations 
In phase O the VWI reports discuss which design parameters are used as a basis 
for line routings. This section looks at the requirements for "high-speed" lines 
that are set by the current technical regulations and what they mean for the 
routes that have be en assessed. 
The Storting has asked for rail tracks to be for 250+. This can be interpreted as 
meaning that design speeds between 200 and 250 kph are applied for Intercity 
traffic, while "+" is for high-speed. It is not yet certain what the "+" will stand 
for. With effect from 01.07.2010 the technicaJ regulations also inc1ude a 
routing table for 300 kph. In Sweden, Svenske Banvarket, now Trafikvarket, 
has decided that their high-speed will be 320 kph. 
When the regulations were changed to also include speeds up to 250 kph, the 
following was changed: 
Curve table extended to 250 kph with normal radius requirement = 4,000 
m. 
Ballast thickness increased from 75 to 80 cm. 
Noise screening: distance from track centre to screen increased from 4.0 to 
4.4 m. 
Railings on bridges: distance from track centre to railing increased from 
3.3 to 3.5 m. 
Platform length for high-speed trains increased from 350 m to 400 m. 
The tabJe for maximum speed in downward gradients was extended (see 
below). 
Greatest permitted speed in downward gradient: 10530, section 5, point 
4.8, tabJe 5.12: 
Table 4.1: Maximum speed in downward gradient 
Determlnlng fJII Permltted speed 
(maximum) (%) (kph) 
1.25 1) 250 
1.25 200 
1.5 180 
1.75 160 
2 140 
2.25 120 
2.5 100 
Source: Norwegian National Rail Administration (2006b), table 5.12 
Higher spee ds than those given in the table above may be applied ifthe signal 
system and rolling stock permit. 
Otherwise, the Norwegian National Rail Administration has a great deal of 
technical equipment that is not authorised for 250 kph, inc1uding the contact 
00W1 
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conductor system. System 25 is on ly authorised for 250 kph with a current 
collector. These are conditions that can be resolved in other countries, so we 
believe they can also be resolved in Norway. 
The difference between design speeds of 200 kph and 250 kph, as regards track 
geometry, according to the new technical regulations with effect from 
01.01.2010, is shown in the table below. 
Table 4.2:Differences for track geometry with design speeds of200 and 250 
k h ~pl 
Limit values in accordance with 200 kph 250 kph ~ Comments ~i~J::~/ 'Å,,-,11~ 
technical re2ulations 
Track separation in open 
sections 
Track separation in tunnels 
Horizontal radius 
Length of transition curve 
Length of straight I ines and 
circular curves 
Camber 
Vertical radius 
Ballast thickness 
Distance to noise screening 
Vertical rise/fa ll 
R > 5000 4.40 m 4.40 m R > 5000 No difference in track geometry 
4000 < R < 5000 4 .56 m 4.56m 4000 < R < 5000 
1000 < R < 4000 4.60m 4.60m 1000 < R < 4000 
Smallest track separation is increased . Air 
4.50m 4.70m resistance issues must be considered by 
other technical areas . 
Minimum. Minimum. Minimum permitted horizontal radius is 
Normal 2,400 m 4,000m Normal increased. 
requirement requirement 
Minimum . With Minimum. With Minimum permitted length oftransition 
normal 208m 262m normal curve is increased. 
requirements reguirements 
Minimum 100m 125 m Minimum Minimum permitted element length is increased. 
Maximum 105 mm 90 mm Maximum Maximum permitted cam ber is reduced 
Minimum IS,400 m 24,000 m Minimum Minimum permitted vertical radius is increased. 
7S0mm 800 mm Ballast thickness is increased 
4.00m 4.40 m Minimum distance to noise screening is increased 
Maximum 12.5 %0 12.5 %0 Maximum Same values 
Source: Norwegian National Rail Administration (2006b) 
4.4 Technical parameters - line routing 
The design parameters that are used as a basis for the VWI report would give a 
speed level of200 to 300 kph on new stretches oftrack. It assumes that the 
developments currently planned would be built according to the regulations and 
speed profile prevailing when the report was written. The reports are primarily 
pre-feasibility studies in which the line routing is relatively undetailed, and 
thereby with a limited level of ambition. Technical parameters have and will be 
changed from this level up until implementation. The reports will therefore 
.~ 
on ly gi ve a rough assessment of the possibil ity of changing technical 
parameters. A more extensive job must be done in the next planning phase so as 
to raise the analyses and routings to a feasibility study leve!. 
The VWI report has generally taken as a basis a horizontal radius of2,600 
metres for speeds of250 kph and a camber of 100 millimetres. Maximum 
gradient is assessed as 1.25 per cent where geography permits a gentle rise or 
fall, but can be increased to a maximum of3 per cent in difficult terrain. The 
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Route 
Hamar - Trondheim 
Råde - Kornsjø 
Oslo-Bergen 
Numedal 
Oslo-Bergen 
Hallingdal 
Oslo-Bergen Haukeli 
Porsgrunn -
Kristiansand 
Kristiansand -
Stavanger 
Stavanger -
Bergen 
Technical regulations 
normal requirements 
Minimum 
requirement 
vertical curve of the track is set at 25,000 metres. Tunnels of over 1.5 km are 
designed to have a parallei service tunnel with connections every 500 metres. 
Tunnel cross section of75 m2 with fixed track. Track is currently laid with 
ballast. 
Norsk Bane's design parameters for its routes with a speed over 250 kph are a 
curve radius of over 3,000 metres and a gradient ofmaximum 1.25 per cent. 
The tunnel under Boknafjorden is an exception. Tunnel cross section is 60 m2 
or for double track tunnel 100 m2• 
Høyhastighetsringen described some design parameters in its report "Den nye 
Bergensbanen" (The new Bergen line, Høyhastighetsringen) (2009). The speed 
is 300 kph and the curve radius is 3,400 metres. A smaller curve radius is 
permitted where there is a press ing need to follow the terrain. The Numedal 
line is to be built as single track for passenger trains with a crossing point at 18 
km. 
Below we have attempted to summarise the figures and facts that it is possible 
to extract from the route maps that accompany the reports. 
T bl 43 T hn' l d fr h a e : ec lca ata om t e route maps 
Horizontal Horizontal Vertical Raute Speed Km Km 
curvature curvature radius fall/rise %0 kph new tat 
Built-up areas Rv line 
3000 m 2000 m 25,000 12.5 %0 - 25 250-300 366 464 
%0 
* * * %0 200 70 70 
2500 m 3500 m 25,000 15 %0 - 30 250/300 364 405 
%0 
2000 m 2000 m * 30 %0 200-250 338 378 
4000 m 2000 m * * 250 370 411 
2500 m 2000m * * 200-300 162 333 
4000 m 4000m * * 250 194 209 
3000 m 3000m * 20 %0 * 221 221 
4000 m 24000 12.5 %0 250 
2900m 20%0 -
(250 kph) 
*No information on route found 
4.4.1 Vertical curvature 
Technical regulations have provisions for maximum rise/fall as shown below: 
Table 4.4: Greatest permitted rise/fall on open line 
Time 
2:45 
2:20 
2:40 
2:25 
2:20 
2:10 
1:00 
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TC",') ,'f 5. 9 
Greates t detennining rise/fall (Oil ) 
Li no:: s • ..... ith mi xe d Passe nge r Si de t ra cks 
t r affi ( t raffic lines 
N onn al ro:: q ui re rne tit 1. 25 .2 1.25 
r'.·1i ni mum requi re tnent 21 2.5 3 
1) Pe nnitte d in <~ length up t o 3 1·:ni. 
Source: Norwegian National Rail Administration (2006b), table 5.9 
A simple consideration of the challenges that occur when design parameters 
limit gradient on the line can be seen from the fo llow ing. Ifthe line is run from 
Finse (1,222 metres above sea leve l) down to Bergen, which is approximately 
at sea level , the distance as the crow flies is about 120 km and the greatest 
determining descent will be a gradient of 10.16 per thousand. This means that 
the total and continuous drop from Finse down to Bergen will present a 
challenge for the train's brakes. 
The nature of the gradient largely determines the choice ofroute and how much 
of the line needs to be in tunnels. The regulations state that there can only be 3 
km with maximum gradient on tracks that have mixed traffic. The same 
requirement does not apply to passenger train lines, but section 4 .8 of ID 530 
gives guidelines for maximum permitted running speeds for trains on 
descending stretches of track. As well as the indicated speed limit, the running 
speed also dep en ds on the train's braking system and the determining descent 
on the section of line the train is running over. The limitations in the technical 
regulations could lead to a greater proportion of tunnel and also longer tunnels 
when the routes are planned in more detail in the next phase. 
4.4.2 Mixed traffie 
VWI is based on mixed traffic from Oslo to Hønefoss/StangelPorsgrunnlRåde, 
with new track, and primarily passenger track, onward from these points. There 
is no tradition of building dedicated passenger train lines in Norway and there 
will be a great deal of uncertainty regarding such a choice. A choice in which 
the technical parameters satisfY both goods and passenger traffic is better 
equipped for any future changes in wishes and requirements. Where dedicated 
passenger train lines are built, there is usually a separate goods line suitable for 
conveying goods and with good gradient conditions. Existing lines in Norway 
currently have poorer gradient conditions than is desirable. When new line is to 
be built on the Drammen-Bergen, Hamar-Trondheim and Halden-Kornsjø 
routes, it is reasonable to suppose that there will be consideration of a better 
route for goods traffic with better gradient conditions. It may be that some parts 
of the route (for example Kvikne-Støren) are laid as dedicated passenger train 
lines. Long tunnels are a disadvantage from a safety point ofview for both 
goods and passenger traffic, but experience from other countries can be brought 
into use here. The VWl report should have had a somewhat better overview of 
which lines and what type oftrain traffic are to be allowed. As we read the 
report, dedicated passenger train traffic has been chosen for all high-speed 
lines. 
Status of knowledge on high-speed rail in Norway 57 
4.4.3 The proportion of tunnel 
VWI estimates a totallength of tunnel for each of the alternatives, but 
proposing a length of tunnel on the basis of a 1:250,000 map is hardly 
appropriate, since a difference of just l millimetre on the map represents a 
distance of250 metres in the actual terrain. The framework for VWI's work 
indicated an undetailed approach . In critical parts of the terrain a more detailed 
section of map should have been used, so that the tunnel could be located in 
more detail and a more precise estimate oftunnellength could have been made. 
Given the considerable proportion of tunnel (48-86 per cent of the proposed 
lines - see VWI's table below), it will be very important to study alternative line 
routings with fewer tunnels. Tunnels have a negative effect on speed, the 
environment (during the construction phase), the length of the construction 
period, costs and passenger safety and comfort. The proposed new 
infrastructure should therefore be reasessed with a view to finding a line 
routing that demands fewer tunnels. 
TabIe 4.5: Tunnel proportions of the corridors investigated 
Line, Tunnel S ~laJe [0/0] 
0510 - Bergen via Hall ingdal 45 
0510 - Bergen via Numedal 45 
Oslo - Haukeli - Berge n 66 
Haukeli - Stavanger 79 
Porsgrunn - Kristiansand 48 
Kristiansand - Stavanger 5-5 
Stavanger - Bergen 86 
Source: VWI (2007b) 
T bl 46 T a e : unne proportlOns o f' h 'd N SIX ot er pro.Jects OutSI e orway 
Line Tunnel and viaduct 
Hannover - Wtirzburg, (1991) 37 % tunnel 
327 km Landrticken tunnel (10,779 metres) 
Mtindener tunnel (10,525 metres) 
Wuhan-Guangzhou 18% tunnel and 48% viaduct 
Seoul-Busan 46% tunnel and 25% viaduct 
Taipei-Kaohsiung 18% tunnel and 73% bridges 
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Taiwan High Speed Rail network 18% tunnel , (48 tunnels) including 
7.4 km in Changhua County 
Nuremberg- Erfurt high-speed 22% tunnel (22 tunnels totalling 41 
railway km) Longest tunnels are the 8.3 km 
Blessberg and 7.3 km Silberberg 
tunnels 
The length ofmany of the world's longest bridges is stated from end abutment 
to end abutment. No information is given about longe st span, which will be 
important when crossing deep fjords in West Norway. 
4.5 Summary 
The reports that have been prepared are not in accordance with the present 
technical rules for speeds over 250 kph. Most lines must be upgraded so 
that they are in line with the rules. The stretches of line that lie in very 
meandering valleys will mainly have a higher proportion of tunnel than 
stretches in wider valleys that have the possibility of increasing curve 
radius, while at the same time having sufficient straight lines between the 
transitional curves. 
The vertical aspect presents a challenge, primarily due to stretches, such as 
Geilo - Bergen, with long ascents and descents, since long descents can put 
a severe load on the brakes. Stretches with long descents should therefore 
be specially considered with regard to the feasibility of such a vertical 
curvature. 
In the existing material, the tunnel parts have not been studied at any 
detailed level and this should be done. 
The proposal for single track rai! lines should also be reconsidered. The 
costs saved by building single track instead of double track must be 
balanced against the operational flexibility that is lost and the costs and 
possible loss of income that this rigid form of operation involves. 
In order to optimise fare levels, traveIling times, stopping pattems and 
departure frequencies, the effects of the levelofthese variables should be 
studied in a traffic mode!. 
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5 Technical challenges in construetion 
This section assesses the routes themselves and how they are adapted to the 
landscape. We consider what challenges are presented by each route and 
whether there are any obvious possibilities for cost reducing measures or for 
reducing the consequences for the environment and society. To assess the 
routes we have used VWI's map material show ing the routes, as well as maps 
that are generally available on the internet. As there is very little information 
beyond the route descriptions in the background reports themselves, we have 
mainly looked at the overall choice of route in the landscape with regard to the 
vertical curve. 
It is worth pointing out, as mentioned earlier in the report, that there is a 
generally held beliefthat Norway has a particularly difficult topography for 
building high-speed raillines. We do not believe this to be correct. Japan, 
France, Italy, Taiwan and South Korea have all either built or are building high-
speed raillines in similar or more difficult terrain to that found in Norway. This 
is further developed in our section on costs (section 6). 
5.1 Assumptions for choice of route and adaptation to 
the landscape 
One of the main purposes of the VWI study was to find the most realistic 
corridor to be investigated, so as to form the basis for further and more detailed 
planning of high-speed rail in Norway. A feasibility study was chosen so as to 
illustrate the possibilities and the limitations of the various corridors chosen. 
The studies conclude with a rough calculation of quantities and present 
fundamental differences between the corridors. 
" .. The study group sees their taskfor the study in fin ding a starting point for 
High-Speed-Rail in Norway and to show away to start rather soon. Therefore 
corridors have to be found where the chanee of realisation is the highest and 
the problems to be solved are the lowest. That does not mean that the corridors 
which are not chosen to take in the investigation are worse for instance by 
regarding travel demand, bul they either are more expensive to build or there 
are different alternatives which have to be compared in detail to find the best of 
these." 
(VWI (2006), page 5-1) 
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In phase 1, VWI considered which corridor was realistically the most feasible. 
Phase 2 then assessed which route in the corridor was best suited on the basis of 
a rough assessment of various data. 
VWI writes as follows: 
"As planning of High-Speed-Rail starts with afeasibility study in a rather big 
scale, not all non-monetised aspeets can be considered. Detailed planning in a 
later phase has to deal with all aspeets in an Environmentallmpaet Assessment 
aeeording to the Norwegian Planning and Building A et. 
In this study basis of the alignment planning are maps in a seale of 1:250.000, 
where smaller loeal environmental important areas can not reeognised. The 
task is more to find the general alignment, ehoosing the right eorridor and the 
optimal speed. This planning will be optimised - also in the point of view of 
environmental aspects - during the following phases of planning if there will be 
a deeision to go on with the projeet. Therefore the aetual alignment is not 
finally flXed and can be moved due to environmental iss u es. " 
(VW! (2007a), page 15) 
In its report, VWI gives a very rough assessment of corridors and ofroutes 
within chosen corridors. For the chosen routes , it is possible to make a rough 
assessment of quantities and the distribution oftunnel/open 
stretches/construction. The object is to assess whether it is technically possible 
to build a high-speed line within the prevailing design criteria, as well as to 
present the differences between the corridors. Against this background, VWI 
has carried out a ranking and recommended in phase 2 of the report that Oslo -
Trondheim and Oslo - Goteborg should be investigated in more detail. 
VWI made its choice of which corridor had the greatest possibilities for 
positive use on the basis of severaI factors. Two of the factors are based on 
constructional feasibility and costs at a very general leve l. Different degrees of 
uncertainty are associated with the different corridors. Considerations other 
than the technical aspects of construction, which would arise during changes in 
assumptions in the course of more detailed planning, could give different 
resuIts and priorities for the final location of the route within the corridor. 
The assumptions given in the operational and market assessments give 
powerful guidelines as to where the line of the route is drawn. We would point 
out in this context assumptions such as the whole line be ing constructed as one 
development, no goods traffic on the line, single track, combined use with 
Intercity traffic etc. 
5.2 Line routing 
The VWI reports briefly discuss alternative routes. The routes have been 
assessed at a generalleve\, which will necessitate detailing the routes in a wider 
OOWI 
Status of know ledge on high-speed rai l in Norway 61 
perspective in later planning stages. By comparison, the operations and 
maintenance depot for train units has be en described in gre at detail. As VWI 
says, the purpose is to give a recommendation ofwhich corridor should be 
carried to the next stage. VWI presents sufficient information to estimate an 
overall cost level, reveal the most significant challenges and consequences and 
assess the technical feasibility of the different corridors. Even so, we believe 
that later planning stages should incIude a new assessment of which corridor 
and route should be chosen in the stretches that are being investigated, since the 
present route assessments have be en at a very generalieveI. 
In ph ase 3 VWI describes in its conclusions that no ranking of the corridors has 
been made. The Oslo - Trondheim, Oslo - Bergen (Geilo) and Oslo - Stavanger 
corridors give relatively equal results. Oslo - Goteborg and Oslo - Trondheim 
have positive benefit. There is relatively great uncertainty about some of the 
corridors and more investigation is needed before one can be certain about the 
scope and feasibility. This applies especially to the line in West Norway and 
the proposed fjord crossings. Further investigations should focus on the areas of 
greatest uncertainty to see whether there are any negative or positive conditions 
and then assess the scope ofthese conditions and whether it is possible to build 
the route. This has been done to some extent in Metier's report, but some of the 
conditions must be gone into in more detail to show the extent of the 
uncertainty and costs more precisely. 
5.2.1 General aspects of line routing in the various corridors 
The maps shown in VWI's reports are of such a small scale that it is difficult to 
assess the need for constructions or the extent of filling and cutting. Such 
assessment requires a better presentation of map materials, perhaps even a 
separate volume of drawings. Some sections are shown with more detailed 
maps, but on the whole the difficult parts and are as are not described in the 
report. 
It would appear that the routes mainly lie in the terrain of valley tloors, with 
tunnels between the valleys. We cannot see that an assessment has been made 
ofviaducts or bridges to cross valleys with the line located at high level. In one 
place there is consideration of keeping the route high in Numedalen, but it has 
been taken down to Geilo and then up to Ustaoset again. An assessment should 
be made of whether it is possible to locate the route high in the terrain and cross 
the valleys on high bridges or in the mountainside so as to maintain the height 
and thereby avoid great variations in the vertical curvature. A consequence of 
this could be that the route is more visible in the terrain. 
Geological challenges presented by the Moss-Halden and Minnesund-Heimdal 
stretches have been assessed in a report from NGI (Olsson and Morgan, 2007). 
NGI also contributed to the assessment of the costs of the proposed routes in 
the work done in Metier's report on costs. Geotechnical and constructional 
aspects are also discussed in the SINTEFINGI report for the Oslo 
Trondheim/Halden routes. We cannot fmd any corresponding investigations of 
the other routes. 
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The text below gives a simple assessment of the various routes, to evaluate 
possible cost reductions, point out various areas of conflict and look at 
alternative routes that might provide input for later planning phases. All routes 
have been assessed on the basis of what is described and shown in the VWI 
phase 2 and 3 reports. 
Sørli - Trondheim 
The route branches off from the existing line at Sørli , descends into agricultural 
landscape and crosses under/over the E6 in cuttings across the agricultural areas 
at Stange in the direction of Løten. The route appears to keep to the elevation 
around Løten before entering the Østerdalen valley. A new station at Stange 
will be in the vicinity of the E6, thereby offering good accessibility to/from the 
motorway. The location of the new Stange station will be between the new 
Tangen station and Hamar station. 
Figure 5.1: Routes between Tangen and Østerdalen with alternatives through 
central Hamar 
Plan 3·1: Ground plan Oslo - Trondheim Part 1 
.. . 
Source: VWI (2007a), plan 3-1 
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VWI has not assessed the costs of developing new double track over Sørli -
Lillehammer, since this is not proposed as a new route for high-speed rail. An 
assessment should be made ofwhether a new high-speed line should follow the 
new double track up to Lillehammer. New track could also be consideredjust 
east of Hamar where it goes bes ide the E6 and on up to Lillehammer. In the 
VWI report, other solutions are looked at that keep the present station. The 
development of new high-speed track Oslo - Trondheim should be viewed 
together with the Intercity strategy to Lillehammer. VWI has recommended not 
following Gudbrandsdalen with new high-speed track. To get over to 
Status of knowledge on high-speed rail in Norway 63 
Gudbrandsdalen with high-speed track, a new tunnel must be bu ilt from 
Lillehammer to Koppang that would be around 55 km (aeross Åstdalen) be fore 
going on up to Østerdalen. 
The route follows Østerdalen along the Glåma and the present line before 
climbing up the western side of Østerdalen and going over to Kvikne. It 
appears that the route VWI proposes is representative for the Koppang -
Heimdal section. A couple of large bridges/embankments may be necessary 
where the line cross es the main valley or side valleys. An example is at Alvdal 
where the valley opens up and flattens out, while new track must maintain 
elevation in the terrain so as to climb up towards Kvikne. The VWI route 
appears to be the shortest and it has the least tunnel/constructions which means 
there is a strong possibility it is also the cheapest alternative. We must assume 
that there will be some more short and medium length culverts/tunnels in 
places, as well as by buildings. The most recent experience ofthis area is from 
the section bes ide lake Mjøsa. Here the County Governor has chosen to 
increase the proportion of tunnel so as to lessen the level of conflict. The route 
is only shown to Heimdal. The route onward to Trondheim should also be 
described in more detail. 
An alternative to the route via Kvikne could be Rendalen-Hessdalen-Tolga-
Selbu-Stjørdal-Trondheim. This route however be somewhat longer and 
probably more expensive. On the other hand this route may have minor 
conflicts with existing rail, road and building, and there could be more major 
conflicts with the natural surroundings in Tydal and Selbu. 
VWI considers that it would be possible to establish a railway with a 1.25 per 
cent gradient between Oslo and Trondheim, with the exception of a stretch of 
about 70 km between Kvikne and Støren. Here the gradient would be 2.5 per 
cent. In this case consideration should be given to whether a route can be found 
that either alone or in combination with existing track can carry goods between 
Oslo and Trondheim with a maximum gradient of 1.25 per cent. 
VWI follows the most obvious route for a new track between Oslo (Sørli) and 
Trondheim (Heimdal). The conflict level is judged to be highest at Løten 
(agriculture), in and near bu ilt-up are as (Koppang, Rena), the rail route via 
Kvikne where there is not currently any railway (wildlife/nature) and on the 
Støren - Heimdal stretch where the valley is narrow and has much other 
infrastrueture. 
Oslo - Goteborg 
The chosen route mainly follows glacial deposits through Østfold that are 
described as moraine and which traditionally provide a good foundation for 
building, but the route als o traverses agriculture and cultural heritage sites, of 
which there are many along the moraine in Østfold. The route goes via Solli, on 
to Sarpsborg and the station at Alvinjordet before crossing the river Glomma. 
Alternatives in later planning phases may be to run the route more to the north 
so that it will cross north of Solli , in a tunnel through Stikkaåsen, and north of 
the new Østfold central hospital. Thereafter the route would follow as shown 
in the VWI report via Kalnes to Tunejordetl Alvim, with astation here. The 
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station is adjacent to the E6 and would allow a branch to the present Østfold 
line. It would thereby be possible to commute towards Fredrikstad and existing 
railway. The line is shown with a cross ing of the Glomma to Arum and then 
follows the landscape to the existing line at Skjeberg. The line follows an 
otherwise open agricultural area beside the E6 and gives Sarpsborg station good 
access to the E6. 
From Skjeberg the line follows the present railway to central Halden. This route 
is relatively easy to build as far as Berg crossing point. The route from Berg to 
central Halden runs bes ide Iddefjorden and may pose problems with regard to 
tunnels and crossing the Halden river at its estuary with a large bridge (with 
fairly poor building ground according to Halden operational area). Possible 
conflicts in this area are nature conservation and taking the fjord into account. 
The route as drawn shows a line across the present harbour where it uses the 
area of the present station as a station area. The costs ofthis are not known. 
They will probably be high, because the area has been shown to have very poor 
building ground. Conflicts with the town centre could be resolved but there 
would be a need to build two bridges, while the route would also impact on 
homes and businesses in Kirkegata. The speed through Halden must be low if 
major consequences are to be avoided. The routes between Haug and Halden 
must be assessed together with the development of the Intercity area. 
The route from central Halden on to Kornsjø appears to go through a tunnel 
that rises to the fields by Idd church and then climbs to a new plateau at 
Aspedamrnen/Gullundmosen. The route continues to the north of ørsjøen. In 
this section VWI has chosen not to run the route along the present railway. 
Why they have chosen to make it different is not made clear. The consequences 
will be greatest for nature and leisure activities, since the route runs north of 
ørsjøen, which is an open space accessible from Halden. 
No actual gradient is stated for the section from Halden up to Aspedammen. 
When working on a new route from Halden to Kornsjø, this should be se en in 
context with the problems faced by goods traffic in Tistedalsbakken. The tunnel 
between Halden and Aspedammen should be considered with regard to a 1.25 
per cent gradient and the possibility of improving Tistedalsbakken and goods 
traffic to Europe. The route shown is suitable as a representative route for the 
corridor. But it raises questions regarding costs, which are around 11 million 
kroner. This appears rather low considering the bridge over the Glomma, 
passing the Solli area and a long, rising tunnel from Halden up to Aspedamrnen 
(compare with the cost of the Oslo-Ski double track). There is relatively easy 
building ground in most parts but the routes through Halden and major 
constructions will affect costs in this corridor. 
Alternative routes that might be considered are from lngedal/Berg across 
Svinesund and east of Strømstad. A new station for Halden would be at 
Bergllngedal. The route will connect with Uddevalla and the Bohus line and 
will involve major investment on the Swedish side. 
Another alternative is to run the line onward from lngedal up towards Raet and 
Rokke befare cross ing past Tistedal. The new station for Halden would then be 
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Tistedal. This line would avoid the slope from Halden and upward, but would 
run through more virgin terrain, with the consequences that follow from 
impacting on an agricultural, naturai and outdoor area with little building. 
Fi ure 5.2: The route between Råde and Koms·ø 
Plan 3-6: Ground plan Oslo - Gøteborg 
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Source: VWI (2007a), plan 3-6 
Oslo - Goteborg - Stockholm 
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The VWI report does not recommend going any further with Oslo - Stockholm 
un less this is done as a collaboration between Jernbaneverket and TrafIkvarket. 
The reason for this is that most of the route lies on the Swedish side. The 
Swedish report on high-speed rai!, which was presented on 14 September 2009, 
proposes building high-speed lines on the Stockholm - Goteborg and 
Stockholm - Malmo routes. Today the journey from Oslo to Goteborg takes 4 
hours. With a new line, the trave Iling time is estimated at 2 hours 20 minutes. 
The Oslo - Stockholm route currently takes 6 hours by train. With upgrades to 
two stretches, Lillestrøm to Åmotfors (80 km) and Hallsberg to Karlstad (119 
km), traveIling time can be reduced to around 3 hours . VWI has estimated the 
traveIling time on a new line between Oslo and Stockholm as 4 hours, if it is 
only built on the Norwegian side, that is to say without a high-speed line on the 
Swedish side. With a new high-speed line between Goteborg and Stockholm, 
with an estimated trave Il ing time of2 hours 30 minutes, Oslo - Goteborg -
Stockholm could be done in about 4 hours 50 minutes if the train passes 
through Goteborg without stopping. 
Oslo - Kristiansand 
The route starts at Porsgrunn station and mainly follows the line described in 
the county plan of 1999, which recommends an outer corridor along the coast. 
This route can be built in two large sections, Porsgrunn - Skorstøl and Skorstøl 
- Kristiansand. The route will have many small, short tunnels (less than 5 km) 
and runs through slightly undulating terrain as far as Skorstøl. 
An alternative route for Porsgrunn - Skorstøl could be to branch off of the 
present line before Porsgrunn station, follow the E 18 and cross Frierfjorden 
together with the E 18, so as to give a straighter line towards 
Skorstøl/Kristiansand. The advantage ofthis route would be that it is shorter, is 
more straightforward to bui!d than going through the built-up area of Porsgrunn 
and would maintain speed for nonstop trains passing Porsgrunn. 
Another alternative from Porsgrunn is to run the route through by going north 
ofFrierfjorden so as to avoid having a large bridge and then beside Rv 356 to 
the Sørland line at Neslandsvatn. The new line would follow the direction of 
the present railway from Neslandsvatn and on to Gjerstad . The route straightens 
out to the present Sørland line outside Skorstøl and rejoins the Sørland line at 
Vegårdshei. This gives an inner line that uses areas that the Sørland line already 
goes through. This allows the possibility ofbuilding section by section and will 
not mean a completely new barrier in the areas where the line runs bes ide the 
Sør land line. The ide a is to as closely as possible follow the present railway, 
which follows the line of the valley/terrain and mainly runs parallei with the 
coast down to Kristiansand. 
South of Skorstøl the route shown in the outer corridor goes through severai of 
the south coast towns. From the detail drawings show ing the raute it appears 
that speed will be reduced through these towns (R 2000 m). From the detail 
maps the route also appears to have many curves, while on the general maps it 
appears to have long straight lines. The opportunity for building section by 
section is limited, since the existing line runs further inland. The ro ute as drawn 
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goes through the towns. Consideration should be given however to running the 
route around the outskirts of the towns, so as to maintain the speed ofpassenger 
trains and reduce costs by avoiding built-up areas. For example one could 
con sider building branch lines from the main line to the towns ifthere is a 
press ing need for a station in the town centre itself. The VWI only describes 
Arendal as a potential stopping place, which indicates that the line should be 
kept outside the other towns rather than running through them. Consideration 
could be given to inc1uding Kjevik airport in the section from Lillesand to 
Kristiansand. Ifthe route had run further inland, there is astrong possibility of 
reducing the consequences for bu ilt-up areas, as well as giving lower 
development costs. Such a line would be less attractive if it became relevant in 
the future to run local trains between the centres of the south coast towns. The 
route runs through the centre of Kristiansand, which would lead to high unit 
prices and problems with difficult building ground. 
Fi ure 5.3: Routes between Tvedestrand and Kristiansand 
Source: VWI (2007b), 2-6 
Kristiansand - Stavanger 
The routes run c10se to Mandal, Lyngdal, Flekkefjord, Soknedal and Egersund. 
This is similar to the section east of Kristiansand that is run along the coast and 
brings the same consequences. The topography ofthis route mainly runs across 
valleys and hi Ils, where to the east of Kristiansand it was more paralleI with the 
line of the land. We can assume that the section between Kristiansand and 
Egersund would involve a great deal of construction, with bridges/viaducts and 
short tunnels. It could be advantageous to build the line section by section and 
place it in the same corridor as the E39 and existing railway. For example 
existing tunnels can be used for the new line or as escape routes ifthe new 
route runs paralleI. Between Eigersund and Sandnes landscape conservation 
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issues may dictate the choice of route. Costings should take this into 
consideration in this area. 
Stavanger - Bergen 
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The route shows an alm ost straight line between Bergen and Stavanger with 
stops at Stord and Haugesund. There are two long undersea tunnels, of 43 and 
55 kilometres, as weU as a long bridge and two smaller ones. The route through 
Haugesund and BergenlNesttun is below ground level in a culvert. Both the 
tunnels under the fjords have two bores, one in each direction. The station in 
the culvert in Haugesund is associated with great uncertainty and high costs. 
Consideration should therefore be given to running the route outside the town 
centre. 
An alternative development would be to run the line through Arna, which 
would make it possible to avoid having a tunnel through BergenlNesttun, while 
the bridge across Samnangerfjorden could be reduced in size or done away 
with . Costs may also be reduced, by runn ing the route through less built-up 
areas. Even so, a great deal of the route would be through tunnel. 
Oslo - Bergen via Hallingdal 
The route follows the present railway through Hallingdal. As VWJ points out 
this allows the possibility of having many connections between the two lines in 
case of line closure, as well as allowing for section by section development. 
The route appears to be very closely connected with the present railway, which 
may give unfortunate effects with existing rail and traffic. The route has many 
curves, some of which have a radius down to alm ost 2,000 metres. The current 
requirement for curve radius is 4,000 metres. This requirement would give a 
somewhat altered ro ute in Hallingdal. This in turn could lead to a greater 
proportion of tunnel than is shown on the map. 
This route assumes that the Ringerik line will be developed. The route and 
costs are therefore only shown west of Hønefoss. We are unsure ifthis is right, 
since the development of the Ringerik line is mainly to shorten the Oslo-Bergen 
route. If Oslo-Bergen runs through Numedal or Haukeli there is a possibility 
that the Ringerik line will not be developed. This issue should be described 
more closely in later planning. 
The route from Geilo to Voss also follows the existing route to a gre at extent. 
Between Hallingskeid and Mjøllfjell a long tunnel has been chosen. It appears 
that the route could be upgraded to 4,000 metre radius without great changes to 
the route chosen. The route via Finse will present some challenges. The route 
here will rise to 1,222 metres above sea level. Building it close to existing track 
is both positive and negative. 
It appears that the route between Voss and Bergen has be en chosen to be as 
straight as possible so that high-speed trains can be run. Most of this part of the 
route runs through tunnels. Jf the curve radius is updated, the proportion of 
tunnel will probably increase. 
Oslo - Bergen via Numrnedalen (VW I) 
Status of knowledge on high-speed rail in Norway 
The route VWI has indicated mainly follows the same corridor as 
Høyhastighetsringen between Flesberg and Geilo. Between Haugastøl and 
Voss on the other hand, VWI has followed the Bergen line. 
Høyhastighetsringen's route is described in more detail in the next section. 
Kongsberg · Gei lo Groundpl an 
Scala: 1 :2~OC'::: 
Source: VWI (2007b), plan 2-17 
Plan 2- 17 
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VWI's proposed route follows the existing line north from Drammen to 
Kongsberg, with a station in Kongsberg. The route runs though a relatively 
untouched area. This will therefore give some negative consequences for the 
area, but will also have the advantage of building away from built-up areas. 
Along Tunhovdsfjorden appears to be a good place to build, but is also possibly 
an area that is at present largely unaffected by other infrastrueture. The route 
should be considered all the way from Drammen, so as to be able to consider 
routes that do not go through Kongsberg. This is mainly to see ifthe route 
could be made shorter by running straight on at Hokksund and up to 
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Numedalen. Satisfying the 4,000 metre radius requirement appears to be easier 
in Numedal than in Hallingdal. 
Oslo - Bergen (Høyhastighets ringen) 
Høyhastighetsringen has praposed a long tunnel from immediately to the north 
of Drammen station to Vestfossen. Unlike VWI's route via Numedalen, 
Høyhastighetsringen follows the mountainside up towards Holtefjell and runs 
in a tunnel up to Lyngdal, from where it runs in long curves until it meets 
VWI's raute at Rollag. This raute may appear to be shorter than the one chosen 
by VWI, but this raute does not use Numedalslågen or Bingselva to climb but 
instead turns the raute 90 degrees from the direction of travel. This gives a 
visible effect on the hillside at Hokksund. The choice of a long tunnel between 
Drammen and Vestfossen appears to be costly compared with us ing the present 
line. Between Haugastøl and Voss, Høyhastighetsringen has praposed a 
somewhat different raute to that in VWI's report. In 2007, Høyhastighetsringen 
put forward a praposal for a tunnel from Haugastøl to Voss. VWI commented 
on this section in its report. The disadvantage of the Høyhastighetsringen raute 
is a tunnel of almost 42 km and a gradient in the tunnel of l.S per cent. Its 
advantage on the other hand is that the highest point on the Bergen line is 
reduced to about 1,000 metres above sea level, just west of Haugastøl. The 
height differential from Voss of about 920 metres over about 80 km could give 
less of a descent down to Voss than the raute via Finse. 
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Between Voss and Bergen, Høyhastighetsringen has proposed moving the 
Bergen line via Samnanger and Norheimsund. The raute consists mainly of 
long tunnels, of 10.3 km, 13 km, 30 km and 5 km. Alternatively the raute could 
run straight from Ulvik to Norheimsund, which would make the line shorter. 
Even so, it would still consist of long tunnels. In this case the raute would run 
along Hardangerfjorden instead of Veafjorden where the Bergen line runs 
today. 
Figure 5.6:Høyhastighetsringen's praposal for the Oslo Bergen raute 
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This route is shown in phase 3 of the VWI report. The route via Haukeli is 
mainly similar to the Norsk Bane route that was presented at agenerallevel. 
VWI has not assessed a branch line to Haugesund. The route straightens and 
follows the Sørland line as far as Bø station, befare following the valley up 
towards Haukeli. The line goes up to Tveitevannet (550 metres above sea leve l) 
before entering a 30 km tunnel under Haukeli to Suldalsvatnet. An alternative 
route is more of a straight line to Røldalsvatnet and on to Odda (80 metres 
above sea leve l). As with Hallingdal, the route is in typical V shaped valleys 
which present problems of rigid curvature and adapting to other infrastructure 
on the valley floar. Rockfalls and avalanches can also be a problem. One of the 
biggest challenges and uncertainties on this route is to cross Hardangerfjorden 
with a bridge span of alm ost 1,500 metres. This route has less of a height 
differential than via GeilolHallingdal, but it does present the problem of 
crossing Hardangerfjorden. 
Source: www.norskbane.no 
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Oslo Stavanger via Haukelifjell 
The route shown in the VWl report goes outside Haugesund. Between 
Drammen and Haukeli it is the same as Oslo-Haukeli-Bergen. The route runs 
largely through tunnels as far as Ølen, apart from an open section near Sauda. 
From Ølen it follows the E 134 and E39 on the surface, before the tunnel under 
the fjord to Stavanger. 
An inn er route that could be considered follows Rv 13 from Røldal down to 
Sandnes. This alternative has long traditional tunnels in the mountains and a 
long bridge across Høgsfjorden at Forsand, as well as a difficult cross ing at 
Jøsenfjorden This is a somewhat different route to that shown in the VWI 
report that goes by Haugesund and the problems this involves in cross ing 
Boknafjorden. 
5.3 Assessment of environmental effects 
The VWI report discusses environmental effects at a generalieveI. The 
assessments described appear to be based on maps with a scale of 1 :250,000, 
and the poor resolution they provide is a very bad basis for assessing the impact 
consequences on the terrain. 
Noise is considered in phase 1. Noise is described as being a bigger problem in 
Gudbrandsdalen than in Østerdalen. Otherwise there is little assessment of 
environmental effects in phase l. 
High-Speed-Rai! will create negative environmental impacts in 
Gudbrandsdalen probably more than in Østerdalen. E.g. less people will be 
pol/uted by noise in Østerdalen than in Gudbrandsdalen. There will be no 
benefits as regular stops and coverage of dem and to compensate the negative 
impacts in the val/eys. The higher demand in Gudbrandsdalen, however, allows 
a goodfeeder-traffic to High-Speed-Rai! in Hamar." 
(VWI (2006), page 5-4) 
After the corridors, Oslo - Trondheim and Oslo - Halden respectively, were 
chosen, a deeper analysis was carried out in phases 2 and 3, in which the 
environmental effects of the various routes proposed for investigation were 
considered. 
Phase 2 of the VWl report describes environmental effects in the chosen 
corridors. The assessment was made on the basis of routes drawn on a map with 
a scale of l :250,000. The assessments only show the effect on national parks 
and major conservation areas. VWI was of the opinion that it was not possible 
to record small er areas on this scale. 
The topic of non-monetised effects is discussed as follows: 
"Environmental aspects are an important issue in the planning of High-Speed-
Rai!. In the socioeconomic analysis, environmental aspects are included either 
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within a category where the elements are monetised or as non-monetised 
elements. Non-monetised aspects are: 
• landscape/cityscape, 
• community and outdoor li/e, 
• cultural heritage and 
• natural resources. " 
(VWI (200?a), page 14) 
Noise and greenhouse gas emissions are discussed in phases 2 and 3. The 
environmental effects of reduced CO2 emissions are considered in the report 
together with the proportion of tunnel for each section. The VWI report do es 
not include a complete environmental audit for the transport sector with and 
without high-speed rai!. Both the VWI and Banvarket reports state that 
developing high-speed routes will have a positive effect on the environment 
due to reduced emissions from the transport sector. 
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VWI further considers that planning work be followed up with analyses of the 
consequences of all monetised and non-monetised effects, including the natural 
environment, natural resources, landscape and cultural environment, in 
connection with more detailed assessments of the routes. 
Wildlifefencing and crossings are the two elements that we can see have be en 
included as regards impact consequences. It is planned to have a fence along 
the line to keep out wildlife, as weU as crossings every 2 to 3 kilometres 
depending on the density of wildlife. For the Sørli - Trondheim stretch, 142 
such crossings are planned at a cost of2.5 million kroner each. 30 crossings are 
planned for Råde - Goteborg. The cost per crossing is possibly correct, but 
since no other costs for environmental disadvantages and mitigating measures 
have been included, the probability is that costs relating to impact 
consequences wi Il increase. 
5.3.1 Cross section width of high-speed line 
VWl's phase 2 report shows an illustration of the width of a high-speed railway. 
This is reproduced below. No reference is made to other reports that could give 
more detailed information about the width that such a track could have. 
Figure 5.8: Normal cross section of high-speed line 
Frgure 3-/ Lateral cut of High-Speed Raltway Lrne 
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Source: VWI (2007a), figure 3-1 
The width shown is the minimum area with which such a railway affects the 
surroundings it passes through . In addition to the railway itselfthere is a need 
for rai sed embankments and cuttings, safety zones, maintenance roads etc. The 
railway influences its surroundings with noise and light and also changes the 
traffic and movement patterns of the area it passes through. At this level of 
planning it may appear that it is sufficient to assess the actual railway itself, but 
the information in the VWI report raises expectations that they have made a 
more detailed assessment of the impact of the railway on the landscape than is 
actually the case. The next stage ofplanning should therefore include an 
assessment of the impact around the track itself, which can be used in turn to 
optimise the route and prov ide a better cost estimate of necessary measures. 
5.3.2 The VWI report on route and environmental effects 
VWI assessed the routes on the basis of 1:250,000 maps. The purpose of the 
feasibility study is to assess which corridors are best suited to high-speed rail 
lines and where costs and consequences are assessed as the lowest. This was 
largely done in phase 1. It is assumed that it is possible to adjust the route 
within the corridor so as to avoid the biggest consequences. The VWI report 
points out that there are better possibilities for changing the route in Østerdalen, 
since this is a U shaped valley that is wide enough to allow for adaptation, than 
in Gudbrandsdalen, which is a V shaped valley with a much narrower valley 
floOf. Gudbrandsdalen als o has more infrastructure and building, which again 
makes this corridor less suitable for adaptation. 
It would have be en useful to review the routes with a simple assessment with 
the aid of GIS tools that can give a more detailed description of the routes and 
the areas they pass through. Such an analysis could describe the route in 
relation to land use data and how many people it affects within a given distance 
(noise etc). Most ofVWI's routes run through large built-up areas, which will 
gi ve very high costs. As we understand it the route proposals are very general , 
but where a route goes through a town centre so as to have a central location 
this should be reflected in the costs. Some ofthe routes run close to towns 
where we cannot see that the trains will actually stop. We assume this has been 
done so as to make a stop possible ifthe market exists. Ifthe trains will not stop 
at these places, the route should be moved further away from the built-up areas. 
In this context it would have been appropriate to assess where the route should 
lie instead and how location further away from the town centre affects the 
number ofpassengers. This has been done to some extent for Hamar but not for 
the other routes. 
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5.3.3 Proposal for simple analysis of the route to assess the 
consequences 
N2S0 includes data at area level such as forest , enclosed fields , treeless areas, 
buiIt-up areas, marsh and water. Sparser building is at point leve l and probably 
does not include all cabins and houses. N2S0 als o has a good deal of 
generalisation in comparison with NSO. Areas, lines and points are adapted to 
the scale and are therefore evened out and moved a good deal in some places, 
especially where space is tight. From a N2S0 base it is simple to analyse the 
proportion of the different types of area the route runs through, as a whole and 
at county and municipality leve\. One can work out the proportion ofpoint and 
line information such as roads, rivers and houses within a given buffer distance 
from the proposed railway. It is also straightforward to connect to the database 
of the Directorate for Nature Management and carry out the same type of 
analysis on this material, as well as for example quaternary geology and 
bedrock from NGU. 
The terrain model is used to define the route. We do not at present know the 
degree of accuracy of the terrain model that provides the basis. If it has the 
same accuracy as N2S0 indicates with SO metres equidistance, a great de al of 
terrain will not be shown on this map and the proportion of tunnel will in reality 
probably be somewhat greater. A high-speed train requires rather gentle curves 
which means it is not so easy to bend around all the irregularities. 
5.4 Summary 
5.4.1 Line routing 
As we understand it, the screening in the VWI report was done in such a way as 
to arrive at a corridor and a route with the best potential for making positive use 
of high-speed trains. It does not appear that the other alternatives between 
towns have been considered and excIuded, but that there is the greatest 
possibility for finding benefit in the chosen alternatives and corridors, on the 
basis of the rough analysis that was carried out at this early stage. A later 
planning phase should therefore incIude a more thorough screening of the 
alternative routes in each corridor before the fmal choice of route is made. 
As an overall study of alternative routes in the number of corridors that were 
investigated, the line routing shown in the VWI report provides a good enough 
answer to the type of challenges presented by the various routes, and the report 
also gives some rough estimates of quantities. The technical rules have also 
changed in recent years. This means that the routes need to be revised. New 
requirements mean that routes through narrow valleys with many ascents and 
descents may require an even higher pro port ion of tunnel and have less 
opportunity to follow the curvature of the terrain . 
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There are further challenges relating to certain limited stretches that should be 
investigated further in later stages of planning. The greatest uncertainties relate 
to the routes in western Norway that have long tunnels beneath the fjords, large 
bridges with long spans and long tunnels and stretches with extreme 
ascents/descents. More consideration should be given to winter operations 
where a line crosses high mountains to see if this involves substantial measures 
etc. 
The routes vary greatly in form and are very distinct from each other. Some of 
them go right into and beneath the town centre (Haugesund), others pass just 
outside (SarpsborglKristiansand), while others are a good distance from the 
town centre (Hamar). The routes therefore have very different speed profiles 
with tight curvature in and near town centres. In terms of costs, a route that 
goes through a town will involve a higher cost per metre. Placing a route 
through the outskirts of a town can reduce the level of contlict and the technical 
issues involved in construction. 
Reducing the proportion of tunnel is and will remain a challenge for severaI of 
the routes. The routes with the lowest proportion of tunnel may provide the best 
opportunities for reducing costs, but this can also lead to greater environmental 
disadvantages. 
5.4.2 Environmental effects 
VWI's report provides very little information about consequences of 
environmental impact. The report only describes impact consequences under 
two cost elements: crossings and fences for wildlife. In this phase the cost 
should have been a percentage mark up in accordance with experience. As we 
see it these two items represent costs for mitigating measures for environmental 
impact consequences. 
Severai of the alternative routes that have been investigated go through areas 
where they will affect and change areas of undisturbed nature and open 
landscape and that are currently registered as national parks. It is equally 
important to clarify these conditions as planning criteria for the track itself so as 
to consider whether the route is feasible at all. In some of the routes a choice 
must be made between developing or conserving. VWI's report provides too 
little information about the routes' effect on the environment and landscape to 
be able to con sider the extent of mitigating measures, other than costs per linear 
metre based on experience of similar projects. 
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6 Costs 
6.1 eost estimates 
There are many different cost estimates for building high-speed rail lines in 
Norway. The estimates in VWI's report vary from 200 to 450 million kroner per 
kilometre for infrastructure and rolling stock, depending on track choice. 
VWI writes in its report: 
"For thefollowing ehoice ofeorridars a rough ealeulation ofinvestment eosts 
based on German east rates for railway projeets was done. Due to eheaper 
Norwegian tunnel east rates this speeial rate was reduced. " 
(VWI (2006), page 5-2) 
This is a debatable proeedure, since the costs of high-speed raillines in Norway 
and Germany must be quite different. Among other things, topography, 
population and land-use planning systems are different in the two countries. 
Norsk Bane and DB arrive at lower costs than VWI: 
"The growth in goods and passenger traffie will demand bu ilding eosts of an 
average 180-220 million kroner (at 2008 priees) per kilometre ofnew traek. Jf 
at least ane lang distance raute is to be realised by 2020, this will east 80-130 
billion kroner (at 2008 priees). " 
(Norsk Bane and DB International (2009b), page 3) 
"#The totallength of the new Oslo-Trondheim line is 451 km (Gardermoen-
Trondheim). Ofthis, 252 km is on embankments, in euttings or at ground level, 
177 km is in tunnels and 22 km is on bridges. Building and planning eosts are 
estimated at NOK 73 billion. In addition there is NOK 6.2 billion for 
proeurement ofpassenger trains and NOK 3.6 billionfor goods trains. A 
reserve for unforeseen eosts of l 0% has also been added to all eosts. This gives 
investment eosts of NOK 81 billionfor infrastrueture and NOK Il billion for 
rolling stoek. The estimated construetion time is seven years. fl 
(Norsk Bane and DB International (2009b), page 6) 
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It is difficult to evaluate DB's cost estimate without having unit costs. DB 
proposes a cost of NOK 81 billion to upgrade 451 km oftrack. This is low in 
terms of international experience of cost per kilometre. 
SINTEF arrives at lower costs than DB: 
"Typical unit costs in million NOK per kilometre for different elements of 
groundwork (i.e. without track and other technical rail installations) for lines 
with the challenges we have mentioned above could be: 
apen rai/line infavourable terrain: 15 - 25 
apen railline on soft ground: 40 - 60 
apen railline with high cuttings and embankments: 45 - 70 
Single tunnel, dep en ding on geology: 60 - 120 
Additionfor paralleI service tunnel: 30 - 50 
Bridgelviaductfor single track (normal span widths): 120 - 200 
Technical rai/ installations (all the way): approx. 25" 
(Beitnes and Olsson for SINTEF and NGI (2007)) 
The figures also tentative ly incIude planning and administration costs. 
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"The variation betweenfavourable terra in, such as in the lower part of 
Østerdalen, and undulating terra in such as Telemark (where it is possible at 
all) is very great. It is difficult to imagine total costs below NOK 60 million per 
kilometre, while average costs for line alternatives that include many bridges 
and tunnels can soon reach NOK 150 million per kilometre." 
(Beitnes and Olsson for SINTEF and NGI (2007)) 
SINTEF and NGI's evaluation of the costs involved in building tunnels is very 
low. Cost levels observed in other parts of the world are NOK 300 to 400 
million per kilometre. 
Norsk Bane writes the following in its report: 
"The VWI report stipulates building costs that are many times higher than 
figures experienced in relevant projects abroad ane is lookingfor example at 
costs for superstructure (rai/s, contact conductor, signals and tele) of 75 
million kroner per kilometre for double track high-speed line. This is alm ost 
twice the costs of the complete high-speed lines opened in 2006 in Finland and 
Sweden, see section 4 of the report on the Haukeli line of 15.11.07." 
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We agree with Norsk Bane's assessment of the costs of superstructure. This co st 
should be NOK 25 million per kilometre maximum. 
METIER presents substantial data on infrastrueture costs for new high-speed 
raillines in Norway. For the line between Trondheim and Oslo, with 366 km of 
new infrastrueture, the total cost is estimated at NOK 162 million per 
kilometre. 
The table below shows VWI's cost estimates for the line between Oslo and 
Trondheim. The total unit cost is NOK 168 million per kilometre. 
Table 6.1: Investment costs Oslo-Trondheim, NOK million 
I n t rast LJ ct LJ re Itjl-,/e tm e nt r'~1NOK 
Tunne l (w itho ut supe rs truc tu re ) 8' 45 4 
O pe n lin e 14'398 
Construeti ons 2 '28 1 
Supe rs tru c ture 9'325 
S tati ons 147 
Powe r S upp ly 428 
Spec ia l Iinfrastru c ture 289 
Faci lities 4 0 
C Cl ntract:or C Cl sis 35 ~3§2 
M an age ment/Eng inee ring 10'622 
La nd acquis ition 468 
PlioJec:t: Cos ts 4 6,f442 
tv1a i ntena nce faciliti es 1 '800 
T ota~ iltr1ve s1lm e In]: ,~U3"242 
Unoorta inty 9'622 
Tota l Es ti m ate 57864 
Source: VWI (2007a), figure 6-1 
VWI's cost distribution is not within the range we see for other high-speed rail 
projects around the world. VWI estimates that 19 per cent of the total costs will 
go to project management and engineer services and 17 per cent to uncertainty. 
In our assessment, project management and engineer services should represent 
no more than 10 per cent of the costs of a rai I project. We question whether 
uncertainty should be included in this way in a feasibility study. The 
uncertainty is typically Iinked to other investments the authorities may decide 
on, independently of the high-speed railline. 
In order to be able to evaluate the cost estimates, we have summarised the level 
of high-speed rail projects (observed and estimated) in various parts of the 
world in the table below. 
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Table 6.2: High-speed raillines (observed and estimated) in various parts of 
the world 
Project Planned speed Length Price/km Price/km 
(kph) (km) (million €) (million 
NOK) 
Hannover - Wurzburg 250 327 20.5 167 
Cordoba-Malaga 300 155 16.8 137 
Madrid-Barcelona-F igueras 300 753 17.7 144 
Madrid-Valladol id 300 179 24.0 196 
Paris-Strasbourg 350 300 190 155 
Rhine-Rh6ne (eastem section) 320 140 16.5 134 
(project) 
Le Mans-Rennes (project) 320 182 130 106 
Tours-Bordeaux (project) 300 302 15.8 129 
Bordeaux-Dax-Hendaye (project) 300 225 144 117 
Bordeaux-Toulouse (proj ect) 300 250 12.2 100 
Poitiers-Limoges (project) 300 100 12.3 100 
Marseill es-Toul on-Nice (project) 300 185 324 265* 
Nimes-Montpel lier (project) 300 60 138 112 
Lyon-Turin (project) 300 310 48,4 392*/** 
Perpignan-Figueras 350 44 21.6 177 
Copenhagen-Ringsted (project) 180 52 22.8 186 
Wuhan-Guangzhou 350 968 12.7 103 
Yatsush iro-Kagoshima 260 127 37.2 303*** 
Takasaki-Nagano 260 118 64.8 528*** 
Anaheim-Las Vegas (Maglev project) 500 433 21.8 177 
Baltimore-Washington (Magi ev 420 64 29.0 236* 
project) 
Seoul-Busan 350 412 38.0 309** 
Taipei-Kaohsiung 300 336 39.0 318** 
Goteborg- Borås (pro j ect) 320 60 17.0 136 
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Project Plan ned speed Length Price/km Price/km 
(kph) (km) (million€) (million 
NOK) 
Linkoping-Sodertalje (project) 320 160 15.3 123 
Oslo-Trondheim 200/250 344 20.7 168 
Oslo-Goteborg 200/250 65+170 22 .5 183 
Oslo-Bergen 200/250 395/405 28 .8/27 .5 234/224 
Oslo-Røldal-Bergen 250 411 47.4 386 
Oslo-Kristiansand-Stavanger - 200/250 554 36.1 294 
(Bergen) 
Source: COWI, RFF and GOA (2009) 
*These stretches have especially high area costs and environmental requirements, are 
disputed and require a large number of bridges and tunnels through the terrain. 
**These lines require many bridges and tunnels since they go through mountains. The 
53 km Alpine tunnel, which will be the world's longest rail tunnel and will be 
extremely difficult to build, represents half the cost of the Lyon-Turin project. Drilling 
the 53.1 km tunnel will take five and a halfyears, using 17 machines working from 
different points. It will be subject to high pressure on the tunnel walls, since this is one 
of the highest peaks in the Alps. 
***Building costs are relatively high in Japan because of the need to secure against 
earthquake, the high cost of land and the need for many bridges and tunnels (up to 70 
per cent for these lines). 
120 km, or 37 per cent, of the 327 km Hannover - Wurzburg route is in tunnels, the 
longest two ofwhich are Landrucken Tunnel (10,779 m) south ofFulda and Mundener 
Tunnel (10,525 m) south of Hann. 
Wuhan-Guangzhou, which recently opened, is 18 per cent tunnel and 48 per cent 
viaduct. 
Seoul-Busan is 46 per cent tunnel and 25 per cent viaduct. 
Taipei-Kaohsiung is 18 per cent tunnel and 73 per cent bridges. 
The costs in the table do not include rolling stock. 
For various reasons the costs of different projects are not directly comparable. 
This may be due to technical differences in accounting, expenses occurring at 
different times or the schedule for expenses not being available. 
The costs that VW) has estimated for high-speed raillines in Norway seem 
somewhat overestimated given that they are for single track and relatively low 
speeds. The low speed permits curves of greater radius so as to be able to avoid 
running the route through residential areas. This means that the need for 
expropriation is reduced and land costs are lower. It should also be possible to 
propose routes with fewer tunnels, which will also reduce costs. 
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6.2 Assessment of costs in relation to national 
transport systems 
The methods used in Metier's report correspond with those used for major 
national investment projects. Norsk Bane and Høyhastighetsringen have not 
taken any assessment ofuncertainty into account in their cost estimates. 
Høyhastighetsringen has prepared cost estimates for the routes and has unit 
prices that differ greatly from Metier's report. 
We have looked more c\osely at Metier's report on concept evaluation, co st 
estimates and uncertainty analyses for the Trondheim-Oslo route, prepared in 
October 2007. 
Unit prices: (2007 price level) in Metier's report: 
Tunnel:The unit prices used in the report: 
• ID 1.1: NOK 75 ,000 per linear metre inc\uding entrances 
• ID 1.2: NOK 20 million per rig 
• ID 1.3: NOK 35 ,000 per linear metre service tunnel 
• ID 1.4: NOK 40,000 per linear metre in addition for cross cuts between 
tunnels 
• ID l.S: NOK 60,000 per linear metre for tunnels through loose 
materials and long entrances 
These unit prices appear to be low in comparison with similar major national 
tunnel projects in Norway. Altogether these IDs give an average tunnel cost of 
NOK 118,000 per linear metre of tunnel. 
Comparable cost examples: 
• Skøyen - Sandvika: The price leve I ofthis tunnel contraet was about 
NOK 1,200 per m3• Assuming a cross section ofabout 80 m2 for the 
main bore, this gives a tunnel cost of about NOK 100,000 per linear 
metre ofunfinished blasted tunnel. Concrete vaulting, lights, 
ventilation, emergency equipment and other electronics are in addition. 
• High standard road tunnel: A high standard road tunnel with concrete 
vaulting, lighting and ventilation costs around NOK 140,000 per linear 
metre inc\uding entrances. 
Bridges: The unit prices used in the report: 
• ID 3.4: NOK 120,000 per linear metre ofrailway bridge 
Given varying ground conditions, measures needed, height and width, this 
average unit price appears to be too low. 
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Railway line in the open:The unit prices used in the report: 
• The total of all lDs gives a unit price of NOK 41,400 per linear metre. 
The unit prices used appear to be of a similar level to those of comparable 
projects, although ground conditions will affect the linear metre price to a great 
extent. 
When we met the Norwegian National Rail Administration, we were informed 
that the unit prices in the report are based on experience from rail projects in 
Norway, Germany and Sweden, and particularly the Åland and Sotnia lines. In 
general the unit prices would not be below NOK 150,000 per linear metre for 
new railway line. It is important to point out that the unit prices in Metier's 
report are based on development being carried out as one contract to build the 
entire stretch, which will therefore have economies of scale that are reflected in 
the unit prices. 
Against this background and our knowledge of the price levels ofmajor 
national transport projects in recent years, building such a high-speed rail line 
would require a high quality of execution and solutions. All tunnels should be 
built with good security and concrete vaulting. Bridges must have proper 
foundations and open lines will require a solid foundation and execution, taking 
into account the demanding winter conditions we have in this country and the 
speed the train will maintain on such a track. 
We therefore believe that the cost levels in the uncertainty analysis of2007 are 
too low in relation to what would be realistic for a high-speed railline between 
Oslo and Trondheim in Norway. 
6.3 Direct and indirect costs 
The costs presented in Metier's report are divided into eight main items, which 
are based on quantity . Two items have also been included that are percentage 
mark ups to the contractor costs. The costs that have be en included for wildlife 
crossings should be entered as indirect costs, rather than direct costs as now. 
Experience-based costs representing a percentage mark up on the contract cost 
for groundwork should more correctly be entered as indirect costs for 
mitigating measures with regard to the route's consequences. Currently what is 
included as indirect cost is rather arbitrary and based on a rough assessment of 
the measures that are necessary . Direct costs should primarily cover 
groundworks, technical work for the railway itself, major constructions and 
road diversions, stations and major infrastructure for new line such as 
transformer stations and service depots. 
6.4 Planning regulations and the route of the line 
It is both demanding and irrational that the planning authority for such large-
scale national transport projects rests with each individuallocal authority. This 
could lead to a problematical, time-consuming and not least costly planning 
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process before building can start. This must be allowed for in the client's costs 
and planning costs. 
Another condition that will greatly affect costs is the proportion of the route 
that will go through tunnels and over bridges. We believe that the proportion of 
line that is planned to be in tunnels and on bridges appears rather low. 
6.5 Summary 
In general the studies provide a study of costs that is thorough, well-adapted 
and relevant with regard to the different high-speed corridors in Norway. 
We have however identified some issues and uncertainties, including that the 
studies generally underestimate the unit costs ofbuilding new high-speed rail 
lines, especially with regard to tunnel costs. Metier's uncertainty analysis of 
2007 estimates an average tunnel cost of NOK 118,000 per linear metre for the 
Oslo-Trondheim stretch. Considered against other, comparable national tunnel 
projects, which have costs of around NOK 140,000 per linear metre of tunnel, 
this seems low. Building a high-speed rail line demands a high quality of 
execution and solutions. All tunnels should be built with good security and 
concrete vaulting. Bridges must have proper foundations and open lines will 
require a solid foundation and execution, taking into account the demanding 
winter conditions we have in this country and the speed of the train. Against 
this background, we believe that the costs in the Metier report are toa low in 
comparison to what is realistic. We should also point out that the unit prices 
Metier is operating with are based on development being carried out as one 
contract to build the entire stretch, which will therefore have economies of 
scale that are reflected in the unit prices. 
We also believe that VW1 overestimates the total development costs somewhat. 
The estimates shown by VWI vary between NOK 200 and 450 million per 
kilometre ofrailway line. The figures are bas ed on Gennan cost rates from 
previous railway projects. To begin with this is a rather debatable procedure, 
since the costs must be somewhat different because of the different topography, 
environment, population and land-use planning systems between the two 
countries. Secondly, the figures have been estimated on the basis of single track 
with a relatively low speed. The low speed permits curves of greater radius so 
as to be able to avoid running the route through residential areas. This means 
that the need for expropriation is reduced and land costs are lower. It should 
also be possible to propose routes with fewer tunnels, which will in turn reduce 
costs. 
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7 Requirements for implementation 
financing 
85 
and 
The questions of fmance and how construction is to be implemented hang 
closely together. We will therefore look at these two aspects as one. By 
implementation here, we mean organisational conditions. 
Financing and organisation have been discussed by Agenda Utredning & 
Utvikling AS and in the Swedish public report SOU 2009:74. Agenda has used 
as a basis experience of major infrastructure projects, while the SOU report 
makes a presentation on a more fundamental leve l. 
7.1 Models for organisation and financing 
One problem with the present fmancing reform for rail development is that the 
projects are dependent on armual grants from the national budget, which leads 
to unpredictability and inefficient implementation. That this financing reform 
has not been done away with long ago is due to it also having some advantages: 
the government is not bound to expenses far into the future, but maintains the 
opportunity to control costs and cyclical policy. Because of the way it slows 
rail development however, many wouid prefer to see infrastructure 
development as a total finance decision for the entire project, so-called project 
fmancing. Both the Agenda and the SOU reports recommend this. In the case of 
high-speed rail, where the railway is expected to take market share from air 
traffic, the end point markets are important. Gains in the end point markets 
cannot be realised until the entire development has been completed, which 
would support the idea oftreating the entire development as a whole rather than 
piecemeal projects. 
Various solutions have been us ed with project financing (in Sweden and 
Denmark for example): taking out loans, annual grants with guarantees and 
grants for the entire project and infrastructure funding. Agenda mentions the 
possibility of creating a Norwegian infrastructure fund. This system is us ed in 
Denmark, where Trafikstyrelsen handles p larming, Banedanmark carries out 
detail planning, development and operation of the infrastructure, while 
financing is by grants from an infrastructure fund (and partlyas loans). 
One potential source of fmancial contribution is user payment. In this context, 
users may mean the transport companies that use the infrastructure or the 
passengers on the new train service. For the transport company, user payment 
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may be demanded via a charge for using the track, a charge that may then be 
passed on to the passengers. User payment can also be demanded directly from 
the passengers as a surcharge on tickets. On one hand, user payment can help to 
facilitate the realisation of the development. On the other hand it can have a 
deterrent effect on traffic. These are considerations that must be weighed up 
against financing from tax, which is not without costs itself (collection costs 
and distortion effects). 
When it comes to the form of organisation, a public-private partnership (PPP) 
in some form or another may be appropriate. PPP is a contract between a public 
and a private party to carry out a development project and/or to provide a 
service. The government thus retains a certain amount of control, while the PPP 
can improve cost effectiveness. In terms of economic effects, a PPP is not in 
itself either a blessing or a curse. Success depends on how the public-private 
partnership is organised, and especially the specification of the contract. 
Different models may be chosen depending on what task - for example 
p lann ing, development, operation or financing - is being outsourced to the 
private sector. In some projects it is appropriate for the same party to be 
responsible for both development and operation, so that the development phase 
will take into account what the best solutions for operation are. Also, the risk 
should be shared so that each party is responsible for the risk that party has 
influence over. Furthermore, the quality of the delivery depends on the extent 
to which it is possible to specify, monitor and measure quality. 
The PPP model that Agenda looked at is that used in road sector projects in 
Norway. It is based on planning and development being transferred from the 
public sector to a private company. The private company is also responsible for 
financing the project. When the project is complete, the private company is also 
responsible for operating and maintaining the infrastructure. Involved parties 
that Agenda has interviewed believe that PPP brings an increased focus on 
progress and cost awareness, while ensuring that considerations of future 
operation and maintenance are safeguarded in the development phase. The 
contractor should bear the project's internal risks , while the government takes 
the risks associated with outside factors. 
Examples of project financing and organisational models from the Gardermoen 
line and Botnia line projects (based on the Agenda report): 
Botnia line: the development of the Botnia line is project financed and is 
fully financed with the aid of loans. The borrower is the 
Swedish government. The actual disposal of the funds is 
handled by a dedicated company, Botniabanan AB, which 
transfers the infrastructure to the authorities on completion. On 
completion the costs associated with the project will be paid 
back as rent over 40 years by Banvarket. Since the project is 
fully financed, it will not directly affect the national budget. 
Neither will the project depend on annual grants during the 
construction period. Experience with this form of fmancing 
shows that it provides more rapid development. 
Status of knowledge on high-speed rail in Norway 87 
Gardermoen line: development of the Gardermoen line was project fmanced 
and a company, NSB Gardermobanen AS, was created to be 
responsible for the actual development and operation. NSB 
Gardermobanen AS financed the development with loans from 
the government and was to partly service these through user 
payment, i.e. a surcharge on ticket prices. When the 
development was completed, the project was handed over to 
the Norwegian National Rail Administration, which is 
responsible for operating the infrastructure, and the actual 
operations were transferred to a subsidiary company of NSB. 
Alternative models for organisation are suggested in the Agenda report and the 
SOU: 
The Norwegian National Rai! Administration is project manager and 
commissions a large contracting company for detail planning, development 
and possibly also operation. 
A project company is created that is owned by the Norwegian National 
Rail Administration. The project company is respansible for detail 
planning, development and possibly also operation. 
A project company is created that is responsible for planning and that 
outsources development and possibly also operation to a contractor. 
This last point is the model recommended in the Swedish report. 
7.2 Summary 
The review shows that piecemeal development and fmancing is inefficient, that 
PPP can be an advantage if it is used appropriately and that project financing is 
recommended from many sides. 
To implement the development, one should choose amodel that 
ensures the certainty of financing for the whole project 
gives the optimum distribution of risk between the parti es involved 
give the best possible incentive to cost effectiveness 
gives an incentive to keep to the schedule (although not at any price if it 
puts safety and quality at risk) 
safeguards quality requirements 
ensures a total overview at all stages, sa that quality in the operational 
phase is taken into consideration during the development phase 
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8 Social effects 
In this section we shall con sider the treatment of social effects as they are 
presented in Norwegian and international studies of high-speed rail in Norway, 
as well as certain other sources. The studies we have particularly focused on in 
this section are ECON's cost-benefit analysis (ECON, 2008) and VWI's phase 2 
report (VWI, 2007), although we have used other background reports and other 
sources where we have found it appropriate in this part of the assessment. We 
have also used the method manuals for cost-benefit analysis from Sweden, 
Denmark, England and Germany. VWI's cost-benefit analysis is based on 
German methods (Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing, 2005), 
but has also partly made use of Norwegian unit prices. ECON's is based on 
Norwegian methods (Norwegian National Rail Administration, 2006). 
Sections 8.1 and 8.2 cover calculation assumptions in the socioeconomic 
analyses. Section 8.3 gives an overview of the elements one would expect 
socioeconomic analyses of high-speed rail to cover, before section 8.4 reviews 
how VWI and ECON have handled these elements in their reports. Risk and 
sensitivity analyses are covered in section 8.5. Finally the findings regarding 
socioeconomic analysis are summarised in section 8.6, where we also give 
recommendations for further work on socioeconomic effects. 
8.1 Clarification of the purpose of and alternatives in 
the analyses 
8.1.1 Reference alternative 
Before starting a cost-benefit analyses, the project's goals must be defined. The 
purpose of the VWI and ECON reports is to com pare Oslo - Trondheim and 
Oslo - Gøteborg routes using high-speed rail with the present situation, within a 
given period. In order to achieve the project's goal it is therefore important to 
devise a precise and sufficient description of the situation with and without the 
measure. 
The reference alternative describes the situation if the measure is not 
implemented. As VWI points out, this is not necessarily identical with the 
situation as it is today, rather the reference alternative should describe how the 
situation is expected to be during the analysis period if the measure is not 
implemented. The reference alternative should therefore include measures that 
have already be en decided upon. 
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As mentioned, the aim of VWI's report is to com pare two rail options in the 
year 2020. VWl's reference alternative includes all infrastructure projects that 
have been decided upon (or that have already started) for train, air and road. 
VWI has taken as its basis the National Transport Plan 2006-2015, and all 
investments up until 2015 (if high-speed rai! is not realised) proposed in this 
plan have been included in the reference alternative. The extended capacity 
described in Handlingsprogram for Jernbaneverket (Action programme for the 
Norwegian National Rail Administration), which follows the National 
Transport Plan, has also been included in the reference alternative. 
The development alternative describes the situation including the measure in 
question, which in this case is high-speed rail. VWI defines two development 
alternatives, one version with a high-speed rail line between Oslo and 
Trondheim and another version with a high-speed rail line between Oslo and 
Gøteborg. VWI has also analysed costs for a number of other corridors, but has 
not carried out any full cost-benefit analyses for these routes. 
ECON mentions neither reference nor development alternatives in its report, 
but the purpose of the report is to provide independent quality assurance4 of 
VWl's cost-benefit analysis. It is therefore natural to assume that the reference 
and development alternatives are the same as in VWI's report. ECON also 
mentions that the cost-benefit analysis is based on the same basic figures as 
VWI. ECON also specifically mentions that investments in goods transport in 
the reference alternative could be saved in the development alternative. 
According to the Norwegian National Rail Administration's Method Manual JD 
205, there are severai factors that both the reference and development 
alternatives should describe. 5 Severai of the factors named are described in the 
reference and development alternatives in the VWI report. Changes in 
infrastructure, traffic volume and distribution of means of transport in the 
relationships within the study area are described. In particular, traffic volume 
on the different routes is described in detail, for both the reference and 
development alternatives. In line with the method manual, the population 
around the main hubs for the Oslo-Trondheim alternative is shown. The 
macroeconomic developrnent is not described any further however. Neither 
population and income developments nor price and cost trends are described. 
The report mentions that traffic demand will increase by 34 per cent because of 
demographic changes and economic growth, without specifying this any 
further. It is true to say that not all the factors mentioned in the method manual 
are relevant or important for this project. Population and income developments 
do however have a significant effect on the market shares of the different 
means of transport. This is something the report could certainly have studied in 
more detail. The market analyses are considered in more detail in section 4. 
4 Commissioned by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
5 Method manual JO 205 on socioeconomic analyses for rail, page 38. 
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We find no explicit description of the reference and development alternatives in 
the VWI report (the alternatives are described in severai sections), but the most 
important points have been included in the description. The reference 
alternative described is based on the National Transport Plan, together with 
traffic volume in 2020. The development alternative includes a description of 
the measure itself, as well as assumptions for traffic volume, transport 
distribution and costs. It would still have been an advantage to collect together 
the two alternatives in a more systematic way, so that it would be easier to 
understand what the different altematives actually contain . 
Reference alternative 2020 Oslo-Trondheim 
It is assumed that the Gardennoen line will be extended from Eidsvoll to Sørli , 
regardless of the implementation of high-speed rai\. The extension of the E6 is 
also taken into consideration, as well as access to Trondheim between Heimdal 
and Trondheim central line. Even though the Gardennoen line is extended and 
trave Il ing time will thus be cut by 20 minutes, market share is not expected to 
change, since the Oslo-Trondheim route is dominated by air traffic. Air 
passengers who transit in Oslo or Trondheim and continue to a domestic 
destination (about 1,000 passengers a day) are not included in the study, since 
this market is not within the railway's scope. 
Reference alternative 2020 Oslo-Halden (-Gøteborg) 
It is assumed that the Norwegian National Rail Administration will complete 
the new Intercity line from Oslo via Moss to Råde, regardless of the 
implementation of the high-speed rail project. It is planned to build double 
track between Oslo and Ski in the next few years as well as an extension of 
Moss station and a connection with the existing high-speed sections towards 
Ski and Råde. It is therefore necessary to design a route between Råde and the 
Swedish border. Development in Sweden has not been included in the analysis. 
An analysis has only be en made of the high-speed line in the Norwegian part of 
the Oslo - Gøteborg route. VWI has included all these planned projects in the 
reference alternative. 
8.2 Determining calculation assumptions 
8.2.1 Discount rate 
The discount rate is the required return on the measure. This means that the 
discount rate used should reflect how much society requires as compensation 
for investing in, for example, railway infrastructure. The required return will be 
affected by what kind of return is required by society, represented by the 
elected politicians. Uncertainty linked to the measure will also affect the size of 
society's required retum. The uncertainty in a project is described through 
systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is , for example, the cyclical 
economic situation, while unsystematic risk is project-specific uncertainty such 
as geological conditions. 
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VWI and ECON use different discount rates for the analysis, 2 and 4.5 per cent 
respectively. The rate used by VWI corresponds to what in Norwegian cost-
benefit analysis is called the risk-free discount rate. The risk-free discount rate 
indicates the cost to society of tying up capital in risk-free activities. This 
means that risk is not included when the various cost and benefit elements are 
discounted to the reference year in the analysis performed by VWI. On the 
other hand VWI adds a risk supplement of 20 per cent to its estimated 
infrastructure costs. ECON has used a discount rate of 4.5 per cent, which 
corresponds with that recommended in the Norwegian National Rail 
Administration's Method Manual JO 205. The rate of 4.5 per cent consists of 
the risk free rate of 2 per cent and a risk supplement of 2.5 per cent. This risk 
supplement is to handle the systematic risk in the project. 
The risk supplement in the discount rate is not necessarily the most appropriate 
way of representing risk in all cases. In some cases the risk wil1 be linked to 
specific conditions within the measure and it will be more appropriate to 
perform a qualitative risk assessment. 
In the Department for Transport's guidelines in England, Transport Appraisal 
Guidance (TAG), and in The Green Book, the discount rate is set at 3.5 per cent 
and the analysis period at 30 years. T AG also recommends that a lower 
discount rate should be used to discount costs and benefits that come more than 
30 years in the future. A gradual reduction of the discount rate is suggested. 
According to the guidelines for Danish cost-benefit analyses (Ministry of 
Transport, 2003), by comparison, a discount rate of 5 per cent should be used 
for infrastructure projects in the transport sector. The Danes use a relatively 
long period for analysis: 50 years. 
The reasons why different countries use different discount rates are due to both 
political decisions about the size of the required retum and different ways of 
taking the risk into account. 
In comparison with the Norwegian method, the effect of us ing the English 
method will be that a lower discount rate gives higher benefits in the future ; 
one values future benefits relatively highly in relation to the benefit today. A 
longer period also gives a higher valuation of the benefit. These two effects 
both tend towards a higher valuation ofbenefit. The Danish method has a 
higher rate than in Norway, but also a longer analysis period. These two 
parameters have effects with opposite characteristics and the effect they have 
on the caIculation of benefit will be specific to the particular case. 
Our assessment of the various choices of discount rate is in agreement with 
ECON that a discount rate of 4.5 per cent should be used. This also agrees with 
the recommendations of the Norwegian National Rail Administration and the 
Ministry of Finance. VWI's uncertainty supplement on investment in 
infrastructure alone appears to be a procedure that does not take into account 
the possibility that other cost-benefit elements are uncertain. It should also be 
mentioned that high-speed rail is a project of a size that perhaps the existing 
methodology in Norway has not be en dimensioned for. High-speed rail in 
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Norway will be a measure with a high proportion of fixed costs. This will tend 
to make the measure more risky since it is difficult to ad apt it to changes in 
demand over time. Seen in isolation this would indicate that a higher discount 
rate should be used. This should lead to more attention being paid to sensitivity 
analyses when presenting results. 
Using a discount rate of 4.5 per cent rather than 2 has major consequences for 
calculating the socioeconomic profitability in this case. The net benefit that 
VWI has calculated for the Oslo-Trondheim high-speed railline would become 
negative, since the present value of the benefit will be approximately halved. 
This is because future benefit flows are given less weight with a higher 
discount rate. 
8.2.2 The analysis period 
The Norwegian National Rail AdministrationIs Method Manual indicates that in 
the analysis of a project the following timings must be c1arified: year of 
reference, year of implementation, year of effect, year of calculation and 
analysis period. 
VWI takes care to present all benefits and costs in the form of annual amounts. 
The investment costs are therefore converted to annuities based on each 
component's lifetime. Annual benefit is calculated on the basis of traffic 
calculations for the year 2020, with and without high-speed rai!. The report is 
c1ear about which date forms the basis for the analysis. 
ECON has followed the Norwegian National Rail AdministrationIs Method 
Manual in specifying the various timings in the analysis. The year of reference 
is 2015, the years of implementation are 2016-2019. The years of effect and 
time horizon extend to 2080. ECON has used the same lifetime for the 
infrastrueture components, but has included reinvestment, which we believe is 
the right approach. The basis year for price level is 2006. 
As is current practice, the basis is that the relationship between prices as it 
exists in the basis year remains constant throughout the analysis period. 
Different developments in real prices can change the relative relationship 
between prices (including time values), for example between means of 
transport, and also between benefit and costs. Jf all prices develop in line, the 
analysis will not be affected. If one co st develops at a different rate to prices 
generalJy, WebTAG (Department for Transport) recommends taking this into 
account. In order to make such a correction, we must have an advance opinion 
on future real price development for the relevant costs. Among the countries 
that perform cost-benefit analysis in a similar way to Norway, only the United 
Kingdom, as far as we can see, facilitates such corrections at present, but there 
are signals that Norwegian transport ageneies will consider introducing this. 
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8.3 Mapping effects 
8.3.1 Traffie effects 
The basis for VWI's socioeconomic analysis is a relatively wide market 
analysis of the consequences of introducing high-speed rail in Norway. The 
analysis has been performed using a comprehensive simulation tool. As 
mentioned, VWI's market analyses has been supplemented by a report from 
Urbanet Analyse in which the effects of high-speed rail are simulated with the 
NTMS model. 
80th UA and VWI find that train will take considerable market share from both 
air and carlbus. 
Table 8.1: Modelled market share with and without high-speed train (2020 
without major road measures in NTMS). 
Os lo-Bergen 16 61 23 54 37 9 
051 o-St a',; a nger 7 68 25 32 57 11 
Os lo-Kri sti an sand 13 24 63 48 17 35 
O sl o-Tro ndhe i m 16 45 39 51 28 21 
Oslo-Bergen 24 48 28 45 31 24 
Osi o-Stavanger 14 50 36 31 37 32 
Osi o-Kri sti ansand 22 28 50 32 21 47 
Osi o-Trondheim 18 40 42 33 29 38 
Source: Urbanet Analyse (2008), table 7-3 
ECON has not performed its own market analysis, but bases its own 
calculations on figures from VWI. 
See otherwise section 3, which discusses the market analyses that have been put 
forward. 
The most important driver behind high-speed rail being expected to take 
substantial market shares from air, car and bus is that high-speed rail involves 
reduced generalised travel costs in the eyes of the passengers. By this we mean 
that the total of ticket and time costs is lower for high-speed rait than for air, car 
or bus for a significant num ber of trave liers. 
8.3.2 Monetised and non-monetised effects 
Neither VWI nor ECON take up non-monetised effects such as impact on 
nature and landscape and baITier effects. In a final assessment of development, 
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the non-monetised effects must be taken into consideration together with the 
effects that have been quantified and monetised in the cost-benefit analysis. 
The monetised effects that one should consider including in the cost-benefit 
analysis are: 
railway investment costs 
increased operation and maintenance costs with the rail infrastructure 
changes in operating costs for train companies (including investments in 
rolling stock) 
changes in ticket income for train companies 
changes in subsidy requirements for public transport companies charged to 
the public purse 
changes in operating costs for airlines 
changes in operating costs for bus companies 
changes in maintenance costs (wear and tear) for roads 
changes in road toll income 
changes in ticket income for airlines 
changes in ticket income for bus companies 
changes in ticket costs (driving costs for motorists ) for travelIers 
changes in the trave lIers time usage on travel 
changes in tax revenues to the government 
changes in noise costs 
changes in emissions costs, local environment 
changes in emissions costs, global environment (C02) 
changes in accident costs 
residual value of investment at end of analysis period 
tax cost of net effect on public budget 
investment savings on single projects within the reference alternative 
There may also be costs relating to traffic handling in the construction phase. 
None of the reports presented describes special consequences for operators or 
trave liers in the construction phase. 
Changes to the transport system on this scale can cause changes in company 
and household location decisions, gi ve the population better access to 
employment and give companies better access to a labour force of more 
relevant expertise. The extent to which cost-benefit analyses according to 
current practice cover such effects is a current professional debate. I f the 
assumptions for perfect markets are fulfilled, the consurner and manufacturer 
surpluses calculated in the transport market will reflect the benefit to society 
(with the exception of extemal effects linked to the environment and accidents 
and tax costs, for which corrections are made). With market imperfections, 
added benefits of investments occur, that is to say socioeconomic effects that 
are not included in the present cost-benefit analyses. Empirical studies of the 
connection between transport investments and economic developments have 
shown that it is difficult to general ise when it comes to the extent and direction 
of effects (OECD 2008). No consensus has be en established as to how such 
effects should be taken into account in socioeconomic analyses of transport 
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investments, but there are examples of methods (HeIdal et al. 2009; Department 
for Transport). 
Below we review the ex tent to which ECON and VWl have taken the effects 
we have listed into account. We have structured the review to follow the same 
categories that are used in the Norwegian National Rail Administration's 
Method Manual, i.e. travellers, operators, the public sector and society in 
general. 
8.3.3 Traveller benefit 
Effects for traveIlers include changes in travelling time and costs (ticket costs 
for train, bus and air and driving costs for car). Traveiling time is included by 
both VWI and ECON, although in somewhat different ways, as we shall see in 
section 4.10.6. There we will also go into more detail about the use of the net 
method, which means that changes in monetary travel costs for travelIers are 
not a separate element in either VWl's or ECON's analysis. 
8.3.4 Operator benefit 
We assume that the operators affected are train and bus companies and airlines. 
It might also be relevant to include road toll companies because of reduced car 
traffic. 
The operators will see changes to both costs and income. By costs, we are here 
thinking of operation of the transport, including maintenance and investment in 
rolling stock. Costs are connected to the form of operation, which in this case is 
defined in the case of high-speed rail. (This is discussed in detail in the VWI 
report.) For the other forms of transport affected, we do not how how what they 
offer will be adapted to the presumed changes in demand. ECON only 
considers the operating costs for high-speed rait and assumes that effects for 
other operators can be ignored, since they will adapt to the new basis for traffic 
and income. VWI concludes that society will save transport costs when traffic 
that would have gone by car, air and bus in the reference alternative travels 
instead by high-speed rail in the development alternative. The differences are 
included in the benefit of modal shift. This also applies to the transferred 
traffic. The total operating costs for high-speed rail are shown in a separate cost 
element however. 
Changes in the operators' income are not considered in either ECON's or VWI's 
analysis, since they use the net method. This ignores transfers between parties, 
so that the trave liers' ticket costs and the operators' ticket income - which cancel 
out the socioeconomic calculation - are not shown. Neither therefore is there 
any discussion of the extent to which the new train service will be financed 
from ticket income or public subsidy respectively. ECON do es assume however 
that operation will be fmanced by ticket income and therefore does not 
calculate any tax cost in the operating costs. 
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8.3.5 Effects for the public sector 
A review of the development alternative shows many effects on the public 
budget. The effects cover infrastructure costs, changes in tax revenues and 
transfers (subsidies/public purchases in public transport). According to the 
Norwegian method, a tax cost of 20 per cent of the total effect on the public 
budget should be reckoned on. 
Changes to tax revenues are Iinked to fuel taxes and value added tax. This does 
not normally represent a significant amount and has been ignored here. 
Transfers from the government to the operators are not considered in either the 
VWI or the ECON report. This is presumably outside their mandate for 
discussing how the new train system could be fmanced. 
What remains as a basis for ca1culating tax costs is thus infrastrueture costs. 
The largest cost element here is investment in new railway infrastrueture. On 
top of this come operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. The 
investment, operating and maintenance costs in the VWI and ECON reports are 
based on the same cost estimate. 
According to the recommended methodology, when investments are made in 
installations that have a longer Iifetime than the analysis period, the residual 
value of the investment at the end of the analysis period should be taken into 
account. VWI operates with annuities that are based on the whole lifetime. 
Neither is residual value explicitly diseussed in ECON's analysis . 
In the development alternative it may be relevant to drop projects that will 
apparently be realised in the reference alternative. ECON considers that 
investments for goods traffic in the reference alternative can be saved in the 
development alternative, since track capacity from passenger traffic with 
normal trains will be released. 
Depending on the amount of traffic that moves from road and air, operating and 
maintenance costs for infrastructure there may also be saved. ECON takes this 
into consideration with regard to wear and tear on roads. 
The extent to which VWI has taken saved investment, operating and 
maintenance costs for infrastructure into account is not obvious. 
As regards tax costs, ECON has included this in its figures, while VWI - in line 
with German methods - has not. If tax costs are not be calculated, as in the 
German method, taxes and other transfers between the government and other 
parti es become irrelevant to the analysis. Such conditions are however relevant 
to the traffic analysis to the extent that they are reflected in the prices according 
to which the parties trade. 
Identifying the effect on the public budget is moreover not only relevant to find 
the basis for the tax cost ca1culation. As we see it, it is the effect on the public 
budget that should be the denominator in the cost-benefit fraction if one intends 
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to measure the net benefit achieved by society for each budget krone invested. 
If the operating costs of high-speed rail are to be covered by ticket income, it is 
wrong to include the operating costs in the denominator of the cost-benefit 
fraction as VWI has done. (ECON shows the net benefit, not the fraction .) 
8.3.6 Society in general 
External costs comprise monetised environmental and accident costs. Under 
monetised environmental costs, we would expect to fmd noise costs, local 
emissions costs and CO2 costs. Both VWI and ECON cover all these. Accident 
costs are also covered by both analyses. 
8.4 Valuation of effects 
8.4.1 Calculation principles for traveller benefit and operator benefit 
VWI's cost-benefit analysis is based on German methods (Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Building and Housing, 2005), but has also partly made use of 
Norwegian unit prices. ECON's cost-benefit analysis is based on Norwegian 
methods (Norwegian National Rail Administration, 2006). 
In broad terms (apart from the employment effects, which are included in the 
German method) VWI and ECON take into account the same effects, but in 
different ways, at different levels of precision and to some extent with different 
weighting. In this section we shall concentrate on the main differences in the 
calculations, namely the valuation of benefits and costs for travelIers and 
operators. Let us first outline a framework in relation to which the two analyses 
can be assessed. 
We use the term existing traffic for journeys by train that exist in both the 
reference and development alternatives. By transferred traffic, we mean 
journeys by car, bus or air in the reference alternative where travelIers choose 
train in the development alternative. Newly created traffic is journeys that do 
not take place in the reference alternative but are generated because what is 
offered in the development alternative has been improved. We could usefully 
consider ordinary trains and high-speed trains to be two different forms of 
transport, but neither VWI nor ECON has made this distinction in its 
presentation. 
Benefit for the traveller consists firstly of changes in time costs er -Tl) and 
secondly of changes in ticket costs or driving costs (BO - BI): 
Traveller benefit = fl - Tl + BO _ Bl 
We are thinking here of passengers who originally travel by car, bus, air or 
train and who will make use of the new high-speed train. We ignore effects in 
the travel markets from which these trave liers are transferred, that is to say that 
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those who continue to travel by car or air after the new system is created are not 
considered to experience any changes in trave Iling time or costs. 
Operators in most travel markets will be affected. Both airlines and bus 
companies will experience a loss of income and a cost reduction when traffic is 
transferred to the new trains, and there will be changes in income and costs for 
the train company or companies. By costs, we are thinking here of operation of 
transport, maintenance and investment (with the exception of publicly fmanced 
infrastructure). The sum of the income changes (BI - BO) and cost changes (Do -
DI) for all operators gives the following change in operator benefit: 
Operator benefit = BI - BO + DO - DI 
The tickets represent a transfer from the traveIlers to the operators and are 
cancelled out in the socioeconomic calculation. What remains of the traveller 
and operator benefit is changes in time costs and changes in operator costs. If 
we use the so-called net method, these are the only elements we are concerned 
about from this part of the cost-benefit analysis. If on the other hand we choose 
to present the analysis by the gross method, in which the effects for the various 
parti es are identified, we will show both the traveller benefit and the operator 
benefit explicitly. It is normal to express travel cost and time benefits jointly as 
generalised cost. The change in generalised cost is multiplied by the number of 
journeys (existing train traffic), while the newly created and transferred traffic 
is multiplied by half the change in generalised cost. Altogether, this represents 
the change in the consurner surplus in this travel market. 
The gross method is especially useful if it is the case that the operators' shortfall 
generates a need for public subsidy, so that the subsidy is a cost on which tax 
cost will be calculated. If the purpose is to show the return on each invested 
public krone, such subsidies should also be included in the denominator when 
net benefit per budget krone is caIculated. Operator costs that are not covered 
by the public budget should not be included in the denominator. The soeial 
effect of the changed transport co st that is not in the public budget should 
however be included in the net benefit and thereby in the numerator in the cost-
benefit fraetion. 
The gross method is in line with the set up in the Norwegian National Rail 
Administration's Method Manual. However neither VWI nor ECON have used 
the gross method here, but have caIculated time gains (YO - rI) and changes in 
operator costs (DO - D\ 
8.4.2 Time gains 
The travelIers benefit from time gains with the introduction of high-speed rail. 
VWI calculates the benefit in the following way: the changes in the number of 
hours travelling time in total by train, bus and air respectively, multiplied by the 
time value for each means of transport. Th is corresponds to YO - rI from the 
framework above. Some new traveIlers also come in addition to those who 
were transferred from other means of transport. The new ly created traffic is due 
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to increased accessibility and is attributed a benefit equal to 10 per cent of the 
time gain that was calculated for the existing and transferred traffic. We can 
also consider this to be part of y<J - rI. 
What is referred to in ECON's report as change in generalised cost appears only 
to apply to change in time cost. There is a change in generalised co st (or actual 
traveIling time x time value) multiplied by the number of joumeys. Newly 
created traffic is taken into account by multiplying the relevant number of 
joumeys by half of the change in generalised cost, in line with the trapezoidal 
rule and with Norwegian practice. 
Thus newly created traffic is treated differently in the two methods, while time 
saving for existing and transferred traffic is directly comparable. As regards the 
existing and transferred traffic, this does not in principle have anything to say 
about the ca1culation of saved time costs based on total change in trave Il ing 
time, as VWI does, or on the change in time usage for the individual trave Iler 
multiplied by the number of trave liers affected, as ECON does. The results 
should be the same ifthey are bas ed on the same traffic figures, traveIling times 
and time values. This is however not the case. 
In order to iIIustrate this, we shall look more closely at the analyses of the Oslo-
Trondheim corridor. The combined traffic figures from VWI's report also form 
the basis for ECON's ca1culation. The difference between the two ca1culations 
arises when we look at travelling time by the different means of transport. VWI 
is based on results from a transport model and also includes among other things 
an element of normal train in the case of high-speed rail. ECON makes a 
simplification and considers an average joumey. In this simplification it would 
appear that all passenger joumeys by train in the corridor are by high-speed 
train once this option has been created. This is the main reason why ECON's 
estimated time gain is high er than VWI's. Table 8.2 shows how this difference 
in assumptions affects the res ult of the benefit ca1culation. 
The time values used are based on the Norwegian National Rail 
Administration's Method Manual and represent a weighted ave rage of travel 
purposes. A small difference occurs because the rate for official joumeys by air 
in VWI's ca1culation differs from that given in the Norwegian National Rail 
Administration's Method Manual - probably unintentionally. 
Table 8.2: Comparison of saved time costs with different assumptions about 
I· h trave tIme c anges 
Assumption that all train travel is 
VWI by high-speed train in the high-
speed rail alternative (ECON) 
Saved time Saved time 
Mill. hours 
Time eost per Mill. hours Time eost per 
reduetion value year reduetion value year 
per year (krlhour) (mill. kr) per year (krlhour) (mill. kr) 
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Train -3 .50 145 .20 -508.8 -0.94 145 .20 -135 .9 
Car 0.88 213 .20 186.8 0.60 213 .20 128,8 
Bus 0.99 88 .20 86.9 0.63 88.20 55.9 
Air 2.04 282 .00 576.4 1.95 292.80 570.5 
Total 341.3 619.3 
Source: VWI (2007a) and ECON (2008), own comparison 
VWI calculates that the time gains are worth NOK 341 million per year. With a 
10 per cent addition for newly created traffic, VWI ends up with NOK 375 
million. 
ECON has calculated the average cost change for a journey in this corridor to 
be NOK 430. With the existing and transferred traffic of 1.44 million journeys 
per year, the time gain is worth NOK 619 million per year for this traffic. 
lncluding newly created traffic, the number of journeys rises to a total of 1.95 
million and the result becomes 1/2 x (1.95 + 1.44) x 430 = NOK 729 million 
per year (trapezoidal formula). 
ECON's simplification leads to an overestimate, while VWl has a small 
underestimate (given that the traffic figures are credible). With the time values 
from the Norwegian National Rail Administration's Method Manual and the 
traveIling times from VWI, saved time costs for existing and transferred traffic 
would be NOK 363.4 million per year. The benefit for newly created traffic is 
in addition and according to the German method this will be 10 per cent of 
363.4, so that the combined benefit of time and accessibility becomes NOK 
399.7 million per year. According to the Norwegian method, the benefit for the 
newly created traffic is calculated as the number of joumeys times half the 
change in generalised cost. If here we on ly consider the time costs in 
generalised costs, the change per joumey will be about NOK 252 on average. 
The benefit of newly created traffic will thus be 0.5 x 252 x (1.95 - 1.44) = 
NOK 64.3 million per year, and the combined benefit of time gains becomes 
NOK 427.7 million per year. 
The saved time costs we have described here are not the same as the traveller 
benefit as calculated in Norwegian practice. ECON points out that, to arrive at 
the traveller benefit, one must also take into account the change in ticket costs 
by means of public transport and driving costs by car that the traveller 
experiences. This would have been in line with the gross method. As 
mentioned, ECON does not consider ticket costs or income in this cost-benefit 
analysis, but only looks at time costs and operating costs (net method). 
In the German method, the trave Iler benefit and operator benefit are not shown 
explicitly. Trave Il er benefit is covered partly by time and accessibility (newly 
created traffic) and partly by the benefit of change in the choice of means of 
transport. This last also partly covers the operator benefit. 
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Severai questions arise in connection with the use of time values in cost-benefit 
analysis of high-speed rail. To begin with, it is a weakness that journeys by 
high-speed train and normal train are treated equally as regards the value of 
saved travelling time. What would the consequences have been for the analysis 
res ult if the time value of high-speed rail had been higher? Secondly, there are 
severai ways of valuing time savings when journeys that are taken by ameans 
of transport in the reference alternative are transferred to another means of 
transport in the development alternative. Which principle for choice of time 
value should be taken as a basis? 
High-speed and normal trains are qualitatively different concepts and to some 
extent attract different market segments. It is therefore reasonable to suppose 
that the value of saved travelling time with high-speed trains is on average 
greater than with normal trains. The results of the Urbanet Analyse survey of 
air passengers' preferences indicates this. The time value for high-speed rail 
will probably be closer to that of air than that of normal trains. 
We thus have two situations here: 
I. The time value for high-speed trains is the same as that for normal trains, as 
in the analyses presented. 
Il. The time value for high-speed trains is higher than for normal trains and 
probably closer to that of air travel. 
We recommend assessing Il. This will have consequences for the results both in 
the transport model and in the cost-benefit analysis. We will consider here the 
consequences in the cost-benefit analysis. The result here is affected in various 
ways depending on how we proceed in valuing saved travelling time when 
traffic is transferred from one means of travel in the reference alternative to 
another in the development alternative. 
Time values are based on willingness to pay for a shorter traveIling time and 
include both trave Il er and means of transport specific components. For example 
a high level of income among trave lIers is a property that might help to raise 
the willingness to pay. High comfort is a property of the means of transport that 
might tend to reduce the willingness to pay, since (seen in isolation) it then 
becomes less important to spend less time on board. It is difficult to know 
anything about the composition of the traveller and means-of-transport-specific 
components for precisely the trave lIers who are transferred. There are at least 
three possible ways of calculating the time gain for the transferred traffic. 
A) Time usage for the means of transport being transferredjrom (for example 
car) is valued with a time value for this means of transport (for example time 
value for car journeys). Time usage for the means of transport being transferred 
to (for example train) is valued with a time value for this means of transport 
(for example time value for train journeys). Saved time costs will be the 
difference between the two elements. 
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8) The basis is how many hours are saved (for example 2 hours on ajourney 
that took 5 hours by car in the reference alternative and takes 3 hours by train in 
the development alternative). The time saved is valued with a time value for the 
means of transport the journey is being transferred to (train in this example). 
C) Basis as in 8, but saved traveUing time is valued with a mix of the time 
values of the two means of transport involved. 
VWI's calculation corresponds to A. Killi (1999) recommends B as a general 
rule and C if there is a large difference between the relevant time values. 
Caution is advised when using C. It is difficult to determine the conditions for 
mixing the two time values involved. Killi (1999) takes up this question in 
connection with transferring traffic to or from air, since up to now air has been 
the means of transport that distinguishes itself in terms of the level of time 
values. The recommendation there is to use 1/6 of the time value of the means 
of transport being transferred from and 5/6 of the time value of the means of 
transport being transferred to. 
What might eaU for the use of a mix of the two time values in aur case is that 
there may be a large difference in time value between car and high-speed train. 
The same applies to transfer between bus and high-speed train. Thus in these 
two cases the use of calculation method C may be sensible. For transfer 
between air and high-speed railon the other hand, we believe that the time 
values are more equal. Here the value for the means of transport be ing 
transferred to should be used unadjusted (calculation method B). 
It is probably the motorists with the highest time value who have the greatest 
inc1ination to choose train rather than car when trave Il ing times by train are 
reduced. They could also have travelled more quickly befare if they had chosen 
air, but there are preferences regarding means of transport that have caused 
them to prefer car. They may have a fear of flying for example or they may be 
unwilling to break the journey with waiting and security checks at the airport. 
These motorlsts may have stronger preferences for rail than for air, but as lang 
as the traveIling time by train was so long they continued to use the car. When 
the traveIling time by train goes down, the potential in the benefit of saved 
travelling time is realised for them. Their time value is higher than the ave rage 
for motorists. This indicates that it is appropriate to mave in the direction of the 
time value by high-speed train, which we would assume to be higher than the 
average for either car or normal train. 
We have now seen that the time value for travel by high-speed train can be as 
for normal train (I) or higher (Il) and that there are different ways of valuing 
time savings in respect of traffic that is transferred between means of transport 
(A, B and C). We shall now see that the consequences of using I or Il dep end 
on whether we use A, B or C. Call the combinations AI, All , BI and sa on. 
Assume for the moment that traffic figures are the same regardless of which 
time value is used for high-speed train, so that we can study here the effect on 
the cost-benefit analysis alone. 
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Going from AI to All means that high-speed rail will come out less well in the 
cost-benefit analysis. If we calculate saved time costs in the way VWI has 
done, and introduee a higher value for high-speed train, then higher time costs 
will arise from the development alternative. 
On the other hand, if we go from BI to BIl or from Cl to cn it will be in high-
speed rail's favour. The benefit of saved travelling time is valued more highly. 
It is important to have these conditions c1ear in order to be able to assess c1aims 
such as that higher time value for high-speed rail will have a positive effect on 
the result of the cost-benefit analysis. 
8.4.3 Saved transport costs 
According to both the Norwegian and German methods, one should take into 
account that changes in usage of means of transport affect costs for travellers, 
operators and infrastrueture holders. In general we can list the following effects 
ofthis project for traveIlers and operators (we ignore taxes here): 
T bl 83 T a e : rave Il er an d operator b fi ' hd ene It Wlt eve opment 
Traveller benefit Operator benefit 
ilT Saved time costs 
ilK Saved driving costs, car 
ilBair Saved ticket costs, air ilBair Red. ticket income, air 
ilB bus Saved ticket costs, bus ilBbus Red. ticket income, bus 
ilB,rain Increased ticket costs, train ilB,rain Inc. ticket income, train 
ilDair Red. operating costs, air 
ilDbus Red. operating costs, bus 
ilD,rain Inc. operating costs, train 
Some elements cancel each other out. This IS hand led in different ways in 
German and Norwegian practice. 
German practice: Ignore tickets, which are pure transfers . 
T bl 8 4 C l I' b ti a e .. a cu atmg ene It accor mg to G erman practlce 
Traveller benefit Operator benefit 
ilT Saved time costs 
ilK Saved driving costs, car 
ABair Saved ticket costs, air 
~ ~, ABair Red. ticket income, air ,~ 
ilBbus Saved ticket costs, bus ilBbus Red. ticket income, bus u.r 
ilBtrain Increased ticket costs train ilBtrain Inc. ticket income, train 
ilDair Red. operating costs, air 
ilDbus Red. operating costs, bus 
ilD,rain Inc. operating costs, train 
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Consequently, VWI counts firstly the time gains ~ T, secondly the benefit of 
changed use of means of transport (brackets in the expression below), and 
thirdly the operating costs ~Dtrain with the new trains. 
~ T + (~K - ~Dtrain for those transferring from car) + (~Dair - ~Dtrain for those transferring from 
air) + (~Dbus - ~Dtrai n fo r those transferring from bus) - ~Dtrain 
For us this appears to be a double count of the operating costs for train and for 
the part of the traffic transferred from other means of transport. 
Norwegian practice: Assurnes that operating costs and ticket in come from 
means of transport other than the travel market we are considering offset each 
other. 
T bl 8 5 C l l' b ti a e : a cu atmg ene It accor mg to N orweglan practlce 
Traveller benefit Operator benefit 
L1T Saved time costs 
L1K Saved driving costs, car 
L1B air Saved ticket costs, air L1Bair Red. ticket income, air 
L1Bbus Saved ticket costs, bus L1Bbus Red. ticket incorne, bus 
L1B train Increased ticket costs, train L1Btrain Inc. ticket income, train 
L1Dair Red. operating costs, air 
L1Dbus Red. operating costs, bus 
L1Dtrain Inc. operating costs, train 
Consequently according to Norwegian practice one should calculate traveller 
benetit consisting of elements in the left column and operator benetit consisting 
of elements to the right. Jf the assumptions hold that operation and income for 
air and bus are equivalent, Norwegian and German practice here should 
comprise exactly the same elements . There is thus nothing remarkable in 
calculating the benetit of changes in use of means of travel , but it is unusual , 
from a Norwegian point ofview, that all the benetit associated with this should, 
according to the German method, be accumulated in one benetit element. 
Separate calculations for each party would have been more transparent. 
What ECON does however, as far as we understand it, is to ignore everything 
other than time gains for traveliers and operating costs for the new trains. There 
is a footnote comment that changes in ticket costs and driving costs should have 
been taken into consideration if traveller benefit were to be calculated 
completely. 
The difference between VWI's and ECON's calculations in terms of what 
elements are included is therefore driving costs by car and operating costs (or 
ticket costs ifyou will) for air and bus. 
What elements are included is one thing; how they are valued is another. We 
have seen that the time gains are handled somewhat differently in the two 
analyses. The operating costs for the new trains are the same, since the 
Norwegian analysis has adopted the German co st estimate. As regards the 
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elements that in our view should have been inc1uded according to Norwegian 
practice, but which are not inc1uded here, namely the costs for car, air and bus 
for the trave liers who want to travel by train in the development alternative, we 
assume that the standard German values used by VWI are higher than the 
corresponding Norwegian values. For time and budget reasons, VWI did not 
have the opportunity to estimate Norwegian rates. The basis they took was that 
it costs NOK 2.24 more per passenger kilometre for a traveller using car instead 
oftrain. The corresponding rate is NOK 1.52 for changing from bus to train and 
NOK 3.44 from air to train. In the Oslo-Trondheim corridor, this gives an 
annual total of NOK 1,288 million in benefit from modal shift. 
This is the major difference in saved costs that is half the explanation of why 
VWI's analysis shows positive net benefit from high-speed rail, while ECON's 
analysis does not. (The other half of the explanation is the discount rate.) The 
reason is that VWI's calculation of cost savings with changes in choice of 
means of transport both inc1udes effects that ECON has not taken into 
consideration and also values these effects highly. According to Norwegian 
practice, these effects should be taken into account, but they should be valued 
at different rates from those used in Germany. 
In SOU 2009:74, a cost-benefit analysis has been carried out in which the 
benefit of changes in use of means of transport is calculated and included in the 
socioeconomic calculation. The Swedish ca1culation is in accordance with the 
gross method, which is to say that the analysis identifies effects for the 
operators' ticket income and operating costs. The result of the cost-benefit 
analysis is a benefit to cost ratio of 1.15, which is to say that the overall benefit 
is 15 per cent higher than the costs. We will not place any emphasis on the 
result here, since the ca1culation has been criticised for underestimating the 
costs and overestimating the income, but the method is of interest to us. 
The Swedish analysis is an example that the assumption that reduced ticket 
income corresponds to reduced operating costs for air, as ECON implicitly 
assumes, is not commonplace. In the calculations, the income reduction for air 
is estimated to be 50 per cent higher than the reduction in costs. The Swedish 
calculations also show that an assumption that the reduction in ticket income 
for air is equivalent to increased ticket income for rail, as VWI has implicitly 
assumed, is not commonplace either. In the Swedish cost-benefit analysis , the 
ticket income for rail is estimated to increase by more than double the reduction 
in ticket income for air. 
The recommended method in Norway, which is reflected in the Norwegian 
National Rail Administration's Method Manual, is to use the gross method 
where effects for the different parties emerge at the same time as only the net 
effects have an effect on the socioeconomic result. Neither of the analyses we 
have looked at uses the gross method. The net effects that we thereby expect to 
find in respect of effects for traveIlers and operators are changes in time costs 
for the travelIers and changes in the operators' operating costs including 
investment in rolling stock. 
We have found that: 
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Saved time costs are overestimated in ECON's simplified calculation 
Saved time costs are slightly underestimated in VWl's calculation, because 
of the rate for time value for tlights 
The benefit from changes in the choice ofmeans of transport in VWI's 
analysis appears remarkably high. This element alone drives the benefit up 
considerably and the effect is further strengthened by the low discount rate 
that VWI uses ( with a Norwegian level of discount rate, the amount of 
benefit from this element would have been roughly halved). 
Saved costs for air and bus have not be en taken into account in ECON's 
analysis, and neither have driving costs for car. 
We recommend that: 
The operating costs for the transport option and the investments in rolling 
stock should be included in the denominator in the cost-benefit fraction 
only to the extent that they are to be covered by the public budget. 
Traveller and operator benefit should be explicitly shown (even though it is 
not in principle wrong to show only net effects) 
Different unit prices should be assessed for travel by high-speed train and by 
normal train. This applies to both time values and ticket prices and could have 
consequences for both traffic analyses and cost-benefit analyses. 
8.4.4 Consequences for the public sector 
The consequences that normally apply for the public sector with infrastructure 
projects, as we have mentioned before, are infrastructure costs (investment, 
operations and maintenance), any public purchases, changes to tax and duty 
revenues and tax costs. We shall ignore tax and duty revenues here. Tax costs 
will be discussed in a separate section below. 
We shall not comment here on the level of the cost estimate, but on the 
procedure for the cost-benefit analysis. In the Norwegian method, investment 
costs are discounted to a year of reference and a residual value is calculated at 
the end of the analysis period that is discounted back to the year of reference. 
The residual value is based on linear depreciation. On the other hand VWI 
con verts the various investment components into annuities based on the 
lifetime of each individual component, in spite of the fact that the German 
method manual also uses the residual value method. VWI confirms that it is 
normal practice to use annuities since this makes it possible to com pare annual 
cost and benefit. What consequence does this difference in method have? The 
important thing here is the discount rate. With a low rate the difference in the 
results of the two methods will be small. A higher rate will mean that 
investment costs are higher with the annuity method than with linear 
depreciation and a calculation of residual value. 
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It is not necessarily correct to treat the operation of the trains as a public sector 
cost. Public purehases are not disc us sed in either the VWI or the ECON report, 
which is understandable since financing of high-speed rail has not been 
clarified. lf we assume that an operator will operate the trains, then the 
operating costs, including investment in rolling stock, belong under operator 
benefit and not under consequences for the public sector. ECON explicitly 
states that they do not calculate tax costs on operating costs since they assume 
these will be financed from ticket income. That is to say, the operating costs for 
rail are not considered as a public sector cost. VWI on the other hand has not 
commented on how they view the operating costs for rail, but we observe that 
they are inc1uded in the costs in the denominator of the cost-benefit fraetion. If 
the operating costs are not to be covered by the public budget, VWI's cost-
benefit fraction then gives a false picture of the benefit per budget krone. 
The wear and tear costs are part of the operations and maintenance costs of the 
infrastrueture. For rail, these costs are inc1uded in the analyses in the ca1culated 
operations and maintenance costs for the infrastrueture. It may also be relevant 
to allow for reduced wear and tear costs for the forms of transport that williose 
traffic to rail , i.e. road and aviation. This wear and tear will naturally depend on 
the amount oftraffic that is transferred. 
In VWI's presentation, wear and tear is not a specific point. ECON inc1udes 
reduced road wear and tear as a specific point. ECON says in its report that "In 
general terms we can estimate this [the benefit of reduced wear and tear] by 
multiplying the reduced traffic for the various forms of transport on the two 
routes by the length of an average joumey and aset cost per vehicle kilometre 
for wear and tear". We agree with this viewpoint but note that there must be a 
difference between the costs per vehic1e kilometre used by ECON and the rates 
in the Norwegian National Rail Administration's Method Manual. We can make 
the following ca1culation based on VWI's traffic figures and the Norwegian 
National Rail Administration's rates for reduced maintenance costs in other 
forms of transport with the transfer to train : 
Table 8.6: Reduced maintenance costs 
Mill. vehicle NOK per vehicle NOK mill. per Trajjic from km per year km (JR J1 year 
car 38.9 0.33 12.8 
bus 3.4 3.09 10.5 
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air 4.5 3.51 15.7 
Source: VWI (2007a) and Norwegian National Rail Administration (2007b), own 
calculations 
From table 8.6 we can see that the reduction in maintenance costs will be about 
NOK 23 million a year as a result of the reduced road traffic. ECON has 
estimated the reduction in road wear and tear at NOK lA million a year, which 
implies a much lower kilometre cost since the vehicle kilometres are the same. 
ECON also argues that the benefit is intemalised for air traffic, since A vinor is 
pa id by the airlines to cover wear and te ar in the infrastructure. The Norwegian 
National Rail Administration's Method Manual indicates however that reduced 
maintenance costs can be included in respect of traffic transferred from both 
road and aviation. 
8.4.5 Society in general (third party) 
According to the Norwegian National Rail Administration's Method Manual, 
reductions in noise costs should be calculated on the basis of transferred traffic . 
As far as we can see, VWI has used the rates given in the manual, even though 
they do not state where the rate for the new rail line comes from (corresponds 
to NOK 1.43 per vehicle kilometre). It should also be pointed out that the 
figures have been miscalculated in VWI's report. The balance between with and 
without the instance should be NOK lAI million per year for the Oslo-
Trondheim route and NOK 1.39 million per year for Oslo-Gøteborg. VWI 
calculates that only 10 per cent of the track is in are as where people will be 
exposed to noise pollution. 
The two reports put a different value on the benefit of reduced local emissions. 
The method for valuing local emissions is to use values for transferred vehicle 
kilometres in different types of local environments. VWI's estimate is NOK 0.7 
million for the Oslo-Trondheim route. VWI's basis is that 10 per cent of the 
length of track should be included and only the rates in the Norwegian National 
Rail Administration's guidelines for areas of low building density should be 
used. We would ask whether the rates for cities and other built-up areas should 
not be used as a basis here, because as we understand it the 10 per cent of track 
for which the Germans are valuing an effect is in built-up areas. 
ECON argues that "VWl assesses that only 10 per cent of all local emissions 
should be included, while the Norwegian National Rail Administration's rates 
already take into account that part goes through built-up areas" (ECON, 2008, 
page 60), and therefore believes that the VWI estimate should be multiplied by 
a factor of 10. ECON's estimate is therefore NOK 10 million. 
Our assessment is that VWI's estimate is too low. They have used the rates for 
areas of low building density for 10 per cent of the track. We believe that the 10 
per cent VWI uses lies in built-up are as according to the argument used for 
calculating noise pollution. They have therefore not taken into account the 
effect on the other 90 per cent of track. We have made a recalculation of this 
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value with the figures VWI uses (thus we use not 10 per cent of the estimated 
change in vehicIe kilometres, but 100 per cent), allowing for 10 per cent of the 
track to be valued as an average of the values for cities and other built-up are as 
and the remaining 90 per cent at the value for are as of low building density. We 
thus arrive at an estimate of NOK 9 million a year in benefit. ECON's estimate 
is closer to ours. 
Transferring traffic from road and air helps to save environmental costs in the 
form of reduced CO2 emissions. According to the Norwegian method, costs in 
respect of global pollution should be based in principle on the costs of adapting 
emissions to Norway's obligations under the Kyoto Protocol for the period 
2008-2012. Norway can meet the obligation through measures in other 
countries either through direct investment or by buying quotas in Europe. The 
price for buying quotas in Europe can therefore be used as a proxy for the cost 
of meeting the obligation and the price of the CO2 quotas can therefore be used 
as an indicator for these costs. The Norwegian National Rail Administration's 
Method Manual JD 205 states that the most long term contraets listed on 
NordPool are the ones to be used. 80th ECON and VWI have used the price of 
CO2 quotas as an indicator, but VWI has used a much higher price than ECON. 
VWI has followed the rate recommended in the German method. The German 
method is also based on the co st of meeting specific national targets, but 
follow's Germany's targets. CO2 emissions are valued based on the cost of 
meeting the German target, which is an 80 per cent reduction in emissions by 
2020 in relation to the 1987 level. SeveraI studies have estimated that the cost 
of meeting the German target is between 163 € and 205 € per tonne. The 
method also recommends using the highest rate so as also to capture some of 
the other greenhouse gases. 
ECON has followed the Norwegian method and has used as a basis the CO2 
quota price currently quoted by NordPool. When the report was written (2008), 
this price level was around 25-30 € per tonne. ECON chose to use a price of 
NOK 273 .33 per tonne, which is considerably lower than a price of 205 € (205 
€ is equivalent to NOK 1,640 at an exchange rate of NOK 8 = l €). It should be 
mentioned that the present quota price is considerably lower, at 12-13 € per 
tonne. The price has dropped to this extent largely due to the financial crisis 
and the cIimate summit in Copenhagen not resulting in a global climate 
agreement. 
The large difference in the CO2 quota price is primarily due to the differences 
in the national targets. As mentioned the Norwegian method is based on the 
cost of adapting the emissions to Norway's obligations under the Kyoto 
agreement and it is appropriate to use this valuation for emissions reductions up 
until 2012. For emissions reductions after 2012, which is the case in both 
reports, the extent to which it is still appropriate to use the Kyoto agreement as 
a basis should be diseussed. ECON diseusses the issue in more detail and refers 
to the climate compromise, the aim ofwhich is to exceed the Kyoto obligations. 
It is therefore expected that the cost of measures will rise. ECON refers to a 
report published by Statisties Norway that performs an assessment, 
commissioned by the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (now the Climate 
00Wl 
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and Pollution Agency), of future quota prices, given the EU's climate goals for 
2020. The Statistics Norway report concludes with a price of NOK 800 per 
tonne. Even so, ECON decodes not to use this price on the basis that the EU's 
targets cannot be compared with the Norwegian ones. It is however pointed out 
that the Norwegian authorities should arrive at a newestimate for the valuation 
of emissions after 2012. 
Klimakur 2020, an expert gro up made up of Norwegian government agencies, 
is carrying out an assessment of future quota prices based on the EU target. The 
report looks more closely at expected quota prices for 2012, 2015 and 2020 and 
on towards 2030. The report points out that there is a great deal of uncertainty 
connected with future quota price development, since future political decisions 
will have great significance for this. For the European quota system however, 
the future development of climate policy over the next few years is fairly 
predictable, since the EU's climate and energy package was presented in 2008 
and included a target of a 20 per cent cut in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Kl imakur 2020 concluded that quota prices of 18, 26 and 40 € in 2012, 2015 
and 2020 respectively are realistic. An assessment of the prices in the quota 
markets in 2030 has been carried out by Point Carbon for Klimakur 2020, given 
the assumptions specified in the global model that formed the basis for the 2020 
estimate. Ifthe 2 degree target is to be achieved, this will give a quota price of 
about 100 € per ton in 2030. That would mean a substantial increase between 
2020 and 2030. This is however highly uncertain, since many assumptions 
would have to be realised for this assessment to be correct. 
As mentioned, the VWI report uses a rate of 205 € per tonne, which is more 
than 50 per cent higher than Point Carbon's estimate for 2030 and more than 80 
per cent higher than ECON's price. Based on the Statistics Norway and 
Klimakur 2020 assessments, it is estimated that the future quota price will rise. 
Even so, none of the reports is anywhere near the German level of 205 € per 
tonne. ECON has used Norwegian standards and a quota price of NOK 273.33 
per tonne is not far off the 2020 estimate of Klimakur 2020 (even though this 
analysis was made before the ECON report was written). It is however far from 
Statistics Norway's estimates. But ECON has used Norwegian methods and it 
therefore appears that ECON has used the correct rate. With a quota price of 
NOK 273.33 per tonne, in comparison with VWI's price of NOK 1,640 per 
tonne, the benefit will be NOK 106 million lower in ECON's ca\culation. 
It would however still be sensible to carry out a review of how future quotas 
should be priced, especially for projects with an extended time horizon, as 
ECON also points out in its report. 
VWI assesses the benefit of reduced accident costs by using the Norwegian 
National Rail Administration's rates for changed traffic volurne for other 
competing means of transport. This is assessed at NOK 13.3 million per year. 
ECON points out that the German method does not distinguish between costs 
that are distributed between internalised and extemal costs. Apart from this, 
ECON does not have any great methodological objections to what VWI has 
done and uses the same value (NOK 13 million per year) in its ca\culations. 
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Our assessment of what has been done is that both ECON and VWI have 
allowed for changed traffic volume on other means of transport giving a gross 
reduction in accident costs for these means of transport. Neither VWI nor 
ECON has allowed for increased traffic leading to increased accident damage 
and injury for rail. This means that the benefit of reduced accident costs should 
be reduced by the number of vehicle kilometres by which train traffic is 
changed multiplied by the Norwegian National Rail Administration's rates 
(table 8.10 in the Norwegian National Rail Administration's Method Manual 
JD20S). High-speed trains cannot be directly compared with the existing trains 
in Norway. The rates should also really be revised therefore. 
A well-integrated labour market in Europe will be a benefit for Norway as a 
whole. In the analysis made by VWI, the effects of better international relations 
are inc1uded as a benefit. This benefit is calculated by using the proportion of 
journeys that are estimated to be international multiplied by 10 per cent of 
operating and train investment costs and 10 per cent of the benefit connected 
with modal shift and newly created traffic. We are critical of the way this item 
has been ca1culated. Neither does the Norwegian National Rail Administration 
include such considerations in its Method Manual. ECON believes that this 
effect is reflected through changes in ticket prices and the like, with which we 
agree. Time values, that is the benefit of reduced traveIling time, reflect the 
benefit of the activity at the destination. 
The benefit of international relations should not be included as a benefit 
element in a cost-benefit analysis since these are projects that are not 
particularly directed at improving collaboration between countries. We believe 
therefore that international relations should not be included in the cost-benefit 
analysis for this project. 
VWI has included employment effects in its analysis, both during the 
construction period and as a result of operations. The Germans use rates for 
finding the benefit that com es from the number of new jobs per NOK 100 
million invested. ECON's review of these calculations points out that the 
benefit has been calculated incorrectly in the German method, and also that the 
benefit of employment effects is not inc1uded in Norwegian cost-benefit 
analyses. 
The Norwegian method for cost-benefit analyses does not include employment 
effects. The Norwegian labour market is not characterised by high structural 
unemployment, as is the German labour market. In the short term, and seen in 
isolation, development will lead to resources having to be moved from other 
parts of society if there is not available capacity where these resources are 
obtained. The development areas (the routes of the tracks) are relatively thinly 
populated, so that it will not be possible to obtain the entire labour force needed 
to develop the high-speed rail line from among unemployed living close to the 
development area. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that development will 
lead to no other effects than that resources must be moved from other parts of 
the country to the railway project under development. Seen as a whole, 
unemployment in Norway is low, and even though the fmancial crisis of 2009 
has led to an increase in unemployment in the building industry, m our 
OOWI 
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assessment there is not nearly enough available labour to pennit this to be 
directly transferred to a rail project. It is therefore also reasonable to suppose 
that part of the labour force to be used for developing high-speed rail will come 
from abroad. There will also be a certain amount of new employment of staff 
along the line of the route and for operations, but this is also thought to be 
marginal in terms of employment. 
AGENDA Utredning & Utvikling has carried out an analysis of social effects 
of various rail projects in Norway, in which they have looked at the 
employment effects of developing the railway between Sandvika and Asker. 
They found that the project employed alm ost 5,400 people, distributed over five 
years. They also write "The top year was 2003 , when the project gave a 
combined employment effect equivalent to 1,700 full time jobs. It must be 
underlined that this does not necessarily refer to new jobs." They also write that 
foreign workers have been used to a small extent. 
Our assessment is that employment effects, both during the construetion phase 
and in operation, should not be included in a cost-benefit analysis. The situation 
in Norway indicates that a development of this size is more like ly to lead to 
increased pressure on the competition for the available labour force, which will 
lead in turn to increased pay and higher prices. On this basis, employment 
effects are not something that should be included in the analysis as a benefit; 
they should either be omitted or included as a cost. 
A distinetion must be made between, on the one hand, employment effects 
relating to development and operation of the high-speed rail line and, on the 
other hand, effects on the labour market that the new line might lead to. Future 
investigations into high-speed rail in Norway should include an assessment of 
the additional benefit (refer to the discussion in the section "Monetised and 
non-monetised effects"). 
In the case of major infrastrueture investments such as this, which affect severaI 
regions, it may be of interest to study regional effects. As re gards indirect 
effects of the investment itself, the PANDA model can distribute these by 
industries in each region (at county level for example). In respect of distribution 
of the effects of the transport option, the results of the cost-benefit analysis can 
be presented by region. 
8.4.6 Tax costs 
Because of distortion effects and administrative costs relating to tax collection, 
according to the Ministry of Finanee guidelines a cost of20 per cent ofpublicly 
financed investment should be added . 
The Danish method for cost-benefit analyses (Manual for socioeconomic 
analysis, 2004) says that "In Denmark distortion losses are reckoned at 20 per 
cent, according to the Ministry of Finance guidelines of November 1999. The 
distortion loss should be added to net public costs in the case of public sector 
finance, as well as the va lue of the time of those trave Il ing on public service, ref 
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below." This is the same rate as is recommended for Norwegian analyses, 
except that in Norway the costs of travel are not included in this context. 
VWI has ignored such a tax financing cost entirely in its report. ECON on the 
other hand has inc1uded this cost for all infrastructure investments in the high-
speed rail project. 
The effects of increased tax costs will be especially important in this project, 
where the real investment is so high. This applies on the assumption that grants 
or subsidies to other are as of government responsibility are not reduced. The 
tax cost should thus be included in line with the Norwegian method. 
8.5 Assessment of sensitivity analyses and risk 
management 
8.5.1 Description of risk and uncertainty 
Metier has carried out an uncertainty analysis of the high-speed rail project in 
Norway. They c1assify the uncertainty factors as social/political objectives, 
project organisation and competence, the contractor market, various interested 
parties, size of project, complexity and need for research and development. 
Metier uses a c1assification model that is similar to that described in the 
Norwegian National Rail Administration's Method Manual JD20S. We have no 
methodological objections to what Metier has done. 
VWI used data from Metier's uncertainty analysis in its own analysis. 
The Metier and VWI approach has laid great emphasis on risk and uncertainty 
in the investment costs, but not in other elements that belong to a cost-benefit 
analysis, such as uncertainty in benefit components or traffic projections. 
Metier briefly mentions in its analysis that different interested parties will be 
affected by the project. ECON makes a good presentation of uncertainty factors 
in its summary, even though it has not dedicated a separate section to them. 
8.5.2 Sensitivity analyses 
VWI has not carried out any sensitivity analyses of key elements in its report. 
ECON has carried out a sensitivity analysis. The elements it has considered are 
shown in table 8.7. 
Table 8.7: Elements in ECON's sensitivity analysis 
Parameters that change Description 
CO2 prices In its analysis, ECON set a CO2 price of NOK 
273.33 per tonne. Here it is increased to NOK 1,649 
per tonne, which is the same value as VWI uses 
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Economic growth Assumption of a real growth of 2 per cent in annual 
benefit and operating costs 
Uncertainty supplement Reduce infrastructure investments from a total of 
to infrastructure NOK 57,864 million to NOK 48,242 million 
investments 
High infrastructure costs Costs are raised to the 90th percentile of NOK 
80,800 million (from Metier's uncertainty analysis) 
Low infrastructure costs Costs are reduced to the 10th percentile of NOK 
40,500 million (from Metier's uncertainty analysis) 
Halving the num ber of Reduction of number of traveIlers from 1.95 million 
travelIers to 0.975 million 
Doubling the number of Increasing the number oftravellers to 3.9 million 
trave liers 
Discount rate Discount rate is reduced from 4.5 per cent to 2 per 
cent 
Tax costs Tax costs of 20 per cent are removed from the 
investment costs 
Longer time horizon Increase of time horizon to 94 years 
Note: ECON has also combined some ofthese parameter changes 
Source: ECON (2008) 
It is important to perform sensitivity analyses so as to be able to see what drives 
the results of s cost-benefit analysis. For example, the total of the annuities of 
the infrastructure investments will be cIose to NOK 3 billion a year with a rate 
of 4.5 per cent, against about NOK 1.6 billion with a rate of2 per cent, such as 
VWl uses. ECON has in our opinion performed a good sensitivity analysis and 
finds that none of the changes they have made can make the project profitable. 
8.6 Summary and recommendations 
A comparisan of the socioeconomic analyses of high-speed trains made by 
VWI and ECON has revealed three important differences: 
There is a difference between VWI and ECON regarding what effects of 
modal shift are incIuded. In COWI's view, in this area ECON has ignored 
the potentially important elements in the socioeconomic use of high-speed 
trains. COWI believes that the German procedure is in agreement with the 
Norwegian National Rail Administration's guidelines for socioeconomic 
analyses, even though the technical calculation set up may be unusual from 
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a Norwegian point ofview. We also believe that VWI has not sufficiently 
investigated how the use of the modal shift is quantified and valued and we 
can only wonder about the level of cost savings from transfer oftraffic. 
ECON has used a discount rate of 4.5 per cent, which corresponds to the 
recommended rate in Norwegian cost-benefit analyses. VWI has used a 
rate of 2 per cent, which corresponds to the German recommendation. 
About half the difference in caIculated benefit between VWI and ECON is 
due to different rate estimates. COWI recommends that socioeconomic 
analyses of high-speed rail should follow ECON's procedure. 
Unlike ECON, VW} has not included a tax financing co st. COWI 
recommends using ECON's proeedure, which is in line with Norwegian 
practice. 
Our recommendation for further analyses is: 
New analyses should use a gross method that sets out the effects for 
operators, traveIlers and the public sector in detail. Neither VWI nor 
ECON has used such a procedure. The result is that the analyses are not 
very transparent and are difficuIt to compare. It can also sometimes be 
difficuIt to fully understand the simplifications made in the reports as a 
result of the socioeconomic caIculation not be ing completely detailed. 
Estimates of market share and time vaIues are critical for caIculating the 
benefit of building high-speed rail lines. There are no differences in 
principle between ECON and VWI's procedures. As shown in the market 
analysis in section 3 however, there are other reports and experiences that 
question whether the area of competition between air and high-speed train 
is well enough represented in the VWI report. Questions may also be 
raised whether the time values that are used in the VWI and ECON 
caIculations are representative for traveIlers by high-speed train. New 
socioeconomic analyses should go into these issues in more detail. 
The ongoing development of methodology in socioeconomic analyses of 
transport investments may introduee new aspects that are not part of 
current practice: added benefit, real price development and the 
reliability of traveIling time. It is worth considering whether these should 
be inc1uded in further investigation into high-speed rail lines in Norway. 
Added benefit is particularly relevant for large infrastrueture investments. 
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9 Recommendations 
In this section we shall make recommendations regarding the way forward in 
the investigation of high-speed rail in Norway. 
9.1 Market, social economics and financing 
For further work we recommend that a more thorough feasibility study is made 
of high-speed rail in Norway, considering in particular the following factors: 
A through investigation into and justification of the delimitation of the 
relevant market. 
Clearly documented assumptions with regard to ticket prices and 
travelling times for both high-speed rail and competing forms of transport. 
A c1ear defrnition of the reference alternative, which inc1udes projects 
planned to be carried out by the Norwegian National Rail Administration 
and NSB, as weU as road projects. 
Now socioeconomic analyses should consider the issues of market share, 
time values and modal shift in detail. 
We recommend an examination of modal shift between high-speed rail 
and other forms of transport, based on a more thorough study of the effect 
the introduction of high-speed railon air traffic in comparable cases. 
New socioeconomic analyses should use a gross method that sets out the 
effects for operators, traveIlers and the public sector in detail. 
Added benefit, real price development and the reliability of travelling 
time. It is worth considering whether these should be included in further 
investigation into high-speed rail lines in Norway. Added benefit is 
particularly relevant for large infrastructure investments. 
For implementation of the development, a model should be chosen that ensures 
certainty about financing of the entire project and that provides the optimum 
division of risk between the principals. The model should also give the best 
possible incentive to cost-effectiveness and to maintaining the schedule. The 
model must safeguard the quality requirements and ensure a total view of all 
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phases, so that quality in the operational phase is taken into consideration 
during the construction phase. 
9.2 Technical parameters and costs 
For further work on technical parameters and costs, we recommend that a more 
thorough feasibility study is made of high-speed rail in Norway, considering 
the following factors: 
Developing and com paring line routing on a scale of 1/50 000 with a view 
to reducing the proportion of tunnel as much as possible 
Comparing and testing the traffic models of different operational plans 
(departure frequency, stops, fares and speed) 
Repeated optimisation proeess with a view to reducing construction costs 
and increasing ticket income 
Consideration of a step by step upward adjustment to 300-350 kph of 
the existing Oslo-Bergen and Oslo-Trondheim routes, beginning with a 
rectification of all sharp curves at the same time as avoiding tunnel 
construction. This would be to achieve the highest possible retum on 
investment. 
Consideration should be given to introducing tilting trains on lines that 
will not be upgraded first. Both Sweden and Finland have decided on this 
approach. 
Because of the many stops on the Oslo-Kristiansand-Stavanger corridor, 
the feasibility of upgrading the existing line to Intercity instead of high-
speed should be considered. 
We recommend that a better correlation between operations and 
optimising of income is achieved, so that actual operations correspond 
with what the market expects in terms of the num ber of trains and their 
capacity. 
We recommend that an assessment be made of double track high-speed 
raillines in Norway. 
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